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Throughout the world, protected areas have been established to preserve biodiversity and 
natural ecosystems, but they are constantly facing economic development pressure from 
surrounding communities. In order to reconcile such conflicts, co-management is sometimes 
proposed as a solution for both conservation and community development. Western literature 
suggests that non-science knowledge (local, Indigenous etc.) can make a vital contribution if 
communities are empowered to participate in environmental management. But there are very 
few such studies relating to China, particularly concerning local knowledge of the Han people, 
which is the predominant culture. This study of Yancheng National Nature Reserve (YNNR) 
helps fill this gap. YNNR is the first and largest tidal flat nature reserve in China dedicated to 
protecting Red-crowned Crane and other rare migratory birds and their habitats. It is also an 
international biosphere reserve in UNESCO’s Man and Biosphere Program (MAB) and a 
wetland of International Importance in the Ramsar Convention List of Wetlands. The aim of 
the research was to examine the local knowledge relating to the habitat of the protected Red-
crowned Crane possessed by the local community, and their aspirations for the use of this 
knowledge in the management of the reserve. The research also examined how nature reserve 
management staff and scientific researchers perceive the value and use of the local 
knowledge as well as to discover the challenges of and opportunities for the integration of 
local knowledge into the management of YNNR.  
 
Through on-site observations and semi-structured interviews with local community members, 
nature reserve staff and scientific researchers, the research found that although the locals have 
detailed knowledge about fishery, farming, salt production and reed production, they have 
limited contemporary knowledge concerning the rare birds and their habitats. This appears to 
be preventing them from contributing to co-management of the nature reserve. Both the 
nature reserve staff and the local people underestimated the value of local knowledge, so the 
current management regime fails to include such knowledge into the management. However, 
there are opportunities for the reserve to facilitate local knowledge protection and integration, 
if the reserve staff can change their perceptions, promote eco-friendly development, and help 
revive some of the traditional farming techniques and local specialty production knowledge. 
The research contributes to international perspectives on co-management through its finding 
that the western concept of co-management does not have a good fit in YNNR and possibly 
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across China more generally, because the general lack of democracy and equity tends to stall 
attempts at public participation and power sharing. Although the reserve has the dual goals of 
conservation and development under the biosphere reserve model, it is difficult to implement 
due to power imbalances and inequity. Biodiversity is still under threat and there are added 
conflicts and tensions within the region because of insufficient compensation and unequal 
benefit distribution in relation to local people, and weak controls on development in the 
reserve by other (non-local) interests. In general, western concept collaborative conservation 
may be incompatible with China’s political situation and development model. The traditional 
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1 Chapter I   Introduction 
 
The master said: “Yew, shall I teach you what knowledge is? When you 
know a thing, to hold that you know it; and when you do not know a thing, 
to allow that you do not know it; - this is knowledge.” 
The master said: “there may be those who act without knowing why. I do 
not do so. Hearing much and selecting what is good and following it, 
seeing much and keeping it in memory; this is the second style of 
knowledge.” 
The master said: “if a man keeps cherishing his old knowledge, so as 
continually to be acquiring new, he may be a teacher of others.” 
 
Confucian Analects (Legge 1960) 
 
The above statements are excerpts from Chinese Classic Confucian Analects which 
are the teachings from the most famous ancient Chinese philosopher and educator - 
Confucius - about knowledge around 3000 years ago. He emphasised that one should 
be truthful about knowing: if you do not know something, admit it and try to hear and 
see much, and select what is good and follow it. He also stressed that old knowledge 
is as important as new knowledge, so man should keep cherishing old knowledge as 
well as acquiring new. That is the traditional way of knowing in China, and it may be 
also true for traditional knowledge throughout the world.  
 
Long before the development of science and the arrival of scientific management 
regimes, the natural resources of the globe existed and thrived under human systems 
of natural resource stewardship (Berkes 2005, Boyce et al. 2007, Folke et al. 2009, 
Ross 2011, Taylor et al. 2014). This stewardship approach was embodied in systems 
of local or Indigenous knowledge that support the continuing livelihoods of 
communities within particular ecological regions (Berkes 2008, Pickering Sherman et 
al. 2010, Ross 2011, Fernández-Giménez and Fillat Estaque 2012). As the wisdom 
and know-how of millennia, traditional knowledge is the most essential possession of 
Indigenous groups, its practice and application is learned through experience and 




The expansion of capitalism accompanied by the expansion of western science 
facilitated the free flow of resources from peripheries of the globe to core centres of 
production and capital accumulation (Ross 2011), but impacted on local knowledge 
systems. Throughout the world, intensive domestication of plants and animals and 
rapid extraction of natural resources were introduced by Europeans, with limited 
concerns of sustainability, ecological capacity, or climate variability (Cronon 1983). 
As Western science-based resource management emerged, particularly where aligned 
with corporate behaviour, it often excluded a wide variety of “small” community 
natural resource users, and has often failed to deliver environmentally and 
economically sustainable extraction (Davis and Ruddle 2010). As a result, 
environment degradation and biodiversity loss has occurred in many areas throughout 
the world. In contrast, many of the landscapes where local and Indigenous people 
maintain their traditional livelihoods retain their beauty and biodiversity, and continue 
to provide ecosystem services (Walker Painemilla et al. 2010).  
 
In China, as in other parts of the world, many national parks and protected areas have 
been created over traditionally utilised areas, and local and Indigenous peoples have 
been deliberately removed from them to fulfil the European visions of parks as the 
embodiment of the Garden of Eden (Spence 2000, Xu and Melick 2007, Foggin 2008). 
However, such exclusive policies have created park-people conflicts when local and 
Indigenous communities are evicted from their land or restricted their activities 
according to management plans that privilege wildlife management over the rights of 
local or Indigenous resource users (Ross 2011).  
 
Although some scholars believe that local or Indigenous knowledge is irrelevant to 
natural resource management, there are an increasing number of scientists and 
resource managers who recognise the legitimacy and relevance of traditional and 
Indigenous knowledge to scientific natural resource management (Sillitoe 1998, 
Fernandez-Gimenez 2000, Kimmerer 2002, Ross 2011). Over the past three decades, 
management agencies, particularly those charged with the management of protected 
areas, have become increasingly interested in providing opportunities to promote local 
or Indigenous involvement in natural resource management decision making (Young 
et al. 2001, Borrini et al. 2004, Plummer and Fennell 2009, Ross 2011, Hill 2011). 
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Various models of co-operative or collaborative management (usually termed ‘co-
management’), a shared approach to protected-areas management, are used in a range 
of different formats throughout the world (Nursey-Bray and Rist 2009, Ross 2011, 
Bown et al. 2013, Stevens 2014).  
 
Internationally there is a considerable literature on the problems and benefits of 
incorporating Indigenous knowledge in protected area management, but less on the 
topic of local knowledge incorporation (the differences between local knowledge, 
Indigenous knowledge and traditional knowledge will be discussed in chapter III). 
Despite the fact that China has over 5000 years of history of civilization and Chinese 
people have developed extensive and intensive local knowledge about their 
environment, there are remarkably few studies of local knowledge in China. This may 
be largely due to the apparent preference of modern Chinese people for the western 
scientific knowledge which drives modern economic development. The increasing 
speed of development since the 1980s has caused a rapid disappearance of traditional 
ways of living and the original landscape, with the few relatively untouched 
ecosystems being under some form of protected area management. Little is known 
about the impacts of this development on local knowledge, and the potential for such 
knowledge to contribute to the management of protected areas in China. This is the 
topic that I became interested in exploring.  
 
As a Chinese (Han) national with an undergraduate background in tourism, and 
through extensive travel around China, I appreciated China’s astonishing scenery and 
biodiversity. However, because of rapid economic development, many protected areas 
are greatly threatened by serious pollution and environmental degradation (Xu and 
Melick 2007, Kram et al. 2012). My Master’s degree in natural resource and protected 
area management in Canada provided me with a broader and deeper understanding of 
conservation issues. Subsequently, through introducing and translating environmental 
educational films, and working with environmental NGOs, I discovered many sound 
practices and inspiring ideas around the world for conservation and sustainable 
development. This background triggered my interest in studying specifically the role 




Yancheng National Nature Reserve (YNNR) is a good place to carry out such a study, 
in part because the UNDP/GEF Wetland Biodiversity Conservation and Sustainable 
Use in China Project from 1999 to 2008 required co-management with local people in 
YNNR (Jiangsu Provincial Government 2011). The reserve is located on the east 
coast of China in Jiangsu province, and it was accepted as an international Biosphere 
Reserve in 1992. It is the largest inter-tidal mudflat and salt marsh coast remaining in 
China (Ma et al. 2009). Stretching for nearly 600 km along the coast of central and 
northern Jiangsu province, the reserve is an important staging area for many migratory 
birds and more than 92 species over-winter in the area (Yancheng Biosphere Reserve 
Administration 2013). The significance of the project area's biodiversity centres on its 
overwhelming importance for globally rare and threatened water birds, which includes 
nearly 100% of the Chinese wintering population of Red-crowned Crane (Grus 
japonensis) and significant wintering populations of 11 other globally threatened 
species (Ma et al. 2009). The local people are engaged in fishing and farming, with a 
long tradition of salt production which gives the name of the city (Yancheng means 
salt city) (Li et al. 2004a).  
 
The intention with this research is to document local knowledge relating to YNNR in 
Jiangsu province, and examine how co-management and local knowledge integration 
have been applied in the nature reserve. Since China has a long-established tradition 
of human and nature coexisting, local knowledge may be of great importance for 
sustainable development for China and for the world as a whole. More fundamentally, 
I am interested in whether the concepts of shared management and knowledge 
systems, which are ideas that originated in western culture, are also relevant to 
Chinese culture. The unique cultural and social context of China, the applicability of 
co-management and knowledge integration in China’s nature reserve could be 
instructive and suggestive of ways forward for other developing countries. Under this 
guiding aim, the research sets out to answer the following research questions:  
 
1. What types of local knowledge does the local community possess in YNNR relating 
to the reed ecosystem which is the habitat of the protected Red-crowned Crane, and 





2. What are the perceptions and practices of nature reserve management staff and 
scientific researchers towards the use of the local knowledge held by local community 
members in the management of the reserve? 
 
3. To what extent do current management mechanisms integrate local knowledge, and 
what are the challenges of and opportunities for the integration of local knowledge 
into co-management of YNNR? 
 
To answer the above research questions, I used a single case study design and carried 
out semi-structured interviews with local community members, nature reserve staff 
and scientific researchers to explore their local knowledge and perceptions concerning 
nature reserve management. I also used on-site observation and document analysis to 
further inform my analysis. My results are discussed in detail in Chapters IV and V.  
 
The thesis is structured in six chapters following this introduction: context, literature 
review, methodology, results, discussion and conclusion. The next chapter, Chapter II, 
is the context chapter that provides some background information about China, its 
biodiversity and environmental governance, protected area management and land 
tenure, as well as an introduction to YNNR. Chapter III is the literature review that 
focuses on academic research, both worldwide and relating to China, concerning co-
management and local knowledge. Chapter IV is focused on methodology and 
explains the approach and methods adopted to carry out this research. Chapter V is the 
results chapter and it summarises the data collected and presents it in different themes. 
In the discussion chapter, Chapter VI, I consider these results in relation to the 
broader context and the literature. In the final chapter, conclusions regarding the 


















2 Chapter II   Context 
 
This chapter provides a general context of China as the background for the study. It 
begins with a brief introduction of Chinese biodiversity and describes the government 
structure and administration practices concerning biodiversity conservation. As 
protected area management is an important aspect of biodiversity conservation, the 
land tenure and management problems of protected areas in China are examined.  The 
study site of Yancheng National Nature Reserve in Jiangsu Province is then described 
and the Chapter ends by highlighting the challenges and threats facing the Nature 
Reserve. Although much of the information in this chapter was assembled through a 
detailed review of peer-reviewed and grey literature, and contains rich data which 
could be presented as research results in later chapters, I chose to keep all context 
related information together in this chapter in order to present an integrated picture of 
the complex historical, legal and political context of China.  
 
2.1 Introducing China 
 
China has the largest population of any country in the world, and is the third largest 
country in area (surpassed only by Russia and Canada) (Encyclopædia Britannica Inc. 
2015). With over 1.36 billion people, ¾ of whom live on less than 20 percent of its 
territory, China has a high population density averaging 143 persons per square 
kilometer (National Bureau of Statistics of China 2015), imposing enormous burdens 
on the environment. In addition, the dramatically increased demand for energy and 
natural resources of all kinds which accompanied the country’s tremendous economic 
development from 1980s has resulted in pronounced biodiversity loss in China (Yu 
and Czarnezki 2013). These pressures of population and development form the 




Despite recent massive biodiversity loss (it is estimated that 15% to 20% of wild 
vascular plants are endangered, 233 vertebrate species face extinction and about 44% 
of wild animals are in decline (CBD 2015a)), China is still one of the 12 countries 
with the richest biodiversity in the world (Yu 2010). According to China’s National 
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Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan (2011-2030), there are 34,984 species of 
vascular plants (of which 17,300 are endemic, ranking China third in the world after 
Brazil and Colombia), and 6,445 species of vertebrates (667 being endemic) (Ministry 
of Environmental Protection 2010). There are 1,371 species of birds (placing China 
first in the world) and 3,862 fresh water fish species which account for 20.3% of the 
world’s total (CBD 2015a). China is also one of the eight main global centers of 
origin for crops, with nearly 10,000 species of crops, including their wild relatives 
(Ministry of Environmental Protection 2008). In marine areas, some 20,278 marine 
species are recorded, representing over 10% of the world’s total (CBD 2015a). 
 
China’s species diversity can be attributed to its large size, great physical range of 
conditions and the fact that it contains ancient centers of evolution and dispersion as 
well as Pleistocene refugia of the Ice Ages (Mackinnon 1996). Covering 
approximately 9.6 million km
2
, China spans 5,500 km and 50 degrees of latitude from 
north to south, covering multiple temperature zones from cold temperate to tropical 
(National Bureau of Statistics of China 2015). Precipitation mainly comes from 
monsoons that originate in the Pacific and Indian oceans: as a result, the eastern and 
south central areas of China are moist and wet, while the northwest is arid and 
bordered by a transitional semi-arid zone of steppe vegetation (Encyclopædia 
Britannica Inc. 2015). Major land cover types of China’s land mass include (in 
descending order of percentage cover): grasslands (33%); forests (21%); desert and 
salt flats (20%); barren lands (7%); shrub lands (4%); wetlands, rivers, and streams 
(2%); and glaciers (‹1%) (Kram et al. 2012).  
 
China is experiencing an unprecedented period of economic growth. As a result, 
China has become the world’s second largest economy today from one of the world’s 
poorest countries 30 years ago (Encyclopædia Britannica Inc. 2015). Based on trends 
in economic development, population growth, and land use, China’s natural landscape 
will experience significant and increasing pressures well into the future (Ministry of 
Environmental Protection 2008). These pressures have already impacted 
environmental quality and led to a greater threat to biodiversity in China. Many 
indicators demonstrate such impact, for example, increase of river and lake 
sedimentation; decrease of lake and groundwater levels; loss of oasis and vegetation 
in arid areas; shrinking of natural forests; reclamation and destruction of grasslands; 
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red tides in marine ecosystems; beach erosion and seawater encroachment; decreasing 
wildlife populations; and many rare plant and animal species in danger of extinction 
(Yu and Czarnezki 2013). Threats to China’s biodiversity come from several sources, 
such as degradation or loss of habitats, excessive exploitation of natural resources, 
environmental pollution, large-scale cultivation of single species, invasive plants and 
animals, wetland reclamation and other human activities (McBeath and McBeath 
2006, Ministry of Environmental Protection 2014).  
 
Fortunately, positive changes are also occurring. The government has improved its 
environmental legislation and management systems and has integrated biodiversity 
into national economic and social development plans and sectoral development plans 
(Ministry of Environmental Protection 2008, 2014). Many actions aimed at 
biodiversity conservation have been implemented, including: strengthening 
conservation systems; restoring degraded ecosystems; controlling environmental 
pollution; strengthening science and technology research; promoting public 
participation and increasing investments in conservation (Ministry of Environmental 
Protection 2014). As a result, the trend of ecological degradation has been somewhat 
diminished in some areas. For example, functions in some ecosystems have recovered 
and the populations of some key protected species have been increasing (Ministry of 
Environmental Protection 2014). However, the biodiversity decline trend has not been 
fundamentally contained, with the main issues including: (a) inadequate legal and 
institutional systems; (b) low-level awareness of conservation; (c) conflicts between 
conservation and development and use; (d) inadequate financing or investment; and, 
(d) inadequate scientific research (Ministry of Environmental Protection 2014).  
 
2.1.2 Environmental Governance  
 
China governs the country according to law, and the Constitution is the fundamental 
law of the nation and has supreme legal authority. According to Article 57 and Article 
58 of the Constitution, the National People's Congress of the People's Republic of 
China is the highest organ of state power. The National People's Congress and its 
Standing Committee exercise the legislative power of the state. The Communist Party 
of China (CPC) is the party in power and the Central Government technically 
maintains authority over all administrative divisions in the country (Kram et al. 2012). 
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Within the central government, China’s chief executive organ - the State Council - is 
authorized to enact administrative regulations pursuant to national and constitutional 
law, while its ministries, commissions and departments are competent to issue 
administrative rules (Beyer 2006).  
 
Under the State Council, the Commission for the Protection of Environmental and 
Natural Resources (ENRPC) has, since 1984, coordinated environmental protection 
work and developed environment-related policies and guidelines (Beyer 2006). The 
Ministry of Environment Protection (MEP) is responsible for supervision of 
environment related issues at the national level and has nationwide control over 
environment protection throughout the country (China.org.cn 2003). Apart from MEP, 
there are at least nine ministries that are frequently involved in environment 
management. Figure 3 describes the structure of China’s environmental 
administration system at the national level (Xu and Melick 2007):  
 




















































































































































































































The following bullet points describe duties for each ministry shown in Figure 3. This 
is based on the information from China.org.cn (2003), Beyer (2006), McBeath and 
McBeath (2006), Kram et al. (2012): 
 Ministry of Environmental Protection - Responsible for the supervision and 
coordination of ecological protection including the development of ecological 
protection plans, the assessment of environmental quality, the monitoring of 
natural resource exploitation activities, ecological reconstruction and the 
restoration of damaged ecosystems. MEP also provides overall coordination of 
the designation and management of national nature reserves, and some nature 
reserves including Biosphere Reserves are directly under its jurisdiction. 
 Ministry of Land and Resources - Responsible for the planning, administration, 
protection and “rational utilization” of land, marine, mineral, and other natural 
resources, and for administering the conversion between different land uses. The 
State Oceanic Administration under its supervision is responsible for designation 
and management of marine protected areas, including some coastal wetlands. 
 Ministry of Agriculture - Responsible for the management and development of 
agricultural resources such as arable land, fisheries, grasslands, beaches, and 
wetlands which are “suitable for agriculture”. Also responsible for the 
management of nature reserves that protect aquatic wildlife resources. 
 State Forestry Administration - Responsible for the management of forests, 
wetlands, and deserts. It also manages protected areas including all forest parks, 
and some nature reserves, wetland parks, etc.  
 Ministry of Housing and Rural-Urban Development - Responsible for the 
management of construction lands and the construction market for housing, 
commercial and other development, as well as some protected areas such as 
National Scenic Areas and World Heritage Sites.  
 National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) - The NDRC 
formulates strategic economic and development goals and plans for the country, 
including for sustainable development, through the Five-Year Guidelines and 
other mechanisms. 
 Ministry of Transportation - Responsible for highway and waterway construction. 




 Chinese Academy of Science - Responsible for the management of some nature 
reserves and World Heritage Sites. It has played an important role in the 
implementation of conservation polices, such as the development of the China 
biodiversity information system.  
 Ministry of Finance - Responsible for financial expenditures and revenues, 
financial and taxation policies, and the basic work of state-owned capital. 
 
All administrative divisions under the Central Government are considered “local 
government”. There are three such levels: provincial, county, and below-county 
(Kram et al. 2012). At the local government level, from provincial down to the levels 
of cities, counties and townships, there are Environmental Protection Bureaus (EPBs) 
and Forestry Bureaus (Beyer 2006). They are funded by the local governments of 
which they are a part and are responsible for environmental protection under their 
jurisdiction (Yu 2010). Each government bureau reports to the level above it. For 
example, the Sheyang County Forestry Bureau reports to Yancheng City Forestry 
Bureau, which reports to the Jiangsu Provincial Forestry Bureau, which reports to the 
State Forestry Administration as highlighted in Table 1.  
 
Table 1: Level of government (Kram et al. 2012) 
Level of 
government 
Forestry agency Environmental 
protection agency 
Land & resources 
agency 






Ministry of Land 
& Resources 
 













& Resources Bureau 





& Resources Bureau 
*: some provinces do not have prefecture level 
 
The local offices operate in a complex administrative context as they serve two 
masters in a “matrix” reporting structure — the director of the agency at the level 
above as well as the head of the government at the relevant level (McBeath and 
McBeath 2006). For example, the director of a provincial forestry bureau would 
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answer to the head of the State Forestry Administration as well as to the provincial 
governor (Kram et al. 2012).  Table 2 uses the State Forest Administration as an 
example to explain how a funding request generated from a county bureau would 
reach the provincial Forestry and Finance Bureau through different levels of 
government and how the requested money would reach the County Forestry Bureau 
correspondingly. 
 
Table 2: Generalized path of funding requests and allocations, using the State Forest 
Administration as an example (Kram et al. 2012) 
  













Prefectural DRC Prefectural Forestry 
Bureau 
County government County Finance 
Bureau 




2.1.3 Protected Area Management and Land Tenure 
 
Since protected areas are widely seen as playing a critical role in maintaining 
biodiversity, the Chinese government has devoted substantial resources to the 
establishment of protected areas (particularly nature reserves) (Xu et al. 2012). By the 
end of 2012 there were 2669 nature reserves in China, accounting for 14.94% of 
China’s total land area (Ministry of Environmental Protection 2013). However, the 
rapid establishment of these reserves and the scale of the current reserves network 
have inevitably resulted in structural challenges that impair the effectiveness of nature 
reserve management (Xu and Melick 2007). The following section discusses the brief 
history of protected area development in China and the associated problems. 
 
2.1.3.1 History of protected areas in China 
 
Environmental protection has a very long history in China. As early as the Qin 




reserves and protected temple grounds (Xu and Melick 2007). However, the modern 
concept of public protected areas was introduced relatively recently. China’s first 
modern protected area was created in 1956, when the government designated the Ding 
Hushan Nature Reserve in southern China’s Guangdong Province as the country’s 
first official protected area (Jim and Xu 2004). From then on, China’s protected area 
establishment can be divided into three phases (Kram et al. 2012).  
 
During the first phase, from 1956-1978, 34 protected areas were established (Jim and 
Xu 2004). The Central Government designated protected areas according to a national 
protected area plan, focusing on quantity over quality and providing limited resources 
for protected area management (Jim and Xu 2004, Kram et al. 2012). Central 
authorities appointed key staff with relatively no active participation by local 
governments or local communities in designation and administration (Kram et al. 
2012). Furthermore, the Central Government was “unwilling and unable” to finance 
the new protected areas while the local governments were reluctant to help manage 
them (Jim and Xu 2004).  
 
During the second phase, from 1979 to 1991, the Central Government made 
fundamental changes to protected area creation and management as part of its broader 
economic reforms (Kram et al. 2012). The government recognized the revenue-
generating potential of protected areas and the growing pressure internationally and 
domestically for nature conservation (Xu and Melick 2007, Kram et al. 2012). In 
response, the government identified quantitative goals for protected area designation 
which local governments were responsible for meeting (Jim and Xu 2004). By 1991, 
664 more protected areas had been established, and over 90% of these protected areas 
were established by local governments (Kram et al. 2012). Many new protected areas 
were designated for the purpose of remedial salvation of flagship species such as 
Giant Panda or Red-crowned Crane. Several were established without a scientific 
basis, with significant funding limitations, and unresolved tenure issues (Jim and Xu 
2004, Kram et al. 2012). 
 
An official designation procedure adopted in 1991 marked the beginning of the third 
phase of protected areas development (Xu and Melick 2007). The statutory 
designation procedures are divided into three stages: (1) site identification and 
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selection, (2) information collection and document preparation, (3) assessment and 
ratification (Jim and Xu 2004). According to the Regulations of Nature Reserves 
(1994), each protected area is designated at a given level of government: national, 
provincial or county. The particular administrative level of a newly designated site is 
commensurate with the tier of government approving it and is tied to the degree of 
human disturbance and ecological value (Jim and Xu 2004). For example, a site with 
high disturbance and no flagship species would be designated at the county level, 
whereas a relatively undisturbed site of national importance would be designated at 
the national level (Xu and Melick 2007). An existing protected area can seek an 
upgrade to a higher level in the hierarchy.  
 
According to the national planning framework, the central government will urge 
provincial governments to propose sites by a “quota and list” system (Jim and Xu 
2004). This is a target-oriented approach that specified a national quota in terms of 
numbers and areas of new protected areas to be attained by 2010 (the planned number 
was 1200, including 160-170 nationally ranked nature reserves) (Jim and Xu 2004). 
Further, the National Plan for Wildlife Conservation and Nature Reserve Construction 
states an aim that by 2030 there will be 2,000 nature reserves in China, with the total 
area taking up 16.8% of China’s land area; and by 2050, the number of nature 
reserves will reach 2,500, covering 172.8 million ha and account for 18% of the 
national land area (Ministry of Environmental Protection 2008). This is in accordance 
with the CBD targets for 2020 when at least 17% of terrestrial and inland water areas 
and 10% of coastal and marine areas are to be conserved through protected areas and 
other effective area-based conservation measures (CBD 2013).  
 
However, many problems have occurred with this fast development of protected areas. 
By the late 1990s, the Central Government reported that at least one-third of protected 
areas suffered from “the three without”: recurrent funding, a management agency, and 
staff (Kram et al. 2012). These problems remain today in China and internationally as 
well. According to the Protected Planet Report 2012 (Bertzky et al. 2012), only 12% 
of terrestrial areas and around 1.6 per cent of the global ocean areas are protected. 
Poor management, under-funding and a lack of critical data on protected areas means 




2.1.3.2 Land and natural resource management 
 
Many studies have pointed out that land tenure is one of the major problems for 
protected area management in China (Miao et al. 2000, McBeath and McBeath 2006, 
Xu and Melick 2007, Feng and Liu 2007, Qian et al. 2011, Xu et al. 2012). As land 
tenure has a very complicated historical and political context, the following 
paragraphs provide background information.  
 
Land tenure is described as “the institutional (political, economic, social, and legal) 
structure that determines (1) how individuals and groups secure access to land and 
associated . . .resources, including trees, minerals, pasture, and water and (2) who can 
hold and use these resources—for how long and under what conditions” (Usaid 2008) 
(p. 1). Over the last 60 years, China has witnessed three major waves of land tenure 
reforms (Kram et al. 2012). The government experimented with significant transitions 
with different tenure schemes for cultivated lands, forests, and grasslands in both 
urban and rural land policies to increase productivity and improve local livelihoods 
(Dean and Damm-Luhr 2010, Vendryes 2010, Jiming 2013). These schemes included: 
1) Private ownership (1930s/1940s to early/mid 1950s): The State granted 
individuals full ownership of agricultural land and forest land within this time 
period, however, grasslands remained a common property resource. 
2) Collectivization/No individual rights (early/mid 1950s to late 1970s): The State 
rescinded individual ownership rights of agricultural lands, forests, and 
grasslands through collectivization.  
3) De-collectivization/Private and increasing use rights (late 1970s to present): The 
State granted individuals limited and short-term use rights, but not ownership, 
during a period of initial de-collectivization in the late 1970s to mid-1980s. Since 
then, the State generally has been increasing use rights granted to individuals, 
except for forests during the 1980s and 1990s (Kram et al. 2012). 
 
Today, the Constitution (1982 as amended) and legislation based on the Constitution 
form the legal basis for the land tenure system (Jiming 2013). According to Article 10 
of the Constitution, there are two types of land ownership in China: state and 
collective. Constitutionally, all land in China belongs to “the people”, so technically, 
land cannot be owned privately (Kram et al. 2012). Land Administration Law (2004) 
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defines state and collective ownership more clearly, as Article 2 and 8 stipulate the 
State can own land anywhere in the country and is the sole owner of urban land. The 
right of ownership in State-owned land is exercised by the State Council on behalf of 
the State. Article 8 and 10 stipulate land in rural and suburban areas is owned by 
peasant collectives which shall be operated and managed by collective economic 
organizations of a village or by villagers’ committees. According to Kram et al. 
(2012), state lands totaled 53%, collectively-owned lands totaled 46%, and the 
remaining 1% had undetermined ownership. Although no units or individuals may 
encroach on land or illegally transfer it through buying, selling or other means (Land 
Administration Law, Article 2, 2004), the use rights to state and collectively-owned 
lands can be allocated to groups, individuals, or other entities - typically for 30-70 
years (The Rural Land Contract Law 2002). However, ownership is often unclear due 
to ambiguities and apparent contradictions in the laws and on-the-ground realities 
(Vendryes 2010). As for natural resources, the State owns “mineral resources, waters, 
forests, mountains, grassland, unclaimed land, beaches and other natural 
resources…...with the exception of [those] that are owned by collectives…...” 
(Constitution, article 9, 1982). In reality, natural resources and land overlap with each 
other, so it may not be clear whether a given parcel of land in a rural area and the 
natural resources within it are under state and/or collective ownership (Kram et al. 
2012). Further, rapid industrialization and urbanization in China make urban 
boundaries expand and encroach on collective land, thus causing disputes between the 
state and collectives (Dean and Damm-Luhr 2010, Wang et al. 2011a). The imprecise 
definition of state ownership (Ho 2001) is the underlying cause of many protected 
areas’ land loss as local governments illegally and indiscriminately sell land for 
economic development.  
 
Another problem comes from the unclear definition of collective ownership. The 
current format of collective ownership is the direct heritage of collectivization and the 
commune system (Vendryes 2010). Although collective ownership encompasses 
nearly all of the cultivated land (94%) and most of the forest land (58%) in China (Xu 
and Melick 2007), the Constitution and legislation have yet to clarify exactly what 
constitutes a collective, so it is uncertain which collective level actually holds the title 
to land. In practice, one or more villages or sub-villages manage collectively-owned 
lands through a villagers’ committee (Vendryes 2010). This has led to considerable 
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confusion and conflict in land rights disputes (Wang et al. 2011a). In the economically 
developed coastal regions, there is a tendency by local authorities to appropriate 
collective ownership rights in order to facilitate land planning and urban construction 
(Ho 2001). While collective ownership is indefinite the State retains the power of 
eminent domain. As the Constitution (1982) states, “The State may in the public 
interest take over land for its use in accordance with the law.” However, the law does 
not define “public interest” which makes it very hard to challenge expropriations and 
effectively gives the State carte-blanche to purchase and develop land as it sees fit 
(Kram et al. 2012).  
 
Land management in China, therefore, involves a myriad of government agencies, 
collective land managers, and use right holders (Ho 2001). Within the central 
government, the agencies most frequently involved in land use decisions include the 
Ministry of Land & Resources, Ministry of Agriculture, State Forestry Administration 
(SFA), Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development, and Ministry of 
Environmental Protection (Xu and Melick 2007). For any one plot of land, multiple 
agencies may be involved in land use decisions based on the natural land cover, 
current and potential land uses, and protected area designations (Kram et al. 2012). 
Land and natural resource legislation is implemented through regulations and policies, 
and then coordinated through an elaborate planning system (Beyer 2006). The major 
planning documents are the Five-Year Guidelines of China, which set priorities for 
economic development, growth targets, and land reforms; China is currently 
implementing its 12th Five-Year Guideline (Kram et al. 2012). Land use planning 
determines which use rights are allowed in which places (Dean and Damm-Luhr 
2010). Plans are legally binding and proposed changes must be approved by the 
agency which originally approved the plan (Vendryes 2010). However, 
implementation and enforcement is highly variable and unplanned development is a 
common occurrence (Dean and Damm-Luhr 2010).  
 
China has also passed a host of environmentally-related laws that govern the use and 
management of rural lands, natural resources, and protected areas (Vendryes 2010, Xu 
et al. 2012, Yu and Czarnezki 2013). Table 3 outlines China’s laws related to 
protected areas management and explains the relevant contents in each of them. The 
most relevant laws for this research are the Law on the Protection of Wildlife and the 
20 
 
Regulations of Nature Reserves. Other laws also have relevant contents as shown in 
Table 3. The Table was compiled by the researcher based on information from 
Vendryes (2010), Xu et al. (2012), and Yu and Czarnezki (2013).  
 
Table 3: China’s law related to protected area management  





Forest Law  1984 1998 Prohibits forest logging in nature reserves; 
authorizes the central forestry department & 
provincial governments to establish nature 
reserves in forest ecosystems, forests as rare 
wildlife habitats, & natural tropical forests; 
authorizes the central forestry department to 
formulate nature reserve management  
Regulations on 




1985  Provides a comprehensive framework for 
nature reserve establishment & for the 
management of forests & wildlife  
 
Grassland Law  1985 2003 Provides legislation on grassland 
management & uses, & establishes some 
grassland nature reserves  
Mineral 
Resources Law  





1986 1988, 1998, 
2004 
Provides legislation for land administration 
and ownership of land, protecting and 
developing land resources, making rational 
use of land, effectively protecting cultivated 
land and promoting sustainable development 
of the society and the economy  
Water Law  1988 2002 Provides legislation for development, 
utilization, conservation, protection and 
management of water resources  
Law on the 
Protection of 
Wildlife 
1989  Provides legislation for wildlife management, 
uses & conservation; nature reserves are 
considered as an important tool to protect 
wildlife; prohibits hunting in nature reserves 
& wildlife refuges 
Environment 
Protection Law 
1989 2014 The cornerstone of environment protection; 
provides legislation on environment 
protection, including nature reserves  
 
Water and Soil 
Conservation Law  
1991  Formulates for the purpose of the prevention 
and control of soil erosion, the protection and 
rational utilization of water and soil 
resources, the mitigation of disasters of flood, 
drought and sandstorm, the improvement of 
ecological environment and the development 










Agriculture Law  1993 2002, 2009, 
2012 
Provides legislation for the development and 
utilization of crop-plantation, forestry, animal 
husbandry and fishery.  
Regulations of 
Nature Reserves 
1994  Provides a legislative framework for nature 
reserves, including: (1) hierarchical system of 
nature reserves (national, provincial, city & 
county); (2) statutory procedures for 
establishing nature reserves; (3) sub-zones of 
nature reserves (core area, buffer area & 
experimental area); (4) restrictions on 
entering the core & buffer areas without 
appropriate permission; (5) prohibition of 
some extractive activities in nature reserves, 
including logging, mining, fishing, grazing, 
medicine gathering & hunting; (6) allowing 
ecotourism, business management & 




1996  Enshrines nature reserves as an important tool 





1999  Authorizes the central oceanic department to 
manage oceanic nature reserves 
Rural Land 
Contract Law  
2002  Provides legislation for household contractual 
management in rural areas, land in rural areas 
includes the arable land, forestlands and 
grasslands owned collectively by the peasants 




2005  Prohibits animal husbandry in the core & 




2006  Provides guidance for solving the problem of 




2007  Provides legislation for property ownerships, 
it stipulates the expropriation of collectively-
owned land should pay such fees as land 
compensation fees, placement subsidies in 
full amount 
 
As illustrated, different laws identify allowable and prohibited land uses for a given 
type of land cover. For example, the Land Administration Law (2004) stipulates that 
cultivated lands must be used productively and encourages the use of “unused lands” 
such as deserts and high alpine areas. The Rural Land Contract Law (2002) delineates 
contractual rights and obligations associated with use rights such as: the right to 
independently make decisions about land within the parameters of the contract; the 
right to make a profit on the land and natural resources; and the right to circulate use 
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rights to other parties within the original contract duration. Because many nature 
reserves are located in collective land, local people have the right to make a profit on 
the land and natural resources according to the laws and, importantly for this research, 
reserve status cannot stop their profit making activities without compensation. Further, 
the Land Administration Law does not specify the non-use rights, for example the 
conservation of land in nature reserves (Kram et al. 2012). This causes confusion 
between development and conservation concerning land management. 
 
While tenure security has improved over the last several decades, land takings have 
caused tenure instability in rural areas. Land takings refers to land conversions (such 
as for commercial development) by local leaders and it has been the main source of 
conflicts since the 2000s (Vendryes 2010). The background reason for this problem is 
that China centralized the power over taxation in 1994 (Kram et al. 2012). 
Consequently, most local governments are facing fiscal shortages and are forced to 
seek extra budgetary revenue, much of which come from sale or lease of often-rural 
land (Zhu and Roy 2009). Additionally, local governments have been unable to fully 
implement a number of unfunded or underfunded policy directives from central 
government such as conservation policies and they often ignore central policies in 
favour of their own interest (Jiming 2013).  
 
2.1.3.3 Problems for protected area management 
 
A problem stemming from unclear land tenure is that boundaries for nature reserves 
are rarely marked on the ground, and are often ignored in practice (Kram et al. 2012). 
According to McBeath & McBeath (2006), only 60 percent or so of nature and forest 
reserves are on state owned land, the remainder is controlled by collectives and 
operates under the Household Responsibility System
1
. It is estimated that community-
owned forests cover an area of more than 7.9 million ha of China’s nature reserves 
and some nature reserves consist almost entirely of community-owned forest (Xu et al. 
                                                     
1
 Launched in the early 1980s, the household responsibility system was an agriculture production 
system, which allowed households to contract land, machinery and other facilities from collective 
organizations. The aim was to preserve basic unified management of the collective economy, while 
contracting out land and other goods to households. Households could make operating decisions 
independently within the limits set by the contract agreement, and could freely dispose of surplus 
production over and above national and collective quotas. 
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2012). In many places intermixed collective and state lands pose great challenges to 
reserve management because conflicts of interests between local community and 
nature reserves lead to conflicting land use activities (Kram et al. 2012). In some 
cases protected areas are established without regard to household use rights or 
traditional uses which have resulted in resettlement and conflicts (Jim and Xu 2004). 
Furthermore, conflicting needs for land uses may take precedence over nature reserve 
protection. For example, a policy requiring the construction of a road to every 
administrative village has trumped protected area tenure restrictions in many locations 
(Kram et al. 2012). In addition, the unsettled ownership status complicates the 
resource allocation problem (McBeath and McBeath 2006). Local people living 
around and in protected areas depend on the resources within them, such as fuel wood, 
timber for construction, fish, or grazing lands (Feng and Liu 2007). Therefore, 
protected areas can effectively conserve nature only with the support of local people. 
However, rarely are these key stakeholders involved in the identification, planning, or 
management of protected areas (Yu and Czarnezki 2013). Further, upon designation 
of a nature reserve, the government in some cases either took the land by political 
force or purchased the land with monetary compensation (Zhang et al. 2007c). The 
first way has caused many conflicts between nature reserves and local communities 
while for the latter, the government has often lacked the funding to provide sufficient 
compensation to the local communities (Miao et al. 2000, Yang et al. 2007, Qian et al. 
2011). Lack of community buy-in can prompt local people to abandon sustainable 
uses and accelerate natural resource extraction once an area is established as protected, 
as they fear that their access will be prohibited altogether (Kram et al. 2012). In such 
cases, conflicts of interest between the local government, local communities, and the 
managing agency are common (Qian et al. 2011).  
 
Besides land tenure confusion, funding is another problem for protected area 
management. Although funding for protected areas has increased over time, many 
claim that it remains inadequate, particularly for operational costs (McBeath and 
McBeath 2006, Qian et al. 2011, Kram et al. 2012). Protected areas can receive 
significant funding for their creation, but there is limited funding for ongoing 
maintenance and basic operations, including patrolling (Kram et al. 2012). There is 
little up-to-date or reliable global data on protected area funding (Emerton et al. 2006). 
According to a survey in 1999 carried out by IUCN, the average global budget for 
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protected areas was US$893 per km
2
 (in 1996 US$), with the mean for developed 
countries totaling US$2,058 per km
2
 and the mean for developing countries totaling 
US$157 per km
2
 (Emerton et al. 2006). A separate survey of 85 nature reserves 
carried out in China estimated that China’s average protected area funding totaled 
US$113/km
2
, with local reserves receiving only US$53/km
2
 (Liu et al. 2003). 
However, protected area management costs vary considerably according to the extent 
of pressures, staff cost requirements (e.g. minimum wage) and so on. Staffing 
adequacy and funding adequacy also differ greatly by region, for example, 
Leverington et al. (2010) stated that protected areas in Asian countries score 
comparatively high for both staffing and funding adequacy, and even higher than 
north America in terms of funding adequacy.  
 
A recent study carried out by Li et al. (2013) revealed that operational expenditures in 
China’s National Nature Reserves (NNRs) were US$5.19 /ha in 2009, ranking second 
among the seven southeast Asian countries in the survey and ranking third after 
adjustments for per capita Gross Domestic Product. The total investment in NNRs 
increased by a factor of 2.3 over 1999 levels and reached US$5.50 /ha in 2009 (Li et 
al. 2013). Although the financing of China’s nature reserves has improved in general, 
most funds are spent on national-level, high-profile sites while the majority of sites 
receive insufficient funding (McBeath and McBeath 2006, Quan et al. 2011, Xu et al. 
2012). Some of the most important protected areas for biodiversity lie in the most 
cash-strapped provinces and counties, which are responsible for funding operations 
and maintenance (McBeath and McBeath 2006). Because operational budgets are 
often inadequate and staffing is limited for some nature reserves, it is not uncommon 
for profit-making enterprises to be established in such reserves, legally or illegally 
(McBeath and McBeath 2006, Kram et al. 2012). 
 
In summary, China is a mega-diverse country, with over ten per cent of the world’s 
known species, and whose preservation is in the global as well as regional and 
national interests (McBeath and McBeath 2006). However, human population growth 
and socio-economic development have rapidly increased the demand for food, water, 
energy, housing, land and other natural resources (Beyer 2006). These pressures have 
caused the loss, fragmentation and disturbance of wildlife habitats (Yu 2010). 
Although China has a large number of laws on species and ecosystem preservation, 
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there are areas of overlap and serious gaps (Wang et al. 2011b). Most laws, 
particularly those regarding land ownership and tenure, are vague and ambiguous, 
which makes administration and enforcement difficult (McBeath and McBeath 2006). 
Furthermore, the roles and responsibilities of government departments involved in 
biodiversity conservation are overlapped. As a result, there is conflict between 
different value perceptions of different government departments (Xu et al. 2012).  
 
Although protected areas are the main element in China’s strategy to conserve 
biodiversity, a number of factors hamper effective conservation in Chinese protected 
areas. These factors include: the spatial overlap of people and biodiversity; lack of 
funding for management of nature reserves and for the resettlement and/or 
compensation of displaced people; obscure tenures and user rights; administrative 
complexity and conflicts; and the dangers of linking funding with financial needs that 
compromise environmental aims (Xu and Melick 2007). The factors and associated 
issues are explored in this thesis in relation to the study site, Yancheng National 





2.2 Introduction to Yancheng National Nature Reserve (YNNR) 
 
 
Figure 4: Yancheng National Nature Reserve office building (the figure of Xu Xiu Juan in front 
of the building, a former employee of the reserve, who died saving protected swans), 
Yancheng, in Dec 2013  
 
The Yancheng National Nature Reserve (YNNR) is the first and largest tidal flat 
nature reserve and one of the most important coastal salt marshes in China. It was 
established in 1983 with the major aim of protecting an endangered bird species, the 
Red-crowned Crane (Grus japonensis) and its habitat. YNNR is one of the most 
important stopovers for 300 species of migratory birds from northeast Asia and 
Australia (Lǚ et al. 2007, Ma et al. 2009, Ke et al. 2011). It was approved as an 
international biosphere reserve in UNESCO’s Man and Biosphere Program (MAB) in 
1992, and in 2002 it was included in the Ramsar Convention List of Wetlands of 
International Importance (Yancheng Biosphere Reserve Administration 2013). With a 
total area of 247,260 ha, YNNR has more than 3,000,000 wintering water birds, of 
which 29 bird species, including the Red-crowned Crane, are on the IUCN Red List of 










The YNNR is located in Jiangsu Province on the coast of the Yellow Sea of China 
(Figure 5, (Wikipedia 2015)). The northern border of the reserve is the convergence of 
Pu Gang and the new sea dyke in Xiangshui County; the southern border is the Liang 
Duo He dam; the western border is the Yellow Sea Road; and the eastern border is the 
Yellow Sea (Zuo and Du 2014) (Figure 6). The geographical coordinates of YNNR 
were readjusted as 119°53′45″—121°18′12″E 32°48′47″—34°29′28″N in 2013 
(Yancheng Biosphere Reserve Administration 2013). The coastline of the reserve is 
582 km long and it contains many sandy shoals (Xu et al. 2005a). The reserve mainly 
consists of an alluvial plain with many small rivers and lakes (Ke et al. 2011) in low-
lying terrain. Elevation in the YNNR varies between 0 and 4 m above sea level (asl), 
with an average slope of less than 5 degrees (Ke et al. 2011).  
 
 





Figure 6: Map of Yancheng’s location in Jiangsu Province and the YNNR (Zuo and Du 2014) 
 
Figure 6 shows the location and extent to the YNNR. It lies within the local authority 
of Yancheng City and occupies part of the coastal areas of five counties: Xiangshui 
County, Binhai County, Sheyang County, Dafeng City and Dongtai County. The 
reserve also incorporates Tinghu Township. The population of villages located inside 
the boundary of the nature reserve is 37,623 (Zuo and Du 2014). Besides the village 
population, there are enterprise employees living inside the reserve, but the number 
fluctuates greatly as there are many migrant workers. Altogether, about 67,000 people 
live in the nature reserve, and most of these residents (including estimated numbers 
for enterprise employees) are engaged in crop farming, fish farming, salt farming and 
marine fishery (Zuo and Du 2014). Of the total population, about 32,000 live in the 
buffer zone and the rest in the experimental zone (Zuo and Du 2014). There are no 




The YNNR has three categories of zones – the core zone, the buffer zone and the 
experimental zone (Figure 6).  The core zone (22,596 ha) (Yancheng Biosphere 
Reserve Administration 2013) extends from the south bank of Xinyanggang port in 
the north, to the north bank of the Doulonggang port in the south, to 100 m from the 
foot of the coastal dyke-highway in the west, and to the seashores in the east 
(Yancheng Biosphere Reserve Administration 2013). A natural landscape is 
maintained within the core zone and there are neither human settlements nor industrial 
facilities (Li et al. 2005).  
 
The buffer zone (about 56,742 ha) consists of two parts. The first part connects with 
the northern border of the core zone and the second part is situated to the immediate 
south of the core zone (Figure 6) (Jiangsu Provincial Government 2011). Most of the 
buffer zone has been or is being converted to commercial fish ponds (Jiangsu 
Provincial Government 2011).  
 
The experimental zone (about 167,922 ha) comprises five parts (Figure 6), and it hosts 
a variety of land uses, including farmland, forests and fish ponds (Zuo and Du 2014).  
 
The YNNR lies in the transition belt between the warm temperate and northern 
subtropical zones with four distinct seasons and a long frost-free period (210–224 
days per year) (Li et al. 2005). The annual average temperature is between 13.7 ~ 
14.6°C (Wang and Liu 2005). January is the coldest month with the average 
temperature of -0.3~1.3°C and August is the hottest month with the average 
temperature of 26.7~17.4°C (Li et al. 2005). The lowest measured temperature was -
17.3°C and the highest was 39.0°C (Li et al. 2005). The annual rainfall is between 980 
and 1070 mm (Wang and Liu 2005). The shallow sea water has a moderate 
temperature (the surface temperature is 5-10°C in winter and 25-27°C in summer) and 
the surface salinity is 30 (Wang and Geoffrey 2010). The local soil is composed of 
19.6% sand, 40.1% silt, and 40.3% clay (Liu et al. 2009). Soil pH and soluble total 





From the sea to land, the landform can be divided into three zones: the sub-tidal zone, 
intertidal zone and supra-tidal zone (Li et al. 2004b). The average high tide is between 
1.27-4.61m, the average low tide is between 1.22-1.67m, and the average tidal range 
is 2-3m (Li et al. 2005). Because of the high tidal range, strong currents, large area of 
seafloor, abundant sediment resource and the well-developed tidal flows in the area, 
both erosion and deposition occur (Wang and Geoffrey 2010). Presently, the land in 
the north of the coastline along the Former Yellow River Delta from the Sheyang 
River (Sheyang County) to the Guanhe River (Xiangshui County) is eroding; and the 
coastline along the fluvial plain in the middle of the Jiangsu coast between the 
Sheyang River (Sheyang County) and Beiling River (Hai’an County) is expanding   
(Lǚ et al. 2007, Wang and Geoffrey 2010). The coastline in Dafeng, Dongtai and 
southern Sheyang experience the fastest annual seaward growth rate of 200 m/a, and 




The wide coastal plain in Jiangsu Province has been formed through interactions 
between the Yellow Sea and the ancient Changjiang (time undetermined) and Yellow 
Rivers (Wang and Geoffrey 2010). Between AD 1128 and 1855, the ancient Yellow 
River entered the sea from the north of Jiangsu province (Lǚ et al. 2007). However, in 
1855 the river broke through its northern dike near the village of Tongwaxiang (in 
Henan province, about 580km to the river mouth then) and took over the course of the 
Daqing River (in Shandong Province) to empty into the Bohai Gulf (SDSQW 2007). 
The Yellow River estuary shifted over 600km to the north of the abandoned one. 
After the Yellow River retreated to Shandong Province the abundant sediment 
resources were shut off and as a result erosion occurred in the area north of Sheyang 
River (immediate north of the northern buffer zone) (Lǚ et al. 2007).  
 
The reclamation of tideland in Yancheng started in about 150 BC with salt production 
by evaporation as the major industry in the area (Li et al. 2004a). According to Wang 
and Geoffrey (2010), three important development events have been recorded: first, 
the Hanhai Dike built by local official Fan Zhongyan from AD 1024 to 1027 during 
the Northern Song Dynasty; second, reclamation and agricultural activities initiated 
31 
 
by industrialist Zhang Jian (AD 1853-1926) during the Late Qing Dynasty (Wang and 
Geoffrey 2010). Modern development was launched after the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC) was founded (AD 1949-present). There are now a variety of diverse uses, 
including land reclamation for agriculture, aquaculture, salt, harbors, tourism and 
industry (Wang and Geoffrey 2010). Grain and cotton production bases have also 
been built in Nantong and Yancheng. Other activities producing commodities for 
export such as salt, Chinese white shrimp (penneropenaeus chinensis), conger pike 
(muraensox cinereus), mollusks (mollusca) and common reed (phragmites australis) 
are highly developed in the buffer and experimental zones (Wang and Geoffrey 2010). 
 
The undeveloped coastal wetlands in the YNNR consists of subtropical estuary 
ecosystems and tidal mudflats ecosystems (Wan et al. 2001). The coastal salt marsh of 
YNNR is dominated by salt tolerant plants. The plant community has a typical 
landward succession sere type: (1) the pioneer species smooth cordgrass (Spartina 
alterniflora) dominates the elevated part of the intertidal zones where tidal flooding 
occurs twice a day; (2) a seepweeds (Suaeda salsa and Suaeda glauca) community is 
dominant in the hightidal zones; and (3) in the supratidal zone, grass such as 
Aeluropus littoralis, common reed (phragmites australis), blady grass (imperata 
cylindrical), Scripus karuizawensis and Zoysiam jacrostachys are prevalent (Ke et al. 
2011).  
 




The YNNR is very rich in biodiversity, containing 559 species of vascular plants, and 
1669 species of animals. Among these, 14 animal species are under class 1 national 
protection, and 83 species are under Class 2 national protection (Wang and Liu 2005, 
Yancheng Biosphere Reserve Administration 2013). There are 401 species of birds, 
284 species of fish, 31 species of mammals, 8 species of amphibians, 26 species of 
reptiles, 508 species of insects, 89 species of zooplanktons and 325 species of benthos 
and intertidal organisms in the reserve (Lǚ et al. 2007, Yancheng Biosphere Reserve 




As the most important rare bird reserve in China, YNNR protects numerous 
endangered species in the reserve area. Among them, twelve bird species, such as 
Red-crowned Crane (Grus japonensis), imperial eagle (Aquila heliaca), Chinese 
merganser (Mergus squamatus), hooded crane (Grus monacha), and black stork 
(Ciconia nigra) are under Class 1 national protection (Lǚ et al. 2007, Ma et al. 2009, 
Su and Zou 2012). Sixty-five bird species, such as the black-faced spoonbill (Platalea 
minor), mandarin duck (Aix galericulata), white-naped crane (Grus vipio), and 
common crane (Grus grus), are under Class 2 national protection (Lǚ et al. 2007, Ma 
et al. 2009, Su and Zou 2012). The YNNR is also home to dozens of birds listed in the 
China Redbook of Endangered Species including 15 rare species, 7 endangered 
species, 11 near-endangered species and 3 uncertain species (Lǚ et al. 2007). Many 
bird species in the nature reserve are also listed in the Birds to Watch, including 22 
near-endangered species, 5 endangered species, 1 extremely endangered and 15 near-
extinction species (Collar et al. 1994). Moreover, 190 bird species in the reserve are 
covered by PRC-Japan Agreement on the Protection of Migratory Birds, accounting 
for 83.7% of the total number of migratory bird species under the agreement and 58 
species in the reserve are covered by the PRC-Australia Agreement on the Protection 
of Migratory Birds, accounting for 71.6% of the total number of migratory bird 
species under the agreement (Lǚ et al. 2007) (Figure 7, 8).  
 
 





Figure 8: Common crane in farmland, in the buffer zone of YNNR, Yancheng, 2014 
 
2.2.1.3.2 Red-crowned Crane 
 
The flagship species protected in YNNR is the Red-crowned Crane (Grus japonensis) 
(Figure 9). This is a globally endangered species categorized under the International 
Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) guidelines with a very small population 
among all crane species (IUCN 2013a). The Red-crowned Cranes belong to the 
Gruidae family of the Gruiformes order (Jiangsu Provincial Government 2011). Two 
separate populations of Red-crowned Crane occur in north-east Asia, the non-
migratory Japanese population (approximately 1300 birds) and the migratory 
mainland population (1500 birds) (Su and Zou 2012). The migratory population 
mainly winters in the Demilitarized Zone of Korea and on the east coast of China, 






Figure 9: The Red-crowned Crane in the core zone of YNNR, Yancheng, 2014  
 
The Red-crowned Crane is a large, land-perching crane. The habitat favored by the 
Red-crowned Cranes is natural wetland (e.g., grass mudflat, common seep weed 
mudflat and reed mudflat with a water depth of 10~40 cm) (Jiangsu Provincial 
Government 2011). However, due to human activities, the habitats for Red-crowned 
Crane have gradually been changed from natural wetlands to artificial wetlands (fish 
ponds and reed lands) and to paddy/wheat fields recently (Ma et al. 1998a, Ma et al. 
1999, Lǚ 2008, Ma et al. 2009, Wang et al. 2010, Liu et al. 2013). The least favored 
habitat includes dry land, spartina mudflat, barren mudflat and salt farm (Dong et al. 
2005, Jiangsu Provincial Government 2011). The Red-crowned Crane basically 
moves in families and a flock is composed of many families (Yu et al. 2001).  
 
Red-crowned Cranes are omnivorous and they feed on reed sprouts, grass seeds, 
grains, insects, crustaceans, snails, frogs and small rats (Jiangsu Provincial 
Government 2011). They migrate from north-eastern China to Yancheng in late 
October and overwinter in YNNR until early March (Ma et al. 1999). In the middle of 
April, Red-crowned Cranes migrate to their breeding ground in northeast China and 
begin to build nests and lay eggs (Yu et al. 2001). Generally, they lay two eggs in a 
nest and the incubation period is about 31 -33 days (Yu et al. 2001). After 6 months, 
the young crane’s weight is about 9770g, height about 836mm, 99% and 92% of that 
of maturity (Yu et al. 2001). In the fall the young mature cranes will fly to their 
wintering area in Korea and the east coast of China with their crane groups (Shi and 




2.2.1.3.3 Cultural importance 
 
As the most well-known protected species in YNNR, the Red-crowned Crane is an 
important symbol in China. In ancient China the Red-crowned Crane was a symbol of 
longevity, fortune and dignity. It was called the fairy crane and always painted 
together with pine trees to signify longevity. Since the Red-crowned Crane is very 
sensitive towards wetland environmental changes, it is an indicator species for the 
wetlands environment (Dong et al. 2005). It is also one of the most famous cultural 
birds in Asian countries, as it is represented in various forms in poems, paintings, 
sculptures, literature, music and dance (Zhao et al. 2013). The Red-crowned Crane is 
one of the most popular birds in China and it was once recommended as the national 
bird for China (Dong et al. 2005). The establishment of the first nature reserve for 
Red-crowned Crane by the Chinese government in Zhalong, Heilongjaing Province in 
1979 was because this location was the principal breeding ground of the species (Ma 
et al. 1998b). Over 30 reserves have since been established at both breeding and 
wintering grounds including Yancheng as the largest and most important wintering 
habitat (Ma et al. 2009, Su and Zou 2012).  
 
 
Figure 10: Red-crowned Crane handicraft made with reed, in Tao Yuan Decoration Company, 






2.2.2.1 Laws and regulations 
 
The YNNR is under the administrative jurisdiction of Yancheng city, which has 
ownership of the entire core zone and 900 ha of the experimental zone (where a 
captive breeding ground for Red-crowned Crane is situated called He Le Yuan) 
(Jiangsu Provincial Government 2011). The lands in the buffer zone and experimental 
zone are under the control of the five county governments and collectives mentioned 
previously. Two laws are directly related to YNNR management, which are the basis 
for its establishment and operation. First, the Regulations of the People's Republic of 
China on Nature Reserves (1994) explain what is permitted in nature reserves 
including the significance of the different zones. The following relevant articles 
outline how nature reserves should be managed:  
 Article 18 stipulates: Nature reserves may be divided into three parts: the core 
area, buffer zone and experimental zone. The core area should protect intact 
natural ecosystems and the rare and endangered animals or plants, and no 
company or individuals are allowed to enter. Scientific research activities are 
generally prohibited in the core area. In the buffer zone, only scientific 
observations and other research activities are allowed. In the experimental zone, 
various activities such as scientific experiments, educational activities, visits 
and investigations, tourism, domestication and breeding of rare animal species 
are allowed. 
 Article 26 stipulates: in nature reserves, activities such as felling, grazing, 
hunting, fishing, gathering medicinal herbs, reclaiming, burning, mining, stone 
quarrying and sand dredging etc., shall be prohibited unless it is otherwise 
provided for by relevant laws and regulations. 
 Article 27 stipulates: nobody shall be allowed to enter the core area of nature 
reserves. Where scientific observations and investigation thereto are necessary 
for scientific research, the organization concerned shall submit applications and 
activity plans to the administrative agency of the nature reserves in advance, 
and shall be approved by the competent administrative department of nature 
reserves in the people's government at or above the provincial level. The entry 
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into the core area of national nature reserves shall be approved by the competent 
administrative department of nature reserves under the State Council.  
 Article 28 stipulates: tourism, production and trading activities are prohibited in 
the buffer zone. 
 Article 32 stipulates: no production installations shall be built in the core area 
and buffer zone of nature reserves. In the experimental zone, no production 
installations that cause environmental pollution or do damage to the natural 
resources or landscapes shall be built. Other installations to be built in these 
areas must not exceed the discharge of pollutants prescribed by national or local 
discharge standards. 
 
In summary, the exclusions from the relevant zones are as follows: entry to the core 
zone is strictly prohibited, and human disturbance should be kept at the minimum 
level. The buffer zone allows some scientific research activities and the experimental 
zone allows tourism and other non-disturbing production activities.   
 
The second law relevant to the reserve management is the Law of the People's 
Republic of China on the Protection of Wildlife (1989) (Wildlife Protection Law). 
This is formulated for the purpose of protecting and saving species of wildlife which 
are rare or near extinction. The articles related to nature reserve management include:  
 Article 14: If the protection of wildlife under special state or local protection 
causes losses to crops or other losses, the local governments shall compensate 
for them. Measures for such compensation shall be formulated by the 
governments of provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities directly 
under the Central Government. 
 Article 16: The hunting, catching or killing of wildlife under special state 
protection is prohibited. 
 Article 20: In nature reserves and areas closed to hunting, and during seasons 
closed to hunting, the hunting and catching of wildlife and other activities 





2.2.2.2 Management plan 
 
The YNNR is managed under the Jiangsu Yancheng Rare Birds Nature Reserve 
Master Plan which is operative from 2008 - 2020 (Jiangsu Provincial Government 
2011). The underlying principles for the Master Plan are: (i) management by law and 
based on science; (ii) integrated protection-research-education; (iii) improved 
management planning; and (iv) community participation and co-management (Jiangsu 
Provincial Government 2011). The latter principle is of particular significance for the 
purpose of this thesis. 
 
The Master Plan has identified three priorities for protection: first, the wintering birds 
and their habitats; second, coastal wetland ecosystems and biodiversity; and third, the 
coastal wetland landscapes (Jiangsu Provincial Government 2011).  
 
At present, the YNNR operates mainly on government financial support. The 
protected wetland area receives regular but fluctuating funding. From 2004 to 2009, 
annual government support for YNNR amounted to approximately US$650,000 
(Jiangsu Provincial Government 2011). Additional revenues were generated from 
tourism activities with an annual income around RMB 400,000 (equals to US$ 50,000) 
(Xu and Wall 2007). Other financing mechanisms including international aid projects 
from Global Environment Facility (GEF
2
) and Asian Development Bank (ADB) are 
available. For example, GEF provided around 1 million US dollars for the Wetland 
Biodiversity Conservation and Sustainable Use in China project (from 2005-2008) in 
Yancheng and ADB provided US$23 million for Yancheng Wetland Protection 
Project from 2012 to 2016 (Vanpraet and Yu 2009, Nanjing University 2011). 
However, there is very little funding gained from visitors and donors in exchange for 
the ecological experiences that they receive. Neither education nor research is well 
funded. Lu et al. (2007) argue that there is an urgent need to increase ecotourism and 
public education at the YNNR to improve the economic benefits gained from 
                                                     
2
 GEF is a partnership for international cooperation where 183 countries work together with 
international institutions, civil society organizations and the private sector, to address global 
environmental issues. The Global Environment Facility was established in October 1991 as a $1 billion 
pilot program in the World Bank to assist in the protection of the global environment and to promote 
environmental sustainable development. The United Nations Development Program, the United 
Nations Environment Program, and the World Bank were the three initial partners implementing GEF 




conservation and to make people aware of the high return on investments in 
conservation. 
 
Although not necessarily consistent with nature conservation, there are other ways 
that economic returns can be made from the YNNR resources. For a long time, 
governments at all levels have regarded tidelands development as offering great 
potential for promoting local economic development (Li et al. 2004a). Since 1996, a 
new wave of tideland exploitation has emerged following the “Eastern Jiangsu on the 
Sea” strategy put forward by the Jiangsu Provincial Government (Li et al. 2004a). As 
a result, between 1995 and 2009, the land use patterns in the buffer and experimental 
zone of the reserve have experienced significant changes (Jiangsu Provincial 
Government 2011). From 1995 to 2009, the area of common seep weed had the most 
significant decline from 26,602 ha to 10,796 ha; the area of mudflats has declined 
from 140,674 ha to 105,923 ha, spartina from 13,542 ha to 10,273 ha, and reed from 
10,704 ha to 9,388 ha (Jiangsu Provincial Government 2011). These losses are largely 
the result of the development of commercial fish ponds, which increased significantly 
from 25,117 ha to 56,588 ha, and farmland, which increased from 28,732 to 38,665 ha 
in the same period (Jiangsu Provincial Government 2011).  
 
2.2.2.3 Use and development within the reserve 
 
Jiangsu Province is one of the regions with the densest populations in China (771/km
2
 
compared to China as a whole 143/km
2
) (Jiangsu Provincial office 2012). With many 
people and relatively little land, the human pressure on the land is huge. The human 
population of the coastal region in Yancheng city increased from 7.5 million in 1988 
to 8.12 million in 2009 (Ke et al. 2011). Population growth has resulted in the 
expansion of built-up areas and also contributed to the reclamation of natural grass 
flats and reed areas for agricultural production (Jiangsu Provincial Government 2011, 
Zuo et al. 2012). Such activities have disturbed the natural coastal wetland ecosystem 





2.2.2.3.1 Development in non-core zone 
 
A recent estimate of activities within the nature reserve notes that 14 agricultural 
farms, and 31 enterprises (including 11 state-run enterprises) are located inside the 
boundary of the reserve (Zuo and Du 2014). During the early stage of the reserve 
management, human disturbance was strictly prohibited, however, after 1995, 
preferential policies for coastal development promoted aquaculture development and 
resulted in reclamation of large amounts of natural wetland in the non-core zones of 
the reserve (Li et al. 2004a). The exploited land has been used mainly for farming, 
freshwater aquaculture, marine aquaculture, salt farms, forestry and reed growing (Ma 
et al. 2009). Many ponds for fish, shrimp, oyster, clam and other living marine 
resources have been constructed for economic benefits (Jiangsu Provincial 
Government 2011). The aquaculture output significantly increased from 132,000 ton 
in 1988 to 852,000 ton in 2006 (Ke et al. 2011). The fast development of aquaculture 
in the region contributed to rapid economic growth in Yancheng city, from a gross 
domestic product (GDP) of about CNY 1.2 billion in 1988 to CNY 191.7 billion in 
2009 (Ke et al. 2011, Jiangsu Provincial Government 2011).  
 
 
Figure 11: Aquaculture pond in buffer zone of YNNR, Yancheng, 2014 
 
Aquaculture farms located in the buffer zone are usually owned by the State or 
collectives, and the annual income from fishponds reaches about US$1000/ha (Zuo et 
al. 2004, Jiangsu Provincial Government 2011). Because the land tenure of 
aquaculture ponds belongs to the state or collectives, no financial benefits are returned 
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to the management of YNNR (Zuo et al. 2004). Moreover, human disturbance is 
much heavier in such artificial wetlands since their main purpose is to maximize 
profits by increasing fish production rather than meet the needs of waterfowl (Ma et al. 
2009). Few waterfowls are attracted to fishponds because of dense human activities 
around the artificial lakes (Zuo et al. 2004). 
 
Reclamation of tideland in the non-core area involves many stakeholders, such as the 
local governments, the lessees, local communities, local industries, and external 
investors and contractors (about 70% in marine aquaculture) (Li et al. 2004a). 
Tideland exploitation has not only provided local residents with a means of livelihood 
but also stimulated the development of related industries (agricultural and aquaculture 
product processing industry) (Li et al. 2004a). Since tideland exploitation can help the 
local economy to attain faster development, which is a very important criterion to 
measure the performance of a local government, the local government is very active 
and has played a very decisive role in promoting the development of tidelands (Li et 
al. 2004a). However, such activities may produce some directly usable products at the 
cost of losing a number of potential ecosystem service functions and may increase 
short-term and partial interests to the detriment of long-term and overall interests (Li 
et al. 2004a).  
 
2.2.2.3.2 Development in the core zone 
 
Developments have even been promoted in the core zone, in part to provide income 
for the reserve (Ma et al. 2009). Four types of development have been promoted: 
aquaculture ponds for fish; planted reed beds for thatch and paper-making materials; 
clamworm (Perinereis sp.) and mollusk fields for the collection of clamworms; and 
snails and shellfish for food (Ma et al. 2009). The reserve authorities have not 
participated directly in the development projects in the core zone, but rent the land to 
contractors and signed agreements with them stipulating the area of development, 
land-use type and management (Ma 2002, Ma et al. 2009). In this way, it was 
intended that all such projects should not only provide suitable habitats for cranes and 
other water birds, but also bring economic benefits to the reserve and local 
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communities (Wan et al. 2001, Ma et al. 2009). This appears to be at odds with the 
laws regarding activities permitted in the core zone. 
 
However, according to some scholars there are some good examples of how this kind 
of development in the core zone can assist with conservation, such as a rag worm 
culturing system (used as feed for fish and birds) (Liu et al. 2009), and a 240 ha 
artificial wetland (waterfowl lake) (Wan et al. 2001). All of the development projects 
in the core zone retain some characteristics of natural wetlands which provide 
artificial habitats for the cranes and other bird species (Ma et al. 2009), and earlier 
developments appear to have had some beneficial effects. For example, the rag worm 
culturing system is said to have improved both the food supply of the waterfowl and 
economic benefits for local residents (Liu et al. 2009). The creation of the waterfowl 
lake had a beneficial impact on water bird diversity, since both the number of species 
and their abundance increased after construction of the lake (Ma 2002). The increase 
most probably results from an increase in the quantity and diversity of food resources, 
and the openness of the water surface providing protection (Wan et al. 2001, Zuo et al. 
2004, Ma et al. 2009). 
 
Such beneficial outcomes from earlier projects encouraged further development 
projects in the core zone. In 1997, the nature reserve began an ecological program 
which included the lease of more than 20,000 mu (about 1,400 ha) of the southern 
section of the core zone for fish farming (Jiangsu Provincial Government 2011). The 
lease was renewable every five years, and the intent was to rehydrate the dehydrated 
wetland by creating semi-natural fish ponds suitable for rare birds while generating 
economic benefits for the reserve (Jiangsu Provincial Government 2011). However, 
when leased out, the area was turned into large-sized, deep commercial fish ponds 
with little regard to the habitat requirements of the rare birds (Jiangsu Provincial 
Government 2011).  
 
2.2.3 Challenges and threats 
 
Due to human population growth and economic development, the YNNR is subjected 
to multiple resource use conflicts, overexploitation of coastal resources and 
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environmental degradation (Ou et al. 2006). According to long-term field 
observations, although the Red-crowned Crane population in the YNNR grew 
between 1982 and 2000 (peaked in 2000), it went through a generally downward trend 
between 2001 and 2011 (Lǚ 2008, Ma et al. 2009, Su and Zou 2012). The wintering 
crane population numbered more than 1000 in 2001, but reached the lowest point for 
11 years with 447 cranes in the 2010 winter survey (Wang et al. 2010, Jiangsu 
Provincial Government 2011, Su and Zou 2012). Further, according to Su and Zou 
(2012), the distribution range and pattern of wintering cranes have also been changing 
dramatically, with areas of occupancy shrinking significantly. The distribution pattern 
of the cranes changed from a continuous distribution along the coast to patchy-
isolated groups in a few wetlands, with about 60%–70% of the total wintering 
population occurring in the core area of YNNR (Su and Zou 2012). Compared with 
early survey results there are now only six to seven sites with cranes present, as 
opposed to 28 sites in the past (Su and Zou 2012). With all these sites lost, the 
wintering range of the Red-crowned Cranes currently is less than 300 km
2
, which is 
about 8% of its range in the 1980s (Su and Zou 2012). 
 
There are many factors attributed to the decline in the Red-crowned Crane population 
and distribution pattern, but habitat fragmentation and degradation appear to be the 
main causes (Lǚ 2008, Ma et al. 2009, Liu et al. 2010a, Su and Zou 2012). Because of 
land reclamation and transformation, the natural coastal wetland has consistently 
decreased and became fragmented and heterogeneous, and thus the habitat has 
gradually diminished and even the core area of the YNNR is threatened (Ke et al. 
2011). Due to the reduction in area of habitat, the food availability for all bird species 
in the core and buffer zones of the YNNR decreased from 11,300 tons in 1992 to 
8,450 tons by 2006, or a decline of 25.2% (Yao et al. 2009). Further, the dense 
population of communities along the edge of the YNNR has led to strong 
encroachment in the buffer and experimental zones. Reports show that Red-crowned 
Cranes were poisoned by agrochemical fertilizers and pesticides used in agriculture 
land in the early 1990s (Ma et al. 1999, Wan et al. 2001, Liu et al. 2010a). Although 
strict regulations on agrochemicals were implemented since the mid-1990s, poison 
events still occur even now (Su and Zou 2012). For example, in Yancheng alone, in 
November 1998 and March 2002 respectively, three Red-crowned Cranes were 
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poisoned and died; in the winter of 2006, seven Red-crowned Cranes were poisoned 
and two died; and in the winter of 2008, seven were poisoned and died (Ma et al. 
1998a, Yu et al. 2001, Su and Zou 2012). Illegal hunting is another reason for Red-
crowned Crane decline. Some people kill Red-crowned Crane by accident when they 
hunt other wild animals for food or economic gain (Jiangsu Provincial Government 
2011).  
 
Another problem for the YNNR is dehydration. Since the coastline along the core and 
buffer zones is accreting seawards at a rate of 100 to 300m per year, the existing 
mudflats are left farther and farther from the sea (Li et al. 2005, Wang and Liu 2005). 
Siltation elevates the near-shore coast and prevents tidal water from reaching the 
mudflats, while the coastal dyke prevents inland freshwater from entering the 
mudflats (Li et al. 2005). A combined effect of the two processes is the dehydration of 
the mudflats, reducing the suitability of the mudflats for rare birds. When dehydration 
takes place in the buffer and experimental zones, the dehydrated areas are often turned 
into farmland or commercial fish ponds with less suitability for rare birds (Jiangsu 
Provincial Government 2011). A total of 18,650 ha in the YNNR suffer from 
dehydration (Jiangsu Provincial Government 2011). 
 
Invasive species also cause environment degradation of YNNR. In 1963 and 1979, 
common cordgrass (Spartina anglica C.E. Hubbard) and smooth cordgrass (Spartina 
alterniflora Loisel) were introduced from England and the United States respectively, 
with the intention of controlling erosion (Chen et al. 2004). After the 1990s, they 
became the two dominant plants of the intertidal zone in the YNNR (Li et al. 2005). 
As an alien species without predators, cordgrass has spread rapidly from 3,561 ha in 
1992 to 14,491 ha by 2007, an increase of 306.9% (Jiangsu Provincial Government 
2011). In the core zone, spartina expanded from 597 ha (or 2.7% of the total core zone) 
in 1992 to 2,814 ha (or 12.9% of the total core zone) by 2007 (Zhang et al. 2006b, 
Yao et al. 2009). The expansion of Spartina has caused high levels of sedimentation 
and constrained the natural succession of saline plants which are the breeding habitat 
for some water birds such as Larus saundersi (Saunder’s gull) (Liu et al. 2010a).  
 
Pollution is another problem for the YNNR. The pollution sources in the cities and 
counties where the nature reserve is located include: (i) industrial; (ii) residential; (iii) 
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animal farms; and (iv) non-point source (Jiangsu Provincial Government 2011). The 
major industries in the cities and counties comprise manufacturing, textile, chemical, 
timber, food processing, and building materials (Zuo and Du 2014). There are high 
wastewater pollution loads from industrial, residential, animal farming, agricultural 
and aquaculture sources (Jiangsu Provincial Government 2011). Because of 
unsophisticated treatment systems, wastewater pollutes rivers and estuaries, causes 
eutrophication and greatly threatens biodiversity and conservation (Li et al. 2004b, 
Wang and Liu 2005).  
 
All those problems need effective management and strategic planning by the reserve 
executives. However, there are institutional and policy barriers to integrated 
management of the coastal wetlands of YNNR, including: (i) no specific wetlands 
regulations to support wetlands conservation in the face of other conflicting activities 
such as agriculture, industry and urban development; (ii) no recognition of ecosystem 
services in a way that would put higher value on wetland conservation; (iii) 
inadequate technical guidance or services for eco-tourism development in both natural 
and artificial wetlands; (iv) a lack of enforcement of environmental laws at the local 
level; and (v)  a lack of cooperation between responsible agencies and a lack of 
coordinated institutional arrangements (Jiangsu Provincial Government 2011). 
Moreover, with increasing pressures due to economic development activities as 
described above, it will be difficult to ensure sufficient support for wetlands 
conservation, particularly in the ability to compensate farmers if they are banned from 
farming or fishing within wetlands as a result of restoration and management 
activities.  
 
Further, the Jiangsu coastal development plan (JCDP), approved by the State Council 
on 10 June 2010 consisting of a combination of industrial, urban, agricultural, port 
and wind energy developments along the coastal areas, places further tremendous 
pressures on the coastal wetlands (Jiangsu Provincial Government 2011). It is a great 







In summary, the major challenges for YNNR management include development 
pressure, environmental degradation and fragmentation, compensation and 
community involvement. Since local people have had livelihoods affected by the 
establishment of the reserve and some are involved in activities that are affecting the 
protected species and their habitats, YNNR needs a more inclusive and effective 
management scheme to manage the reserve. Further, any change to management to 
improve the habitat will inevitably impact on local people. As co-management is one 
of the four principles of the reserve management plan, and former as well as current 
international aid projects all emphasize co-management on project implementation, it 
appears logical that YNNR should put more emphases on participatory conservation 
and local engagement. The following chapter discusses the concept and practice of co-
















3 Chapter III   Literature Review 
 
This chapter explores theories and research relating to co-management and local 
knowledge, and brings together recent writings in both English and Chinese language 
in these two realms to provide a framework for understanding and analyzing what is 
happening in the YNNR. It begins with the definition and characteristics of co-
management, its evolution to adaptive co-management, then its practice worldwide 
and in relation to Biosphere Reserve, and then its introduction and practice in China. 
The local knowledge literature is also examined and is arranged in a similar manner. 
This portion of the Chapter starts with the definition and characteristics of knowledge 
integration and culture diversity and then discusses local knowledge in practice and 
local knowledge research in China. After reviewing the literature, knowledge gaps are 
identified and research questions are raised to address these gaps.   
 




The decentralization of natural resource governance has become increasingly popular 
since the mid-1980s due to two important trends (Larson and Soto 2008). One is 
political shifts, such as the reduced influences of colonial structures in Africa and of 
authoritarian governments in Latin America. The other is the recognition of people as 
a solution with regard to land and natural resource degradation. As a result, there has 
been a significant shift in environment and resource management approaches in both 
developing and industrialized countries to replace or complement top-down 
management principles with bottom-up planning and management, such as public 
participation and co-management (Berkes 2010). 
 
Collaborative management, or co-management, has been defined as ‘the sharing of 
power and responsibility between the government and local resource users’ (Berkes et 
al. 1991:12). Although the term co-management is relatively recent, the practice of 
formalized power sharing in resource management goes back to earlier times 
(Armitage et al. 2007). In the area of fisheries, the earliest documented legal co-
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management arrangement is recorded with the Lofoten Islands cod fishery in Norway 
in the 1890s (Jentoft and McCay 1995). In forest management, government-
community partnerships existed in the community forests of the Kumaon Himalayas, 
India, from the 1920s and the 1930s (Agrawal 2005). The earliest wildlife co-
management started in the 1980s in northern Canada and Alaska (Kendrick 2003). 
Early examples of co-management of protected areas also occurred in the Kakadu 
National Park in Australia, however, protected area co-management did not become 
widespread around the world until the 1990s (Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2004).  
 
Central to co-management is the idea that the responsibilities for allocating and using 
resources are shared among multiple parties (Pinkerton 1989, Berkes et al. 1991, 
Plummer and Armitage 2007a). Its outcomes ideally include enhanced equity and 
efficiency of decision-making, broader based legitimization for actions, and increased 
capacity at a local scale (Plummer and Fitzgibbon 2004a). Uses of co-management 
range from serving as a means of enlisting uncontrolled social groups and movements 
in the conservation of resources, to being a means of empowerment of disenfranchised 
rights claimants (Spaeder and Feit 2005).  
 
There are multiple forms of co-management, and the terms used and their meanings 
sometimes differ between nations. In East Africa and Latin America the collaborative 
approach is termed ‘integrated conservation and development’; in South East Asia 
they have ‘joint forest management regimes’, and in Australia they refer to the ‘co-
management’ of national parks (Spaeder and Feit 2005, Armitage et al. 2007, Ross et 
al. 2009, Ross 2011). Co-management often involves techniques such as community-
based natural resource management, participatory natural resource management, 
participatory rural appraisal, participatory action research, and devolved management 
(Armitage et al. 2007).  
 
There is no single universally accepted global definition of co-management because 
there is a continuum of co-management arrangements with different degrees of power 
sharing and joint decision-making by governments and communities (or user groups) 
about a set of resources or an area (Pinkerton 1989, Armitage et al. 2007, Berkes 
2010). For the purposes of this research, Borrini-Feyerabend et al.’s (2004:69) 
definition of co-management is adopted. It states that co-management is “a 
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partnership by which two or more relevant social actors collectively negotiate, agree 
upon, guarantee and implement a fair share of management functions, benefits and 
responsibilities for a particular territory, area or set of natural resources.” 
 
3.1.2 Conditions for co-management 
 
Plummer and Fitzgibbon (2004a) explain the concept of co-management in more 
details by proposing a structure that organizes co-management into context, 
components, and linking mechanisms (Figure 13). This structure is developed from 
integrated knowledge gained from experience with co-management and it is valuable 
to both practice and theory (Plummer and Fitzgibbon 2004a). Because co-
management arrangements are increasingly used in the practice of managing 
resources, this framework proposed by Plummer and Fitzgibbon (2004a) offers a 
means for systematic identification of co-management practices and differentiation 
among the spectrum of possible co-management arrangements. Characteristics of co-
management are particularly instructive because they indicate the presence of 
underlying processes and provide insights for those beginners who are just entering 
into co-management.  
 
As shown in Figure 13, the context of co-management involves resource 
characteristics, claims of property rights, and potential regimes (Plummer and 
Fitzgibbon 2004a). The resources associated with co-management are almost always 
common pool resources, although they may also include other resources with different 
tenure characteristics. The nonexclusive or common nature of these resources 
demonstrates multiple claims to property rights and challenges the dominant property 
rights regimes (Plummer and Fitzgibbon 2004a). These claims also become the 







Figure 13: Conceptual framework of co-management (Plummer and Fitzgibbon 2004a:879)  
 
Figure 13 shows three components that are consistently associated with effective co-
management: preconditions, characteristics, and outcomes. According to Plummer 
and Fitzgibbon (2004a), preconditions or antecedents that lead to successful co-
management are evident in the literature. These include real or imagined crisis, 
willingness for local users to contribute, opportunity for negotiation, legally 
mandated/brokered/incentive, leadership or energy center, common vision/existing 
networks (Pinkerton 1989, Pomeroy and Berkes 1997, Mitchell 2002, Wondolleck 
and Yaffee 2003, Plummer and Fitzgibbon 2004a). Plummer and Fitzgibbon (2004a) 
also state that the impetus for co-management originates from preconditions either in 
the external environment or in the human dimension. Human dimension antecedents 
that appear to be crucial for effective co-management include: willingness for local 
users to contribute, opportunity for negotiation, leadership, and common vision. These 
points are supported by other authors such as Pomeroy and Berkes (1997), Mitchell 
(2002), Wondolleck and Yaffee (2003). 
 
Characteristics are attributes repeatedly observed in co-management, which include 
pluralism, communication and negotiation, transactive decision-making, social 
learning and shared action/commitment (Plummer and Fitzgibbon 2004a). According 
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to Plummer and Fitzgibbon (2004a), pluralism means inclusion of diverse interests 
into the process; communication and negotiation means an exchange of information 
that leads to consensus; transactive decision-making means decisions are made 
through dialogue involving pluralistic inputs; social learning means mutual gaining of 
knowledge; shared action/commitment means the commitment of actions. These 
characteristics may be used to define if a practice can be classified as co-management, 
because they are indicators of an underlying process through which co-management 
operates in a certain stage or context.  
 
Outcomes are positive consequences that may be realized from co-management, 
although mixed success as a result of co-management arrangements often occur in 
practice. According to Plummer and Fitzgibbon (2004a) outcomes that co-
management seeks to accomplish include enhanced means of decision-making, broad-
based legitimization, and increased capacity. Since decisions are made through equal 
access and influence of stakeholders and integration of nonscientific knowledge 
systems, decision making can be enhanced within a co-management framework 
because of efficiency and equity (Plummer and Fitzgibbon 2004a). Legitimization of 
actions stems from co-management and is manifested through enhanced credibility of 
objectives and responsibility of organizations such as quotas, compliance and 
regulations in fisheries management (Plummer and Fitzgibbon 2004a). Increased 
capacity means enhanced abilities of local citizens, resource management and 
effective use of resources (Plummer and Fitzgibbon 2004a). Conventional outcomes 
such as the formation of co-management agreements, achievement of goals, and 
implementation of projects, are paradoxical in evaluating success of co-management 
since such outcomes sometimes fail to achieve greater equity and efficiency in 
decision making, enhanced legitimization and increased capacity (Innes and Booher 
1999, Castro and Nielsen 2001, Plummer and Fitzgibbon 2004a, Jentoft 2007).  
 
3.1.3 Power-sharing in co-management 
 
Power is the ability to control, potential to influence, and capability to exercise 
authority (Plummer and Fitzgibbon 2004a). In the realm of natural resources 
management, there are many kinds of power involved, such as legal power, political 
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power, coercive physical power, power of position, economic power, household and 
group power (Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2007). By contrast, the power of passive non-
compliance, subtle sabotage, evasion and deception is another important kind of 
power which enables the disenfranchised to survive and gather more environmental 
benefits than the established system of power would have allowed (Borrini-
Feyerabend et al. 2007). In the context of multiple social actors with conflicting 
interests and concerns or competing entitlements on the same set of natural resources, 
environmental inequality may occur as different stakeholders struggle for access to 
valuable resources with unevenly distributed benefits and costs (Pellow et al. 2001, 
Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2007). Different social entities continuously exert their 
power through control, resistance, and solidarity, however, powerful actors like state 
agencies, bureaucracies, business federations and multinationals may dominate in the 
decision-making processes (Meadowcroft 1998, Armitage et al. 2009). They 
sometimes ignore rules of commons use or reshape the rules in their own interests 
(Dietz et al. 2003). According to democratic theory, those who are affected by 
management decisions should have a say in management decision-making (Hersoug 
and Rånes 1997). Failure to include those with a legitimate stake is not fair or just and 
may underscore power differentials (Plummer and FitzGibbon 2004b).  
 
In order to overcome power asymmetry and enhance equality, cooperative 
management promotes a shared power with broad representation (Plummer and 
FitzGibbon 2004b). Sharing decision making can take many forms, from various 
kinds of partnership to decentralization, delegated powers and devolution (Armitage 
et al. 2007). The degree of power held by the community can vary widely, from 
merely being consulted to having effective control over the resource (Armitage et al. 
2007). As presented in the multi-dimensional model of co-operative management 
proposed by Plummer and FitzGibbon (2004b), the power dimension starts from 
informing at the bottom to consultation, co-operation, communication, advisory 
committees, management boards, to community control at the top. But it is the quality 
of power sharing that often makes partnerships problematic, because the less powerful 
partners are at a disadvantage for a variety of reasons (Nadasdy 2003, 2005), such as 
less formal education and lack of bureaucratic skills. Within co-management 
arrangements, power may be retained by existing agencies and cooperative 
management regimes may have the potential to be exclusionary and undemocratic 
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(Meadowcroft 1998, Plummer and FitzGibbon 2004b). The case of Dall sheep 
management in Yukon’s Ruby Range in Canada demonstrates that adaptive co-
management is unlikely to address the political/economic inequities that lie at the 
heart of Kluane people’s concerns about the sheep (Nadasdy 2007). In other cases, the 
co-management arrangement was perceived as a means of co-opting local claims to 
contested land (Castro and Nielsen 2001). In reviewing many cases in developing 
countries in Latin America, Africa and Asia, Larson and Soto (2008) found that many 
central government personnel are reluctant to redistribute power and resources and 
frequently find ways to retain these even when discourse and policies suggest 
otherwise. For example, forestry decentralization is often aimed at reducing costs, 
increasing forest department revenues, or even increasing control over local 
communities in India, rather than truly sharing power (Agrawal and Chhatre 2006). In 
some countries the introduction of protected area co-management was undertaken 
primarily because of economic and political crises and donor pressure (Larson and 
Soto 2008) as will be elaborated on later in this chapter’s review of case studies of 
developing countries. Further, local representatives sometimes may be overruled by 
the majority of stakeholders, such as government agencies, private firms, global non-
governmental organizations, and other interest groups external to communities 
(Larson and Soto 2008) and as a result, co-management may even further marginalize 
local communities and resource users (Castro and Nielsen 2001). It is unsurprising 
that co-management has therefore, been described as a continuum of power sharing 
approaches by some academics (Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2004). 
 
However, power sharing can be made more equitable through state legitimization and 
formalized arrangements, as in native titles and land claims agreements in Canada, 
Australia, and treaty settlement and land courts in New Zealand (Berkes 2009). It can 
be further strengthened by institution and capacity building and knowledge sharing 
(Armitage et al. 2007). Mitchell (1989:245) identifies seven types of institutional 
arrangements (1) legislation and regulation, (2) policies and guidelines, (3) 
administrative structures, (4) economic and financial arrangements, (5) political 
structures and processes, (6) historical and traditional customs and values, and (7) key 
participants or actors. Co-management and public participation have the potential to 
create institutional arrangements that are efficient, equitable, empowering and 
sustainable (Plummer and FitzGibbon 2004b). In order to establish such arrangements, 
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a thorough understanding of the social, economic, and other sources of power which 
influence regulatory bodies, and the wider society is fundamental (Armitage et al. 
2009). Without an understanding of class, ethnicity, gender, and the other structuring 
dimensions of society, the fragmenting forces of social, bureaucratic, and scientific 
sectors will continue constraining flexibility and preventing genuine share of 
governing authority (Armitage et al. 2009). Further, since the problem of 
overharvesting and misuse of ecological systems are often attributable to various 
causes, the preference for simple solutions to complex governance problems is 
misleading (Ostrom 2007). The adaptive attitude is crucial to deal with uncertainty 
and enhance resilience.  
 
3.1.4 Development of co-management arrangements over time 
 
The early literature on co-management depicted it as some kind of simple partnership 
arrangement similar to Arnstein’s (1969) ladder of participation, such as the different 
images of co-management that Carlsson and Berkes (2005) proposed to illustrate the 
relationship between public and private actors (Figure 14). The first image in this 
figure shows co-management as an exchange system between separate spheres (‘the 
State’ and a ‘community sphere’) including exchange of information, goods and 
services. The second image in this figure shows co-management as a joint 
organization with overlapping sectors, and stakeholders sometimes form quasi non-
governmental organizations where borders between sectors are blurred. The third and 
fourth images in Figure 14 are nested systems where either the State or the 
community might be the de facto holder of all the legal rights in a certain area or a 






Figure 14: Four images of co-management (Carlsson and Berkes 2005:68)  
 
Since the 1980s, the wide range of international experience accumulated indicates that 
co-management has become more complex and dynamic than might be concluded 
from this earlier literature, and has evolved in diverse directions (Plummer and 
Armitage 2007b). The different aspects of co-management in the literature include co-
management as power sharing, as institution building, as trust and social capital, as 
process, as problem solving and as governance (Berkes 2009). Two additional facets 
of co-management as knowledge generation and as a social learning opportunity are 
becoming increasingly important (Berkes 2009). 
 
To demonstrate such evolution, Hill et al. (2012) propose a three dimensional model 
to illustrate different types of co-governance arrangements (Figure 15). The figure 
describes the spectrum across the three dimensions of power sharing, participation, 
and intercultural purpose. “The power sharing dimension ranges from little power 
sharing in Indigenous Governance and Agency Governance types (in which 
indigenous peoples and agencies retain power respectively) to substantial power 
sharing in Indigenous driven co-governance and agency driven co-governance. The 
latter two both determine and reflect the arrangements for decision making, rules-
definition, and resource cultural values and property rights. The participation 
dimension ranges on a spectrum from inclusive to narrowly defined across the three 
categories of participation processes, organizations engaged, and coordination 
approaches. Practices to intercultural purpose vary across a spectrum from Indigenous 
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Governance’s focus on advancing distinct Indigenous societies’ and culture’s 
contributions to the nation-state, to Agency Governance’s focus on achieving 
Indigenous equity within the culture of the nation-state” (Hill et al. 2012:10). 
 
 
Figure 15: Position of types on the three axes, namely participation, intercultural purpose, and 
power sharing, and the zone of convergence of western science and Indigenous Ecological 
knowledge (IEK) that emerges in the Indigenous-governed and Indigenous-driven co-
governed types. (Hill et al. 2012:7)  
 
Different maturity stages of co-management can be identified in terms of the degree 
of power sharing, shifts in worldview, rules and norms, the building of trust and 
respect, and the elaboration of network arrangements (Armitage et al. 2007). Hence, 
one important consideration for successful and long-lasting co-management 
arrangements is the generation and use of knowledge (Berkes 2009). Some maturing 
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co-management arrangements may become adaptive co-management in time, through 
successive rounds of knowledge-sharing and learning-by-doing (Berkes 2010).  
 
3.1.5 Adaptive co-management  
 
The co-management experience since the 1980s suggests that co-management should 
not be seen as an end-point so much as an ever-evolving and responsive set of 
relationships and practices. Adaptive co-management is receiving an increasing 
amount of attention (Plummer and Armitage 2007b) and it combines the perspectives 
of co-management with those of adaptive management, producing a synthesis that is 
distinct from either (Armitage et al. 2009). Adaptive management emerges from the 
literature of applied ecology to deal with uncertainty and complexity (Berkes 2009). 
Some academics identify that the two concepts have been evolving toward a common 
ground because adaptive management without collaboration lacks legitimacy, and co-
management without learning-by-doing does not develop the ability to address 
emerging problems (Berkes 2009).  
 
As an interdisciplinary concept, adaptive co-management is an intricately woven and 
highly nuanced concept that is difficult to dissect (Plummer and Armitage 2007a). 
There are many working definitions of adaptive co-management, and each has 
different emphasis. For example, Folke et al. (2005:448) define adaptive co-
management as: “a process by which institutional arrangements and ecological 
knowledge are tested and revised in a dynamic, ongoing, self-organized process of 
learning-by-doing”. In contrast, Armitage et al. (2009:96) refer to adaptive co-
management as “a flexible system of resource management, tailored to specific places 
and situations, supported by, and working in conjunction with, various organizations 
at different scales”. The first definition focuses on process while the later puts more 
emphasis on systems. As Olsson et al. (2004) point out, a key feature of adaptive co-
management is the combination of the iterative learning dimension of adaptive 
management and the linkage dimension of co-management to share rights and 
responsibilities. For the purpose of this research, the above Armitage’s definition will 




In practice, adaptive co-management has a number of key characteristics. According 
to Berkes (2009), adaptive co-management has three aspects: horizontal interaction 
among stakeholders, vertical interaction of communities with actors at other levels 
and iterative learning. Plummer and Armitage (2007b:6) identify five core 
components of adaptive co-management:  
1. adaptive capacity to evolve and change in light of feedback; 
2. social learning by which actions are developed, tested, reflected upon, and 
revised, i.e., double loop learning, learning by doing; 
3. communication, i.e., sharing of information and establishment of shared 
understanding; 
4. sharing authority, i.e., power, between at least two groups of actors, usually, 
but not limited to, the state and civic actors and/or users; and 
5. shared decision making. 
 
In order to distinguish adaptive co-management both structurally and functionally 
from other forms of collaborative undertakings in natural resource management, 
Armitage et al. (2009) identified ten key conditions for success and these are 
presented in this Table 4 below. This table provides a good way to assess successful 
adaptive co-management and will be used later in this thesis to assess what is 





Table 4: Ten conditions for successful adaptive co-management (Armitage et al. 2009:101)  




Systems characterized by relatively immobile (as 
opposed to highly migratory and/or trans-boundary) 
resource stocks  
Small-scale resource use 
contexts 
 
Small-scale systems (e.g. management of a specific 
rangeland or local fishery) will reduce the number of 
competing interests, institutional complexities, and 
layers of organization.  
Clear and identifiable set of 
social entities with shared 
interests 
In situations where stakeholders have limited or no 
connection to “place”, building linkages and trust will 
be problematic.  
Reasonably clear property 
rights to resources of concern 
(e.g. fisheries, forest) 
 
Where rights or bundles of rights to resource use are 
reasonably clear (whether common property or 
individual), enhanced security of access and 
incentives may better facilitate governance innovation 
and learning over the long term.  
Access to adaptable portfolio 
of management measures 
 
These measures may include licensing and quota 
setting, regulations, technological adjustments (e.g. 
gear size), education schemes, and so on.  
Commitment to support a 
long-term institution-
building process 
Success is more likely where stakeholders accept the 
long-term nature of the process. 
Provision of training, 
capacity building, and 
resources for local-, regional-
, and national-level 
stakeholders 
At the local level, resources that facilitate 
collaboration and effective sharing of decision 
making power are required. Regional- and national-
level entities must also be provided with the necessary 
resources. 
Key leaders or individuals 
prepared to champion the 
process 
 
Individuals who have a long-term connection to 
“place” and the resource, or, within a bureaucracy, to 
policy and its implementation. Such individuals will 
be viewed as effective mediators in resolving conflict. 
Openness of participants to 
share and draw upon a 
plurality of knowledge 
systems and sources 
Both expert and non-expert knowledge can play 
productive and essential roles in problem 
identification, framing, and analysis.  
National and regional policy 
environment explicitly 
supportive of collaborative 
management efforts 
This support can be articulated through federal or 
state/provincial legislation or land claim agreements, 
and the willingness to distribute functions across 
organizational levels. Additionally, consistent support 
across policy sectors will enhance the likelihood of 
success, and encourage clear objectives, provision of 
resources, and the devolution of real power to local 
actors and user groups. 
 
Although adaptive co-management may provide an evolving and place-specific 
governance approach that responds to feedback and orients social and ecological 
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systems towards sustainability, there are many challenges and barriers in practice 
(Armitage et al. 2009). Plummer and Armitage (2007b:7) summarize the following 
key challenges or barriers to adaptive co-management in practice: 
 the unwillingness and inflexibility of the state and resource managers to share 
power; power asymmetries among those involved; 
 insufficient commitment of resources, e.g., financial, human, technical, etc.; 
 group dynamics: preconceived attitudes about stakeholders unresolved 
conflicts and defensiveness, mistrust, domination of particular interests; and 
 lack of capacity and information asymmetries. 
 
Besides the above challenges and barriers to adaptive co-management, there are other 
cautions about embracing the concept of adaptive co-management. One caution is that 
adaptive co-management is no guarantee of fairness and equity in resource sharing 
(Agrawal and Ostrom 2001). Another caution is that learning does not necessarily 
lead to adaptation and, in some cases, participatory processes may be reduced to a 
bureaucratic mechanism in which some groups are able to pursue their private 
interests at the expense of other less powerful stakeholders (Berkes 2009).  
 
3.1.6 Co-management in practice 
 
In practice, different kinds of co-management exist, from informal consultation to full 
and equal sharing of authority (Berkes et al. 1991). Viewed collectively, these 
exercises in decentralized participatory management constitute a fundamental 
redesign of conventional resource management institutions by linking resource 
managers and resource-dependent local communities (Spaeder and Feit 2005). One 
recent attempt to synthesize experience from 130 cases of community-based fishery 
co-management globally found that successes are more likely in more developed 
countries (as measured by human development index rank) and in industrial rather 
than small-scale enterprises (Gutierrez et al. 2011). Developed nations such as Canada, 
US, New Zealand, Australia, and Scandinavian countries (Sweden and Norway) have 
more advanced co-management regimes and more successful cases. Developing 
nations, such as countries in South East Asia (Indonesia, Cambodia, Vietnam, and 
Philippines), Africa, and Central America, with less money and greater population 
62 
 
pressure, have less developed co-management schemes and face greater challenges 
(Larson and Soto 2008). Some specific examples of more and less successful co-
management regimes are discussed below. 
 
3.1.6.1 Successful co-management practices 
 
Early successful co-management cases in Canada are related to Aboriginal Peoples 
and land claim agreements, because land claim agreements provide legally defined 
management rights of local resource users (Pomeroy and Berkes 1997). Starting with 
the 1975 James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreements, co-management first emerged 
in the North of Canada (Pomeroy and Berkes 1997). Each of these modern 
comprehensive land claim agreements has a section that specifies the sharing of 
jurisdiction for fisheries and wildlife management, and establishes an institutional 
structure (in the form of management boards and joint committees) to implement co-
management (Berkes 2005). The case of Haida Gwaii had been characterized by long-
term conflicts and power imbalances. From the perception of Haida Gwaii people, the 
signing of the Haida Gwaii Strategic Land Use Agreement (1993) represented a 
significant turning point in resource management and the beginning of a more 
balanced relationship between the Haida Nation and government of British Columbia 
(Takeda and Ropke 2010). The successful establishment of co-management also 
involved a coherent grassroots alliance, long-term radical planning and visioning, 
strong leadership and the capacity for effective mobilization (Takeda and Ropke 
2010). But from a Parks Canada perspective, the agreement does not differ from 
others where the Minister still has the rights to make decisions when consensus is not 
gained. In the US, the case of Yup’ik Eskimo hunters in Western Alaska also shows 
that the establishment of legal rights for aboriginal peoples to manage resources was 
the basis for Yup’ik Eskimo hunters to win the right for co-management through the 
courts (Spaeder 2005).   
 
Indigenous people’s involvement in protected area management has also been long 
established in Australia (Ross et al. 2009). The introduction of the Aboriginal Land 
Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 enabled traditional owners to claim ‘unalienated 
Crown land’, and this led to the creation of Kakadu National Park – a joint managed 
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park between the traditional owners and the government (Ross et al. 2009). There are 
now numerous examples of co-management in varying forms across Australia 
stemming from growing experience and interest, including formal joint management 
(supported by legislation), less formal co-management (supported by policy 
arrangement but not legislation) and Indigenous Protected Areas (Ross 2011). For 
example, in the Kimberley region of Western Australia, the Miriuwung-Gajerrong 
people initiated a Cultural Planning Framework to help achieve greater equity in 
planning for co-management of the first Indigenous owned protected areas managed 
with the state (Hill 2011). In this case, Miriuwung-Gajerrong people’s sense of 
ownership and empowerment, the clear visibility of their law and culture, and the 
emerging joint vision and joint decision-making approach between the parties, 
characterize this shared sense of equity (Hill 2011). 
 
In New Zealand, the case of Te Urewera, previously known as Te Urewera National 
Park, is the most prominent recent example of a commitment to co-management. This 
settlement demonstrates that the potential effectiveness and legitimacy of co-
management may be dependent on appropriate resolution of the historical legacies on 
which parks in former colonies are premised (Coombes and Hill 2005). In 2014, the 
Maori tribe of this area and the New Zealand Government reached a settlement that 
has implemented a revolutionary resolution whereby the park has been removed from 
the National Parks Act 1980 and known now as being its own entity and having its 
own legal personality (Te Urewera Act 2014). Neither Maori nor the Government 
own this land now as it is its own entity. The land is now co-managed by a Board with 
representatives from the tribe and Government (Te Urewera Act 2014). 
 
As the only developed country in Asia, Japan has one of the world’s oldest and most 
successful marine fisheries co-management regimes. Fishery cooperative associations 
(FCAs) are the management body of local fisheries (Matsuda et al. 2010). Based on 
both the traditional and scientific knowledge of the local environment, each FCA 
establishes detailed rules on the fisheries operations on the local fishing grounds and 
enforces them on autonomous bases (Matsuda et al. 2010). Government supports such 
activities by providing legal and scientific information and subsidies (Matsuda et al. 
2010). Experience from the co-management of fisheries in the Shiretoko World 
Heritage site show how adaptive management based on daily operations can work 
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when the fishermen compile the catch statistics (Matsuda et al. 2009). Japan’s case 
shows that once autonomous regulations have been agreed upon, the management 
plan is relatively well implemented with lower cost (Matsuda et al. 2010). 
 
Among the myriad of developing countries, there are some exceptional examples of 
advanced co-management. In Kumaon, India, villagers mobilized against the efforts 
of the British colonial state to appropriate forests, and won significant property rights 
to become proprietors of large areas of forests through community based Forest 
Councils (Agrawal and Ostrom 2001). Such Councils constitute perhaps the oldest 
surviving examples of formal collaboration between communities and the state to 
manage resources although local collective action by villagers and bureaucratic 
politics within the state were critical in the formation of the Forest Councils (Agrawal 
and Ostrom 2001). Another example, known widely as the Joint Forest Management 
Program, was initiated in the 1990s by the central Indian government and many 
provincial governments (Nayak and Berkes 2008). Despite criticisms that rural 
households have a limited share in proceeds from sales of forest timber, Joint Forest 
Management has provided millions of villagers more legitimate access to important 
livelihood resources and has given them a stake in environmental conservation 
(Agrawal and Ostrom 2001). 
 
In the Philippines, government, NGOs, fishing communities, academic and research 
institutions have implemented well over 250 community-based co-management 
projects (Blake et al. 2012). These groups and organizations have developed strong 
networks to play bridging functions and to facilitate learning about community based 
co-management across multiple sites (Blake et al. 2012). In the Philippines, co-
management practitioners have paid increased attention to inter-sectorial and cross-
scale linkages after observing the vulnerability of progress made through earlier 
efforts. An example is the promotion of ecotourism in co-managed marine protected 
areas, which can benefit host communities but has the potential to disempower certain 





3.1.6.2 Failed co-management practices 
 
Since the early-1990s, public participation and empowerment have become an integral 
part of all donor conditions for development assistance (Ruddle and Hickey 2008). 
Many development projects greatly reduced the role of state authorities and enhanced 
the involvement of local actors under the assumption that local actors and institutions, 
acting out of self-interest, would display a greater sense of responsibility for local 
sustainable development and resource management than would centralized state 
institutions (Ruddle and Hickey 2008). Such implications are demonstrated in many 
co-management projects practiced throughout the world. However, numerous cases 
demonstrate the resistance of central government to transferring real powers to other 
entities (Larson and Soto 2008). Due to various reasons such as failure to transfer 
significant powers to local institutions, local elites take advantage of power and 
upward accountability, many co-management cases failed to bring real benefit to local 
communities. For example, in Bangladesh, co-management agreements for 
agroforestry served as legal mechanisms to assert control over contested land which 
intensified conflict and tensions between forest service and forest communities 
(Larson and Soto 2008).  
 
Further, the co-management concept is based on the political and economic context of 
capitalist resource extraction, so it may result in thoughts and actions that end up 
reinforcing existing political and economic inequalities (Nadasdy 2007). Uganda is an 
example of such failed practice of co-management. Despite attempts at decentralizing 
management of forest and fishery resources in Uganda, market value takes priority 
over local-level development and resource sustainability (Lawrence and Watkins 
2012). The analysis reveals that the failure to transfer power to local-level users; 
inefficient distribution of revenue to the local communities, and prioritization of 
market value of natural resources over social development are the reasons for the co-
management failure (Lawrence and Watkins 2012). The current institutional 
arrangements that govern Uganda’s forestry and fishery resources allow for maximum 
resource extraction to take precedence over ecosystem health and resource 
sustainability and longevity (Lawrence and Watkins 2012). As a result, devolution of 





Similarly, Ruddle and Hickey (2008) analyzed the reasons for the failure of co-
management projects in tropical nearshore fisheries. All the three main actors 
(national governments, donors and user communities) were found to have different 
perceptions of the benefits, basis and hidden agendas in the co-management process. 
As a result, conflict is inevitable, thereby undermining the undertaking from the outset. 
For example, national governments and donors commonly assume that user 
communities are not organized, and that existing local institutions based on traditional 
systems and custom law are not suitable for use in a new management regime. 
Consequently, the national government feels it must organize and mobilize the 
community to participate effectively in co-management which is created by 
government facilitators employing Western democratic principles and processes 
acceptable to donors. Although democratic and transparent arrangements for the 
participation and support for the new management system from the fishermen were 
written into the documents, neither the regulations’ content or structure, nor their 
monitoring and enforcement, changed significantly. In such cases, when there are 
existing local systems, introducing a ‘new’ management system is not as effective as 
strengthening the useful elements of the old ones with recognition, support and some 
new tools from the government (Ruddle and Hickey 2008). 
 
By contrast, in some parts of the world, especially in Western Europe, the 
participatory approach to protected area management has been for some time the rule 
rather than the exception (Borrini et al. 2004). For instance, the interests of local 
people are generally central to the stated objectives of protected areas and privately 
owned plots are commonly included in the protected territory (Borrini et al. 2004). As 
the landscapes of Europe are the product of a long history of interaction between 
people and the land, biodiversity values are often found in association with traditional 
land uses and the most appreciated landscapes are those that combine natural and 
cultural features (Borrini et al. 2004).  
 
On a global scale, participatory conservation has become the guiding principle of 
UNESCO Biosphere Reserves (BRs) since the 1970s (UNESCO 1996). Since the 
1990s, through its MAB and LINKS programs, UNESCO has implemented activities 
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to facilitate development of partnerships with local communities and protected area 
management, including co-management (UNESCO 2008).  
 
3.1.7 Biosphere Reserves and co-management   
 
3.1.7.1 Biosphere Reserve concept 
 
As noted in Chapter 2, YNNR is a Biosphere Reserve. The Biosphere Reserve (BR) 
concept was introduced by UNESCO and its Man and Biosphere (MAB) program in 
1974 (UNESCO 2014). The World Network of Biosphere Reserves (WNBR) 
currently comprises 621 Biosphere Reserves located in 117 countries (UNESCO 
2014). The BRs first had two primary goals: conservation and ecological research, 
then in 1995 according to the Seville Strategy, the concept expanded to promote the 
combination of biodiversity conservation with sustainable use and benefit sharing 
from natural resources (UNESCO 2014). In 2008, the Madrid Action Plan (MAP) 
further elevated Biosphere Reserves as principal internationally designated areas and 
learning sites for sustainable development (UNESCO 2014). This concept is in 
contrast to conventional protected areas, such as the IUCN category I and II protected 
areas with the following definitions (IUCN 2013b):  
 Ia Strict nature reserve: Strictly protected for biodiversity and also possibly 
geological/geomorphological features, where human visitation, use and 
impacts are controlled and limited to ensure protection of the conservation 
values. 
 Ib Wilderness area: Usually large unmodified or slightly modified areas, 
retaining their natural character and influence, without permanent or 
significant human habitation, protected and managed to preserve their natural 
condition. 
 II National Park: Large natural or near-natural areas protecting large-scale 
ecological processes with characteristic species and ecosystems, which also 
have environmentally and culturally compatible spiritual, scientific, 




Conventional protected areas are supposed to be kept free from human impacts that 
requires eliminating or at least dramatically minimizing human use of natural systems, 
such as the above IUCN category I and II protected areas (around 6 million km
2
 
worldwide (Bertzky et al. 2012)) (Batisse 1997, Salafsky 2011). These protected areas 
have generally been established in areas of low population density. In contrast, in 
alluvial and agricultural plains, protected areas are difficult to establish because of the 
pressures created by higher population densities and economic activities (Batisse 
1997). Strictly managed protected areas are like closed territories with little or no 
links to the outside world. As Batisse (1997) describes, many national parks look from 
the air like vegetation patches cut out from the surrounding landscape with scissors. 
However, conservation is also a human endeavour that ultimately requires getting 
resource users to support conservation aims, and serving human welfare and 
development needs (Salafsky 2011). Where local populations have not been included 
in the decision making process of establishing a protected area, the community can 
easily become hostile (Batisse 1997). Furthermore, if those who depended on 
resources near reserves are criminalized for what they harvest, it can result in 
inequality and human suffering, and the emergence of resistance and political struggle 
(Dressler et al. 2010).  
 
Biosphere reserves are designated to reconcile conservation of biodiversity and 
biological resources with their sustainable use (UNESCO 1996). The objective for 
biosphere reserves is to achieve a balance between the sometimes conflicting goals of 
conserving natural and cultural diversity, promoting sustainable development, and 
facilitating research, monitoring, education, and training (UNESCO 1996, Batisse 
1997). The basic principle of biosphere reserve management is to obtain the consent 
and the active support of all stakeholders, particularly local people living in or around 
the biosphere reserve (Batisse 1997). Sound management of biosphere reserves 
depends on sharing a common vision and arriving at some kind of contractual 
agreement with these stakeholders that states what can or cannot be done in the 
different zones (Batisse 1997). Given the geographic juxtaposition of human poverty 
and biological wealth (Sanderson et al. 2002, Sanderson 2005) of many biosphere 
reserves, a variety of “win-win” approaches have been designed to enhance the well-
being of local people while simultaneously halting the destruction of ecosystems, 
which include debt-for-nature swaps, extractive reserves, community-based 
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conservation, and integrated conservation and development projects (McShane et al. 
2011). 
 
As some ecologists point out, humans usually, although not always, improve their 
condition by simplifying nature to the detriment of its biological diversity and as a 
result, an increase in human welfare generally involves diminishing natural world 
welfare (Robinson 1993, Salafsky 2011). Integrated projects that rely on extraction 
have been critiqued as fundamentally ecologically unsound for exacerbating negative 
ecological impacts (McShane et al. 2011). Ironically, such attempts have also been 
criticized for not being extensive or quick enough in generating economic 
development for unequal distribution of benefits which favour more powerful 
interests rather than the poorest or the most in need and for coming into conflict with 
existing livelihood strategies (McShane et al. 2011). A review of projects supported 
by the Global Environment Facility found that most GEF projects in the biodiversity 
portfolio involve some form of restriction of existing patterns of resource exploitation, 
which generally leads to a loss of livelihood and development opportunities for at 
least some individuals or groups (McShane et al. 2011). Consequently, although so-
called win-win approaches to conservation have the appearance of being ethical, 
efficient, and highly marketable (McShane et al. 2011) overall there is a definite 
trade-off between conservation and development (Salafsky 2011).  
 
3.1.7.2 Trade-off between conservation and development 
 
In the heated “parks vs. people” debate, many scholars have expressed their views 
about the positive and negative aspects of attempting to trade off development and 
conservation (Miller et al. 2011). From the nature protectionists’ point of view, 
improving the material quality of human life will inevitably decrease the diversity of 
life, because resource potential and human needs are incompatible (Robinson 1993, 
Miller et al. 2011). According to Robinson (1993), economic constraints on user 
groups often force overexploitation, which means activities such as limited catches 
and selective cuts that are ecologically sustainable do not meet the socioeconomic 
needs of the users. He argues that the more intense the human use of an ecosystem, 
the greater the loss of biological diversity, thus sustainable use is a utopian vision 
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which can hardly be achieved without the management capacities and appropriate 
economic incentives (Robinson 1993). From the social conservationist point of view, 
strict conservation will slow down economic growth, ignore human rights (i.e., pre-
existing use rights), reduce human welfare and disrupt traditional institutions and 
culture (Wilshusen et al. 2002, Miller et al. 2011).  
 
This debate is leading to the fundamental questions of: what is conservation 
ultimately for - is it for nature, or for human beings? The nature protectionists believe 
nature and biodiversity must be conserved for their own sakes, (i.e., for its intrinsic 
value), while social conservationists believe biodiversity should be protected for its 
instrumental value to humans and conservation should focus on human welfare 
(Wilshusen et al. 2002). So one side is non-anthropocentric which is pro-nature and 
the other is anthropocentric which is pro-people (Wilshusen et al. 2002, Miller et al. 
2011). Underlying this debate is the question of whether human and nature are 
separated. In fact, humans used to be part of nature and lived along with the natural 
cycle of nature. However, as humans become more and more powerful and able to 
manipulate nature especially after the industrial revolution, humans have become 
more and more alienated from nature (Meadows et al. 1972, Wilson 2002). So 
increasingly humans consider themselves as the masters of nature and superior to all 
other species, and that they can use all natural resources to increase their welfare 
(Robinson 1993, Wilson 2002). In this way some people from industrialized nations 
separate themselves from nature, and the harmony between them and nature is lost.  
 
Currently, the dominant development model throughout the world still emphasizes the 
goal of growing national gross domestic product (GDP) through increasing the 
consumption of natural resources and the export and import of goods (Robinson and 
Redford 2004). Under this model, the welfare of nature and welfare of humans are 
incompatible, resulting in resource depletion and environmental degradation 
(Robinson and Redford 2004). The confrontational dichotomy between humans and 
nature (Wilshusen et al. 2002) is largely driven by the economic imperatives of 
modern extractive and agro-industries for capitalist production (Nadasdy 2007). As 
long as this capitalist dynamic exists, the pressure to make management decisions 
based on the stability of one or two key resources will remain enormous and may lead 




Many studies have indicated that in several countries, beyond a certain point, GDP 
growth no longer correlates with increased economic welfare such as HDI, and further, 
increased economic welfare doesn’t mean increased life satisfaction and personal 
happiness (Kubiszewski et al. 2013). However, the “First World” conventional notion 
of economic growth is promoted throughout the world, and the trend so far appears 
irreversible as it increasingly spreads into previously lower-impact nations such as 
China. Once people get used to cars, airplanes and other modern technologies, it is 
hard for them to go back to traditional ways of living. Consequently, the whole world 
is pushed by this development trend and ecological degradation is the inevitable 
consequence. As Wilson (2002) claims, it would now take four Earths to meet the 
consumption demands of the current human population, if every human consumed at 
the level of the average US in-habitant. It is this development model that is 
unsustainable and incompatible with conservation unless we can change the 
development goal to serve both human and natural welfare. 
 
According to Robinson (2011) some practitioner and academic communities are 
beginning to question the assumptions underlying win-win approaches for 
conservation and development as conceptually flawed, since many situations on the 
ground involve competing, rather than complementary, social, economic, and 
ecological goals (Robinson 2011). In real life cases, there are trade-offs to be made 
between different interests and priorities, between long-term and short-term time 
horizons, and between benefits at one spatial scale and costs at another (McShane et al. 
2011). According to McShane et al. (2011), the essence of trade-off thinking is the 
idea that, when some things are gained, others are lost. Practitioners have to make 
hard choices in the conservation-development nexus because each choice, even the 
best or “optimal” one, involves loss in some way and a loss that for at least some of 
those affected is likely to be significant. Acknowledging trade-offs thus implies 
recognizing the gains as well as the losses - no matter whether they are real, potential, 
or perceived – will be incurred by various choices and actions in the domains of 
conservation and development. As McShane et al. (2011) note, choices are often made 
without even knowing that something is being overlooked or given up because there is 




3.1.7.3 Biosphere Reserve concept in practice 
 
3.1.7.3.1 Biosphere Reserves worldwide 
 
Many cases around the world have demonstrated that the ambitious goal of the 
biosphere reserves (BR) to achieve conservation and development simultaneously is 
unrealistic. For example, the Mornington Peninsula and Westernport Biosphere 
Reserve (MPWPBR) designated in 2002 in a part of a peri-urban Australian city has 
faced unprecedented land use pressures from numerous private development sectors 
(Mercer and Hyman 2009). While the integrated functions proposed by the Biosphere 
Reserve concept could potentially be applied there to achieve better planning 
outcomes, none of the State, local, or Commonwealth actors have attempted to 
mobilise the Biosphere Reserve status for this purpose. Past and contemporary 
pressures are so intense that even the authors doubted the ability of an international 
label to influence the sustainability of the region. In addition, because the State 
government declared that economic growth and development are at the top of the 
policy agenda, and the cheap land in the areas has been singled out as offering the best 
sites for the provision of new housing, the views of local government and community 
groups have to be in accord with this vision. So the promise of the MPWPBR for 
integrating development and conservation remains unfulfilled (Mercer and Hyman 
2009). 
 
Another case is the La Sepultura Biosphere Reserve in Chiapas, Mexico which 
showed that attempts to achieve a win-win, involving both Payments for 
Environmental Services (PES) and Integrated Conservation and Development Projects 
(ICDPs) had potential impacts on local culture and tradition. Their results support the 
idea that PES is contributing to shifting from a “culture of conservation” to a “culture 
of monetary criteria” and this might be harmful for conservation purposes in the long 
run (Rico García-Amado et al. 2013). ICDPs are also market-oriented and market-
dependent, since projects support activities at all market scales and follow the 
“conservation by commercialization” logic. Markets make Conservation and 
Development strategies (direct and indirect) potentially vulnerable because small 
producers are less able to compete, and producers may face high opportunity costs, 
like foregoing lucrative illegal or non-sustainable activities, and market discount rates 
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tend to clash with social–ecological discount rates (Rico García-Amado et al. 2013). 
So all these seemingly win-win solutions have potential pitfalls and involve trade-offs.  
 
This is also true in Asian counties. In comparing cases in the Philippines and Thailand, 
Dressler and Roth (2011) found strong congruencies in how neoliberal conservation 
has interconnected with and facilitated agricultural change toward a more privatised, 
commodified and commercialized direction. Although “many suggest the Philippines 
and Thailand have undergone a profound shift from coercive to devolved 
conservation”, they conclude that both cases “have shown that park planners, NGO 
and powerful locals have rearticulated older ways of regulating farmer behaviour 
through market-based conservation (Dressler and Roth 2011:860)”. As a result, such 
approaches forced small and subsistence farmers to join the global market and give up 
their traditional way of living thus destroying the cultural diversity they tried to 
protect. If the global market fails, those small farmers and small countries will be the 
first to lose out, and the environment will suffer in turn.   
 
3.1.7.3.2 Biosphere Reserves in China 
 
The biosphere reserves in China also share the same experience as their international 
counterparts. In Wolong Biosphere Reserve, local farmers bore the brunt of the 
conservation costs of restricted land use, with their traditional resource use impaired 
by the spatial regulations of the reserve (Coetzer et al. 2014). Despite the effort made 
by the management authority to adopt some strategies of integrated conservation and 
development projects (ICDPs), for example ecotourism, the revenue of ecotourism 
seldom went to local farmers and it was not enough to be a significant incentive to 
promote conservation (Fu et al. 2004). For the community, the establishment of the 
Biosphere Reserve further undermined their already fragile socio-economic 
circumstances, offering no opportunities for improvement of livelihood options 
(Coetzer et al. 2014). The lack of local participation in development and conservation 
projects, and the inadequate concern about the welfare of local farmers, made 
restrictions hard to enforce, and as a result, illegal felling of forest trees and 
exploitation of other forest resources continued (Fu et al. 2004). So, in this case, both 




In Changbai Mountain Biosphere Reserve (CMBR), a famous sightseeing attraction in 
northeast part of China, attitudes held by most farmers are not favourable toward the 
conservation of the CMBR. Although ecotourism has been carried out there for over 
25 years, the 1-day-sightseeing tour style and the limited tourism period failed to 
provide any enhancement for local income (Yuan et al. 2008). Because the CMBR is 
not a successfully operating ecotourism destination, it can only generate funds for 
conservation, while community benefits are very limited (Yuan et al. 2008). Further, 
before 2006, reserve authorities supplemented their limited salaries by issuing 
collection contracts to private individuals for forest resources (e.g. pine nuts), and 
such unequal treatment caused resentment from local residents and provided them 
with the motivation to continue with their own exploitation of the forest, regardless of 
the restrictions in place (Coetzer et al. 2014). Such situations are common in the early 
stages of protected areas management across China and cause negative impacts not 
only on the image of nature reserve authorities but also the quality of the ecosystems 
they set out to protect.  
 
The only exception in China may be the Jiuzhaigou Biosphere Reserve. The results of 
a study of tourism carried out by Li et al. (2006) showed that the natural environment 
in Jiuzhaigou Biosphere Reserve was not degraded and some indicators even 
improved because all the residents participated in tourism and gave up farming and 
hunting. They concluded that it is possible to use tourism as a way to balance natural 
resource conservation and economic development under the preconditions of making 
effective policies to encourage and help local people participate in the tourism 
business and to benefit from it (Li et al. 2006). A more recent study in Jiuzhaigou 
Biosphere Reserve carried out by Hu and Lei (2014) discovered that when tourist 
numbers increased around the mid-1990s, the negative impact of mass tourism such as 
pollution and unplanned construction caused environmental destruction. As a result, 
the administration moved all private hotels outside the reserve, and compensated the 
local residents with alternative businesses inside the reserve and allocated ticket 
revenue to them as well (Hu and Lei 2014). So in this seemingly win-win solution, 
there were also trade-offs, since the administration put priority on conservation and 




As Salafsky (2011) pointed out, perhaps we need to stop believing that we can “have 
our cake and eat it too” which means recognising that attaining both conservation and 
development goals is unachievable. He suggests that practitioners should either 
implement projects with pure conservation ends, or at least projects with clear links 
between conservation and development ends so that stakeholders can make well-
informed trade-offs (Salafsky 2011). There can be a wide gap between the 
development goals of local people and conservation goals in a strictly protected area. 
However, if a conservation project adopts strict conservation ends, it cannot ignore 
development concerns. Instead, they need to consider human needs in the context of 
the threats and contributing factors, and find the most optimal solutions from a 
conservation perspective, while considering socio-economic constraints (Salafsky 
2011).  
 
3.1.7.3.3 Participatory conservation evaluation 
 
In order to investigate the relevance of participation in Biosphere Reserve 
management activities, some surveys have been conducted in the World Network of 
Biosphere Reserves to gain insights into community participation in decision-making 
and implementation, and the management effectiveness in achieving the goals. Stoll-
Kleemann et al. (2010) carried out two parallel surveys involving managers of 276 
BRs worldwide. The surveys found most Biosphere Reserve managers are confronted 
with tremendous difficulties in effective implementation of conservation goals. The 
difficulties include: chronic lack of financial, technical and human resources, critical 
power asymmetries between conservation institutions and local actors, and structural 
obstacles such as poverty, corruption or weak governance. Thus, despite the promises 
of participatory conservation, the decline in biodiversity within officially designated 
areas remains rife. However, many managers believe community participation plays 
an important role in Biosphere Reserve management and view it as a significant 
component both in the acceptance of the Biosphere Reserve and/or the success of its 
conservation programs (Stoll-Kleemann et al. 2010). Similarly, through analysis of 
146 survey responses from Biosphere Reserves Centers, Schultz et al. (2011) found 
that the involvement of local people in management had three positive effects: 
increased support from local people and the likelihood of projects to produce 
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satisfactory outcomes; higher expectations of reaching sustainable development goals; 
and no negative effects in reaching conventional conservation goals. According to 
some respondents to the study, adaptive co-management arrangements make 
conservation become part of development and enhance the effectiveness in reaching 
sustainable development goals without impairing conservation goals. Overall, there 
were no negative effects of participation and adaptive co-management although the 
feasibility of adaptive co-management is context-dependent and should not be 
promoted as a panacea (Schultz et al. 2011).   
 
3.1.8 Summary  
 
In summary, there are a number of complexities in co-management: (1) complexities 
of the State, (2) complexities of the community, (3) complexities of the dynamic and 
iterative nature of the system, (4) complexities of the conditions available to support 
the management system, (5) complexities of co-management as a governance system, 
and finally (6) complexities of the ecosystem that provides the resources that are 
being managed (Carlsson and Berkes 2005:67). In order to tackle such complexity, 
researchers have increasingly been attending to political and historical contexts, as 
well as conflicts and power relations between local communities and governmental 
management institutions (Spaeder and Feit 2005). The following section considers co-
management in China in relation to the complexities inherent to the country. 
 
3.2 Co-management in China 
 
3.2.1 The introduction of co-management into China 
 
As the above sections demonstrated, co-management has been widely practiced 
throughout the world in various kinds of natural resources management realms 
including protected area management. However, in China, such a concept was novel 
until the 1990s when the Western-style “no-take, no-go” protected areas model was 
increasingly realized to be culturally and socially flawed (Ruddle and Hickey 2008). 
For example, one consequence of the protected areas was the estimated millions of 
“conservation refugees” forced off their ancestral lands to support the Western ideal 
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of protecting nature from humans (Ruddle and Hickey 2008). Yet, with more than 12% 
of all land protected from its indigenous inhabitants, biodiversity continued to 
decrease on a daily basis and at an accelerating rate which was an indication that the 
wrong prescription is being applied to the issue of biodiversity loss and sustainable 
resource management (Ruddle and Hickey 2008). 
 
Co-management is a strategy proposed to tackle such problems. One of the first 
examples of co-management in China was the Global Environment Facility (GEF) 
program, introduced in 1995. China’s Nature Reserve Management Project, started in 
August 1995, was funded by GEF and operated under the specific guidance and 
management of the World Bank and the China State Forestry Administration 
(Broadfield and Kaber 2002). The project focused on five reserve areas of 
international importance in China (Qinling Nature Reserve, Xishuangbanna Nature 
Reserve, Boyanghu Nature Reserve, Shennongjia Nature Reserve, and Wuyishan 
Nature Reserve). Co-management was a key subcomponent in the project.  
 
As an integral part of all donor conditions for development assistance, the rationale 
for the donors to encourage co-management was that local people would be more 
responsible for local sustainable development than central government (Ruddle and 
Hickey 2008). However, co-management was a novel concept in China, as it arose 
from the participation of the general public in environmental debates and grassroots 
democracy in Western societies (Ruddle and Hickey 2008) which is very different 
from the situation in China where public involvement in any form of management is 
very limited to non-existent. Despite this, government officials agreed to co-
management clauses in order to be able to meet donor requirements in order to gain 
much needed cash infusions for their otherwise resource-limited departments (Ruddle 
and Hickey 2008). 
 
Subsequently, many donor-aided co-management projects were implemented in China. 
For example, from Oct 2002 to Oct 2008, GEF implemented the Sustainable Forestry 
Development Project (SFDP), which consisted of three components: Natural Forest 
Management (NFM), Plantation Establishment (PE) and Protected Area Management 
(PAM). This project involved 13 nature reserves in 7 provinces in China. Co-
management was a subcomponent of the PAM component (Huang et al. 2004). In 
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1998, with the help of the Netherlands government, China implemented the Forest 
Resource Conservation and Community Development Project in Yunnan Province 
(Liu et al. 2010b). There were other international organizations which also funded co-
management projects in nature reserves throughout China during this period, such as 
World Wildlife Fund (WWF) and International Crane Foundation (ICF) (Su 2004).   
 
3.2.2 The experience of co-management in China  
 
Since GEF had a consistent policy seeking community involvement, it incorporated a 
co-management component as an indicator of management efficiency for most of its 
funded projects. In the Nature Reserve Management Project carried out in 1995, GEF 
required a pilot community nature reserve co-management structure to be 
implemented at six of the reserves. It supported four activities: (1) Community 
briefing on the scope and benefits of co-management; (2) Training for NR staff in 
Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) techniques and conservation advocacy skills; (3) 
Formation of stakeholder committees; and (4) Preparation of Community Resource 
Management Plans and Co-Management Contracts (Global Environment Facility 
1995).  
 
GEF defined co-management as the sharing of responsibilities for management 
decision-making, implementation, and evaluation which is different from the 
definition my research adopted which emphasizes partnership (Global Environment 
Facility 1995). According to local project practitioners, the concept of co-
management was translated as the process of sharing the management responsibility 
of the nature reserve and the community’s natural resources between the nature 
reserve management team and the local community (Huang et al. 2004). This 
definition further discomposes co-management as a process of sharing responsibilities 
for the ease of implementation. Another definition known by Chinese scholars came 
from Borrini-Feyerabend (2000): “a pluralist approach to managing natural resources 
(NRs), incorporating a variety of partners in a variety of roles, generally to the end 
goals of environmental conservation, sustainable use of NRs and the equitable sharing 
of resource-related benefits and responsibilities.” (p. 1). Although this definition is 




According to GEF (1995), the co-management contract between a nature reserve and 
a community will contain an alternative income generation program whereby GEF 
and local government will provide grants to reduce the need for communities to 
harvest protected flora and fauna in nature reserves. Grants will be approved by the 
provincial office of nature reserves, and each grant will be made under a contract 
between the recipient and the nature reserve administration on the basis of a model 
contract acceptable to the World Bank Group (the money lender); and a report 
evaluating the experience of the community investment grant program will be 
prepared and furnished to the World Bank Group (Global Environment Facility 1995). 
Co-management activities sponsored by other international agencies often had similar 
goals, which were essentially biodiversity conservation integrated with sustainable 
community management (Wild Fauna Flora Protection Nature Reserve Management 
2002).  
 
The total number of co-management projects sponsored by international aid agencies 
conducted in China is difficult to estimate due to the number of international agencies 
and the scale of the projects. However, according to Yang et al, (2007) from 1995 to 
2006, 10% of the nature reserves in Yunnan province (193 nature reserves in 2005) 
established co-management mechanisms or carried out co-management activities 
sponsored internationally. Almost all the large national and provincial nature reserves 
in Yunnan province were included, such as Gaoligongshan, Xishuangbanna and 
Baimaxueshan. Another survey carried out in 2005 used a questionnaire containing 
co-management as an indicator for effective management (Quan et al. 2011). The 
result showed that among the 535 nature reserves (representing approximately a 
quarter of China’s nature reserves in 2005) surveyed, only 7.29% had a co-
management committee or a counterpart agency to carry out co-management activities 
(Quan et al. 2011).  
 
In practice, co-management of nature reserve projects in China generally undertake 
the following steps (Zhang and Wang 2004:316):    
(1) Establish and train a leading group. Leading groups will be formed at a county 
level to oversee the co-management process, and are composed of officials 
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and staff from local government, the nature reserve, and representatives from 
co-management communities.  
(2) Conduct Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) baseline surveys, including: 
social and geographic setting of the community, natural resources use, rules 
and institutions for the use and methods for solving conflicts.  
(3) Select co-management sites 
(4) Establish management forum in co-management villages 
(5) Prepare Community Resource Management Plan (CRMP). Resulting from 
participatory mapping exercises and discussions with stakeholders, a CRMP 
contains a community-based natural resource use and protection program, 
proposals for economic activities that reduce the overuse of critical natural 
resources or provide alternative livelihoods, and outlines the organizational 
structure and approach for managing the CRMP and the Community 
Conservation Fund.  
(6) Establish and Manage the Community Conservation Fund (CCF). Funding 
will be provided for the establishment of CCF to support projects identified 
within the community that solve problems identified in the CRMP. The project 
will provide guidance and training to the village management forum on 
management of the CCF and options for sustaining the fund for future projects, 
such as creating revolving loans.  
 
According to early evaluations of the co-management projects implemented in China, 
many of them were highly successful (Broadfield and Kaber 2002, Su 2004, Huang et 
al. 2004, Zhang and Wang 2004, Liang and He 2006, Yang et al. 2007, Xie et al. 
2007). Some major achievements included improved relationships between the nature 
reserve management and the local community; combining biodiversity conservation 
with sustainable income generation and fostering community economic development; 
enhanced ability of local residents to increase household income; improved 
environmental protection awareness in communities; and substantially enhanced the 
ecological environment of nature reserves (Broadfield and Kaber 2002, Huang et al. 
2004, Zhang and Wang 2004, Liang and He 2006, Li and Lu 2007, Xie et al. 2007, 




3.2.3 Problems for co-management in China 
 
Despite the above positive evaluation, upon a closer investigation, there were many 
hidden problems with these seemingly successful co-management projects. A project 
performance assessment report written by an independent Evaluation Group for the 
National Reserve Management Project (1995-2002, funded by GEF) identified that 
although community co-management (CCM) contracts were developed between 
nature reserves and eight selected villages, these agreements were general and did not 
contain any detailed management responsibilities for the communities (Bhouraskar 
2008). The only benefit tied to their achievement was the receipt of one-time 
community investment grants (CIGs) for environmentally sustainable economic 
activities or educational projects. The actual approach contributed little to developing 
biodiversity conservation management because the nature reserves did not adequately 
cultivate participation and counterpart funding did not always materialize. In most of 
the villages, the CCM procedures that were introduced to cultivate participation and 
identify issues were not conducted fully or at all (Bhouraskar 2008).  
 
In addition to formal project reports on internationally aided projects, many 
researchers investigating co-management projects in China also identified key 
problems throughout the process of project implementation. First, co-management 
projects were not clearly defined, and many projects emphasized community 
economic development and ignored the conservation objective (Huang et al. 2004, 
Yang et al. 2007). Some nature reserves considered co-management as an approach or 
process accompanying the sponsored project, not as a continuous mechanism for 
long-term management (Yang et al. 2007). As a result, both nature reserves and 
communities sometimes think of co-management as a poverty elimination project and 
cooperated just for this reason (Huang et al. 2004, Yang et al. 2007).  
 
Contradictory obligations, rights and benefits have also hampered long-term 
involvement of stakeholders (Moller et al. 2004, Zhou and Wu 2006, Zhang et al. 
2007b, Yang et al. 2007, Li 2009). One continuing problem as mentioned in Chapter 
II is unclear land tenure, since many nature reserves are located on collective land 
where people have rights to make profit according to the Land Administration Law 
(2004). As the nature reserve regulations (1994) prohibit the use of natural resources 
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inside nature reserves, some local people in some cases responded by destroying the 
resources they had previously managed on a sustainable basis after collective lands 
were incorporated into nature reserves (McBeath and McBeath 2006). 
 
Another problem was that some nature reserve land was either taken by political force 
or purchased without sufficient compensation to the local communities (Miao et al. 
2000, Yang et al. 2007, Qian et al. 2011). As Yu and Czarnezki (2013) pointed out, 
large numbers of people have been displaced from their homes and communities to 
serve conservation values, while those remaining constantly face threats to their 
livelihoods. There is little consensus in local areas of China that biological diversity 
should take precedence over a variety of other uses of natural resources (Yu and 
Czarnezki 2013). As a result, lack of local community buy-in of conservation in 
addition to insufficient compensation and livelihood constrain from nature reserves, 
make local communities unwilling to participate in the co-management of the nature 
reserve (Xue et al. 2008, Liu et al. 2010b).  
 
A further issue is that nature reserve management staff often lack expertise and 
knowledge to manage the financial and social problems of the project (Huang et al. 
2004, Moller et al. 2004). According to 2009 statistics, nearly two thirds of the nature 
reserve management staff only received high school education (Qian et al. 2011). 
Many nature reserve staff lack knowledge of the life sciences and ecological 
principles for decision making, which can lead to poor management standards (Yu 
and Czarnezki 2013). Some of them could not distinguish the species they were hired 
to protect, and had no incentive to increase their knowledge or capability (McBeath 
and McBeath 2006). Lack of training and social/management background resulted in 
the nature reserve staff being incapable of carrying out the education and cooperation 
tasks in co-management projects.  
 
Another problem is lack of funding continuity, so local communities usually stop 
participating when funding ends (Huang et al. 2004, Su 2004). Since co-management 
projects are usually funded by international aid agencies, the funding only lasts for a 
certain period. The central government provides no follow up funding for the 
continuity of such projects and nature reserves with insufficient funding for their own 
operation would hardly have any capability to finance the local community (Zhang et 
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al. 2007b, Liu et al. 2008). Such over-reliance on foreign funding for management, 
training and technical support proved unsustainable in the long-term in some cases 
(McBeath and McBeath 2006). 
 
With limited project scale, the impact of CCM for the whole nature reserve 
environment is limited (Su 2004, Bhouraskar 2008). For example, the Nature Reserve 
Management Project, involving five nature reserve groups, covered a total area of 
around 623,000ha (Global Environment Facility 1995). The co-management 
component was carried out in only eight communities, Dawan village in Qinling 
nature reserve being among the largest of them, with an area of 987ha (Bhouraskar 
2008). So the scale of co-management project was less than 1% of the total project 
area. According to a survey carried out by Liu et al. (2008), among the 535 nature 
reserves surveyed in 2005, 70% of the nature reserves have not carried out any co-
management activities.  
 
Furthermore, there are no particular laws and regulations to support co-management 
of nature reserves. According to the Nature Reserve Regulations (1994), the 
Environmental Protection Administrative Department of the State Council is 
responsible for the integrated management of the National Nature Reserves. Relevant 
administrative departments of the State Council such as forestry, agriculture, geology 
and mineral resources, water, and the ocean, can also manage nature reserves within 
the scope of their duties. The local governments at or above the county level set the 
responsibilities of the department responsible for the management of nature reserves. 
For example, among all the forest nature reserves, 58.4% (89.7 million ha) of the total 
are collective forests, but no nature reserves are under collective ownership (Xu and 
Melick 2007). As there is no legal mandate for local communities to manage nature 
reserves even on their own communal land, there is little incentive for local people to 
participate in co-management. 
 
3.2.4 Summary of co-management in China 
 
In general, it is evident from the literature that most co-management projects in China 
are project oriented and dependent on external investment to start up the project. 
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Without on-going co-management organization, voluntary participation and active 
involvement of local communities, many projects ended as soon as the funding dried 
up. China’s co-management projects cover a wide range of ecosystems, from forests 
and rangeland to wetlands, and most of these projects include vast areas of nature 
reserves with unclear boundaries. Such large scales cause enormous administration 
and financial problems for project implementation and as a result, many projects have 
to redesign or shift direction. Consequently, more recent projects are focused on 
relatively small scale and more specific objectives. Furthermore, co-management 
projects always involve various stakeholders with conflicting interests. On the bases 
of unclear property rights and insecure land tenure the commitment to support long-
term institution building is nonexistent. Although international aid agencies will 
provide funding for training, capacity building and collaborative tools to implement 
co-management projects, regional and national governments seldom provide the 
necessary co-funding or ongoing funding once the aid project has finished. Therefore, 
the capacity and resources for the local community and nature reserve staff to sustain 
the project are limited.  
 
Table 5 summarizes the above points, contrasting the conditions of Armitage et al. 
(2009) with the dominant conditions in China. By these measures, co-management of 
nature reserves in China is generally at an early stage of development, with very 





Table 5: Conditions of co-management cases in China 
Condition of success  Conditions of co-management cases in China 
Well-defined resource 
system  
Systems are diverse, boundaries are not well-defined 
Small-scale resource use 
contexts 
Large scale at the beginning, gradually change to 
small-scale systems  
Clear and identifiable set of 
social entities with shared 
interests 
Complicated social entitles with conflicting interests 
Reasonably clear property 
rights to resources of 
concern  
Unclear property rights 
Access to adaptable 
portfolio of management 
measures 
Economic, regulatory, and collaborative tools are 
available during the project time, but inaccessible after 
project ended  




Provision of training, 
capacity building, and 
resources for local-, 
regional-, and national-level 
stakeholders 
Project provided training, capacity building and 
resources for implementation, Regional- and national-
level entities seldom provided the necessary resources. 
Key leaders or individuals 
prepared to champion the 
process 
Few key individuals exist with limited resources 
Openness of participants to 
share and draw upon a 
plurality of knowledge 
systems and sources 
Very limited knowledge sharing, expert knowledge 
dominated, non-expert knowledge seldom recognized. 
National and regional policy 
environment explicitly 
supportive of collaborative 
management efforts 
No explicit support for collaborative processes and 
multi-stakeholder engagement through state/provincial 
legislation or land claim agreements 
 
3.2.5 Co-management in YNNR 
 
As with some of the examples above, co-management was introduced to YNNR 
through the requirements of GEF funded projects. YNNR was one of the project sites 
for the UNDP project on Wetland Biodiversity Conservation and Sustainable Use in 
China (from 1999-2008). The UNDP project document required that it “support local 
community awareness campaigns, with the primary focus to develop and implement 
plans for co-management of protected areas and buffer zones by local communities” 
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(UNDP 1999:25). A new project started in 2012 and funded by GEF together with the 
Asian Development Bank, called Jiangsu Yancheng Wetlands System Protection 
project, also called for co-management. The CEO endorsement document for this 
project stated as one of its outputs: “establishment of a public education center and a 
community co-management center” (GEF 2012:60). Further, as Chapter II mentioned, 
co-management is one of the principles in the YNNR management plan, so, 
community affairs are a management responsibility of the nature reserve.  
 
As Chapter V of this thesis will explore in more detail, the Yancheng National Nature 
Reserve management structure includes a community affairs management branch, 
established in 2010. The main tasks of this branch are to carry out investigations into 
the social and economic status of the local community and propose alternative 
livelihood projects and eco-compensation schemes to their administrative head 
(Yancheng Biosphere Reserve Administration 2013). Recently, the branch has 
cooperated with the Nanjing University to carry out a community survey and has 
piloted an organic farming experiment in the north buffer zone (Yancheng Biosphere 
Reserve Administration 2013). Those co-management initiatives are also discussed in 
more detail in Chapter V.  
 
3.2.6 Summary  
 
In summary, co-management in China’s nature reserve management was a foreign 
concept introduced to China by international aid agencies in the1990s (Zhang and 
Wang 2004, Yang et al. 2007, Liu et al. 2008). Due to the absence of the tradition of 
collaboration and civil rights in China, co-management practice is still relatively 
undeveloped despite almost two decades of official practice in some parts of the 
country. There are many difficulties and obstacles to exercising co-management 
concepts into practice. Firstly, there are huge populations that live in and around 
nature reserves in China. These are generally poor communities and the development 
pressure is enormous. It is unethical to deny residents their development requirements; 
however these desires are contradictory to the objective of nature reserve management 
and it is hard to reconcile the two. Secondly, unclear land tenure results in obscure 
obligations, rights and benefits. Without tenure security, people will not have 
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confidence to use, dispose of, and make decisions about using the land, and it is not 
likely that land and natural resources will be managed for long-term productivity 
(Kram et al. 2012). Third, insufficient funding results in poor maintenance of 
infrastructure and incapable staff and this further reduces the possibility of expanding 
the co-management project for longer terms and at a larger scale. Finally, without 
legal support, co-management will not become part of the management scheme in 
nature reserve management, the government will still dominate the decision making 
process and the community will hardly have their voice heard. Since local knowledge 
plays an important role in co-management, especially adaptive co-management 
throughout the world, the following section moves to discuss local knowledge in the 
context of co-management.  
 
 
Figure 16: Boundary sign for YNNR, in the buffer zone of YNNR, outside the Reed Company, 










Throughout the world, protected areas are established to conserve natural and cultural 
diversity, manage ecosystems and their services to benefit people, as well as protect or 
enhance intrinsic values of ecosystems (Batisse 1997). Managing ecosystem services 
requires knowledge of social-ecological systems in their full complexity (Berkes et al. 
2003). It is difficult for any one group or agency to possess the full range of 
knowledge needed to manage resources, and such knowledge is often dispersed 
among local, regional, and national agencies and local groups (Berkes 2009). There 
has been growing international recognition that local and traditional ecological 
knowledge (LEK/TEK) can be useful sources of information to complement “western 
scientific approaches” to resource management (Berkes et al. 2000, Gilchrist et al. 
2005, Brook and McLachlan 2008). It may be particularly useful when managing 
wildlife populations that occur in remote locations where extensive scientific studies 
may be impractical (Barsh 1997, Ferguson et al. 1998, Gilchrist et al. 2005).  
 
3.3.2 Terminology and definition of local knowledge 
 
Many terms, with distinct or overlapping meanings, are used to refer to knowledge 
held by people who interact directly with place. Studies use a variety of terms such as 
traditional ecological knowledge (TEK), traditional knowledge (TK), local ecological 
knowledge (LEK), local knowledge (LK), Indigenous knowledge (IK), and fisherman 
or farmers knowledge (Emery 2001, Olsson and Folke 2001, Bart 2006, Collins 2007, 
Charnley 2008, Dung and Webb 2008, Hill et al. 2010). Terms that specifically refer 
to indigenous knowledge, where ‘indigenous’ refers to “those peoples and nations that 
have a historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies, and consider 
themselves a distinct but non-dominant sector of the prevailing society” (Mann and 
Blunden 2010) are less relevant to this research. The YNNR case study involves the 
knowledge of the Han people who have lived in the area of the reserve for up to 800 
years and are the majority nationality of China. Some smaller ethnic groups in China 
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could be said to have Indigenous knowledge, but the knowledge of the Han people 
does not fit this definition. The major focus of this section will therefore be on 
literature that explores local knowledge, or LEK, but TEK, TK and IK are also 
discussed in this chapter as they provide useful insights into the issues involved in 
applying non-science knowledge to management. Terminology and definitions can be 
obscure and confusing, so these are discussed initially. 
 
TEK, LEK and local knowledge emerged from the literature at roughly the same time, 
but from different roots: TEK from anthropology, LEK from biology and local 
knowledge more from development studies. TEK appears to have morphed into IK, 
and the term now appears to be used predominantly within a post-colonial context 
(especially in literature from Canada, USA, India, Australia, Sweden/Arctic, and New 
Zealand). The oldest reference found to TEK in natural resource management came 
from Canada’s Man and Biosphere program in 1993 (Inglis 1993) and it has older use 
in anthropology (Johannes 1989). In the development context local knowledge is 
more commonly used from early-mid 1990s onwards around agricultural development. 
Examples of its use can be found in work by, Borrini et al. (2004), Borrini-
Feyerabend et al. (2000) Chambers (1994), Fairhead and Scoones (2005), Gasteyer 
and Butler Flora (2000) and others.  
 
Olsson and Folke (2001) define LEK as “knowledge held by a specific group of 
people about their local ecosystems …it concerns the interplay among organisms and 
between organisms and their environment” (p. 87). However, this definition focuses 
on the ecological aspect of local knowledge and thus narrows its spectrum. Geertz 
(1983) defined local knowledge as ‘‘an organized body of thought … strongly rooted 
in a particular place’’ (Yang 2015). With this definition the term local knowledge is 
broader and more inclusive than LEK. For the purpose of this study, the following 
UNESCO definition of local knowledge will be used. According to UNESCO’s 
program on Local and Indigenous Knowledge Systems (LINKS), local knowledge is 
defined as: “understandings, skills and philosophies developed by societies with long 
histories of interaction with their natural surroundings” (UNESCO 2011b).  
 




 Originates and maintained within a community; 
 Disseminated orally from generation to generation; 
 Owned collectively; 
 Develops and changes over generations; 
 Embedded in a community’s way of life.  
 
Alternatives to local knowledge, contextually relevant to this thesis, include TEK and 
IK. The most widely cited definition of TEK is “a cumulative body of knowledge, 
practice, and belief, evolving by adaptive processes and handed down through 
generations by cultural transmission, about the relationship of living beings (including 
humans) with one another and the environment” (Berkes 2008:7). However, although 
certainly not intended by Berkes, the word “traditional” sometimes has the underlying 
implication that the knowledge is frozen in time, so that only knowledge and practices 
that remain unchanged before colonization, for example, is considered traditional 
(Nadasdy 1999, Briggs and Sharp 2004). 
 
Many researchers prefer the term Indigenous Knowledge (IK) where it relates to 
Indigenous peoples. Dei (1993) defines IK as the ‘common sense knowledge and 
ideas of local peoples about the everyday realities of living’ (p. 105), so there is no 
necessary link with past traditions. As noted above, the term Indigenous is applied to 
indigenous peoples who have a clear history of colonization, conquest or 
marginalization from within by other societies (Mauro and Hardison 2000). Therefore, 
the knowledge of the Han people, even if it fitted Dei’s definition, could not be called 
IK. Clearly, local knowledge is not necessarily restricted to people officially 
recognized as or considering themselves as Indigenous people. Non-indigenous 
people can also develop extensive knowledge of the resources they use (Emery and 
Barron 2010). In order to avoid the colonial associations and Indigenous rights issues 
related to the term of IK, the term local knowledge will be used for this study, except 
where citing literature using other terms, for comparative purposes. 
 
Knowledge can be viewed as: “an output of learning, reasoning and perception and a 
basis for predictions of future events; it is people’s understanding and interpretation 
based on some explainable logic of supposedly general validity” (Joshi et al. 2004:3). 
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Agrawal (1995) found out in his IK studies that through direct experience of the 
workings of nature and its relationship with the social world, local people can possess 
highly detailed and complex information about agriculture, agro-forestry, pest 
management, soil fertilization, multiple cropping patterns, health care, food 
preparation and so forth. However, such IK is not just about immediate technical 
solutions to everyday problems, it also contains wisdom, ideas, and innovative 
capabilities that relate to ecological, biological, geographical, or physical phenomena 
(Agrawal 1995). In this sense, similar to IK, local knowledge includes stories, songs, 
folklore, proverbs, cultural values, beliefs, rituals, customary laws, language, and 
agricultural practices (Hiwasaki 2011). Houde (2007) divides TEK into six aspects: 
factual observations, management systems, past and current uses, ethics and values, 
culture and identity, and cosmology. Similar to Houde’s classification, local 
knowledge can also be divided into factual knowledge about ecological components 
and processes, such as knowledge of land and animals; knowledge put into practices 
of environmental use, such as resource management systems; and the cultural values, 
ethics, and philosophies that define human relationships within the natural world, such 
as social institutions, worldviews and spiritual knowledge (Stevenson 1996, Berkes et 
al. 2000, Houde 2007, Gagnon and Berteaux 2009, Apgar et al. 2011). 
 
The knowledge of local people is not some pristine perception of the world but hybrid 
knowledge evolved from also interacting with external knowledge (Agrawal 1995, 
Joshi et al. 2004, Raymond et al. 2010). Because local knowledge (and IK as Agrawal 
states) is generated in the immediate context of the livelihoods of people, it is a 
dynamic entity that undergoes constant modifications as the needs of the communities 
change (Agrawal 1995). So, local knowledge is neither static nor can it be isolated 
from outside societies. Complex bodies of local knowledge have evolved through 
generations, inevitably some of the past generations’ knowledge is replaced through 
the present’s experience, but the knowledge core generally remains intact (Ruddle and 
Hickey 2008). In this way, local knowledge can adapt and evolve by adopting modern 
practices and emergent economies, but remain a distinct entity (Pilgrim et al. 2009). 
However, it should be permitted to evolve without forced assimilation (direct or 
indirect) into the dominant culture (Pilgrim et al. 2009), otherwise its fate is doomed. 
So, the future for local knowledge can only be ensured by ensuring the survival, 
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resilience, and flourishing of local peoples, as Turnbull (2009) points out in his IK 
studies. 
 
3.3.3 Co-management and local knowledge 
 
Since local knowledge is essential for maintaining global cultural diversity and the 
biological diversity with which it is intricately connected (Pilgrim et al. 2009), 
interests in integrating local knowledge are growing among some researchers. There 
are two motivations for integrating knowledge, one is that local knowledge (or TEK 
as Nelson states) contributes valuable information for science and natural resource 
management and sometimes fills gaps in understanding (Nelson 2005). The other is 
that incorporation of local/Indigenous knowledge in natural resource management 
may empower local peoples (Ellis 2005, Aikenhead and Ogawa 2007, Ruddle and 
Hickey 2008, Pilgrim et al. 2009, Sillitoe and Marzano 2009). In order to achieve 
these goals, some researchers propose co-management arrangements as means to 
integrate knowledge through collaboration and participation (Plummer and Armitage 
2007a). Although the generation and use of knowledge is considered as one important 
indicator for successful and long-lasting co-management arrangements, combining 
different kinds of knowledge is particularly difficult in co-management as it involves 
local people whose knowledge may be based on different worldviews than researchers 
and managers (Moller et al. 2004, Berkes 2009). Using science together with IK 
requires not a synthesis of the two kinds of knowledge, but an ability to develop 
mutual respect and trust (Berkes 2009). That is the reason why some scholars are 
opposed to knowledge integration given the different ontologies and epistemologies 
that give rise to them (Howitt and Suchet-Pearson 2006, Coombes 2007). Still others 
talk about knowledge co-production instead of integration to avoid the implication of 
cultural assimilation (Moller et al. 2004).  
 
Through co-management practices, knowledge integration is often encouraged for the 
benefits of broadening a knowledge base and empowering people. However, some 
scholars argue that ‘integration’ endeavors can be disempowering and hence that 
knowledge may be best held in tension (Howitt and Suchet-Pearson 2006, Coombes 
2007). This controversy is well illustrated in practice since successful cases of 
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knowledge integration are very few especially in protected area management around 
the world where scientific knowledge is the dominant information sources and science 
is often the only official basis for decision making (Ross 2011).  
 
3.3.4 Difference between science and non-science knowledge 
 
There are many different perspectives of what constitutes knowledge or how someone 
comes to know something (Raymond et al. 2010). For many western researchers, 
science and local or other non-science knowledge are distinct entities and can be 
considered separate from each other quite easily. Science is focused on creating 
generically applicable and repeatable data, with ecological research at least being 
generally focused on quantitative, compartmentalized, limited-variable, synchronic, 
cause seeking, value- and context-independent information (Berkes 2009, Jacobson 
and Stephens 2009). Local knowledge (or TEK in this case) on the other hand is 
characterized as being qualitative, interconnected, holistic, diachronic, context-
specific cumulative knowledge specifically relating to the interconnections between 
the people and their local environment (Stephenson and Moller 2009). Because of 
such characteristics, some scientists reject local knowledge (or LEK in this case) as 
“anecdotal”, “imprecise”, “unsubstantiated”, or “inaccurate” (Brook and McLachlan 
2008). Conversely, local people can be frustrated where scientists have an insincere 
and biased view towards TEK, and can feel uncomfortable with science because of its 
abstractness and detachment (Nadasdy 1999).  
 
Despite the seemingly obvious differences between science and local knowledge, 
there are elements of similarity between the two, as Agrawal (1995) stated in his IK 
studies. For example, between agroforestry and the multiple tree-cropping systems of 
small-holders around the world; between agronomy and the indigenous techniques for 
domestication of crops; and between taxonomy and the plant classifications of local 
farmers. Due to the distinct characteristics of science and non-science knowledge, 
many researchers see the potential of combining these two to generate new 
understandings or methods (Stephenson and Moller 2009, Raymond et al. 2010, 
Bohensky and Maru 2011). Moller et al. (2004) summarized five areas of 
complementarity between science and TEK, which are likely to be similar for the case 
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of science and local knowledge. In their opinion, science and TEK may strengthen 
one another through providing more diverse forms of information, and thus a broader 
and more holistic perspective. For example, recognising both diachronic and 
synchronic data; averages and extremes; quantitative and qualitative; better 
hypotheses and better tests of mechanisms; and objectivity and subjectivity (Moller et 
al. 2004). As a result, some researchers argue that integrating non-science knowledge 
and scientific knowledge can expand the spatial and temporal scale of existing 
knowledge and create a collective knowledge base that would exceed either 
knowledge system in quality and scope (Kimmerer 2002, Nadasdy 2003, Gagnon and 
Berteaux 2009).  
 
If such integration can be successfully implemented in the practice of protected area 
management, it will definitely expand the existing knowledge and enhance the 
knowledge base to facilitate better informed decisions. In countries with a long history 
and rich local knowledge such as China, such complementary integration in protected 
area management could be promising for biodiversity conservation and environmental 
protection.   
 
3.3.5 Development projects and knowledge integration  
 
Inclusion of local knowledge in development projects started to be sought because of 
the failure of former top-down development strategies (Briggs and Sharp 2004). As a 
result, since the early 1990s, almost every major bilateral development agency has 
emphasized participatory policies involving bottom-up planning, acknowledging the 
importance of local knowledge and claiming to empower local people (Ruddle and 
Hickey 2008). In the prior decades, many development projects were criticized for 
their expert-led, top-down approaches which were blind to local knowledge and local 
needs (Sillitoe and Marzano 2009). It is widely believed that by integrating local 
knowledge (or TEK as Nadasdy states) and science into management it can increase 
the overall understanding of the environment and improve resource management as 




However, inclusionary practices are neither universal nor necessarily successful. The 
relatively new practice of participatory development has been widely criticized for its 
negligence of political and economic inequality and exploitation that are the root 
cause of seemingly technical problems such as poverty (Nadasdy 2005). Drawing 
upon postcolonial theory, Briggs and Sharp (2004) reveal that local knowledge is 
often drawn into development in a very limited way, and many development projects 
fail to engage with other ways of perceiving development, thus missing the possibility 
of devising more challenging alternatives.   
 
Development aid now is a huge multi-million dollar industry with its goal to alleviate 
global poverty (Sillitoe and Marzano 2009). Some authors argue that the driving force 
behind development is growth and consequently, industrial development (Ellis 2005). 
So the power behind development is in the hands of dominant western nations and its 
industrial complex. According to postcolonial power and knowledge theory, science is 
a tool employed by industrialized nations to expand the values of European industrial 
culture through development projects (Briggs and Sharp 2004, Ellis 2005). So the 
reason for the failure of integrating local knowledge is power, since to advocate such 
knowledge threatens the stability of conventional power structures rooted in the 
western industrial complex (Ellis 2005). Because the west controls the majority of 
resources and has the power to define what development should be, they are unlikely 
to support a radically different ‘development’ from their own (Sillitoe and Marzano 
2009).  
 
The Western development paradigm, based on consumption and a market economy, 
and a focus on GDP growth, is unsuitable for most developing countries because of 
the combination of population pressures and resource scarcity. Even the current 
“green tech” developments are nearly all top down, with centralized systems for 
cleaner energy supply and waste disposal, and such “hyper-complex” techno-social 
systems are vulnerable to all sorts of shocks (Ravetz 2006). By contrast, the efforts of 
the poor start with low-tech, self-help systems, designed for resilience against 
extremes of their environmental and social context as much as for idealistic 
motivations (Ravetz 2006). Worldwide the poor use minimal resources to maintain 
their livelihoods and generally they are more sustainable in their resource use: in this 
sense, poorer people are greener. Some developing nations have pushed back against 
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this paradigm, with Bhutan for example proposing “gross national happiness” as the 
development goal instead of GDP (The Centre for Bhutan Studies and GNH Research 
2015). This goal put people's happiness ahead of material wealth and is based on a 
traditional worldview, values and knowledge systems that are dramatically different 
from western knowledge.  
 
3.3.6 Problems of ‘knowledge integration’ 
 
Many researchers agree that the value of local knowledge lies in its context-specific 
and holistic characteristics. In the political and economic context of global capitalism, 
the goal for knowledge integration of many development projects is to collect and 
document local knowledge (or TEK as argued by Nadasdy) in order to integrate it 
with scientific knowledge for use in resource management (Nadasdy 2005). This goal 
forces researchers to compartmentalize and distill local people’s beliefs, values and 
experiences according to external criteria, potentially seriously distorting them in the 
process (Nadasdy 1999). The very values and practices that can enable environmental 
decision making that focuses upon environmental stewardship and respect for the land 
are discarded or ignored because they are incompatible with science and dominant 
western values (Ellis 2005). In some instances, local knowledge (or TEK as argued by 
Ellis) has become simply a new form of data to be incorporated into already existing 
management bureaucracies and acted upon by scientists and resource managers 
(Nadasdy 1999). In this way, as Ellis pointed out in her TEK studies, local knowledge 
can lose its essence and be transformed into a form of science (Ellis 2005). Further, in 
order to make knowledge universally applicable and valid, international development 
agencies try to isolate, document, and store knowledge in international, regional and 
national archives; and disseminate it to other contexts and spaces (Agrawal 1995). 
Because such ex situ conservation strategies have been used in western science with 
great effect, it is supposed to be suitable for local knowledge (or IK as Agrawal states) 
conservation. Nevertheless, divorced in archives from its cultural context, no 
knowledge can maintain its vitality or vigor (Agrawal 1995).  
 
Such reinterpretation of local knowledge (or TEK in this case) outside of its cultural 
and spiritual origins can lead to its assimilation and transformation, and can maintain 
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the dominance of Western knowledge over other forms of knowledge (Stephenson 
and Moller 2009, Berkes 2009). In order to solve the above problems for knowledge 
integration, Bohensky and Maru (2011) suggest reframing integration as a process in 
which the originality and core identity of each individual knowledge system remains 
valuable in itself, and is not diluted through its combination with other types of 
knowledge. They also advocate that integration might begin from the perspective of 
local knowledge (or IK in this case) and then to seek relevant scientific knowledge. 
Indigenous scientists who span both knowledge systems and appreciate the 
significance of culture to local knowledge (or IK in this case) can play a key role as 
“bridgers” in knowledge integration (Bohensky and Maru 2011). 
 
Some authors argue that it is false to separate two forms of knowledge, because both 
possess specific histories, particular burdens from the past and distinctive patterns of 
change (Agrawal 1995). Agrawal (1995) argues that science and local knowledge (or 
IK as Agrawal states) have no fundamental differences across substantive, 
methodological and epistemological or contextual characteristics. Some scholars go 
further to regard science as another local knowledge, one that is localized in the 
institutions of the west and which has gained its universality through the formation of 
colonial and neocolonial power relations (Briggs and Sharp 2004). Due to the failure 
of western power over development and the rise of indigenous rights, science as a 
kind of western epistemology no longer serves as the benchmark by which other 
epistemologies are evaluated (Maffie 2009). Its questions and concerns are no more 
universal and no less local, than other indigenous or local philosophers (Maffi 2005). 
From this perspective, science and local knowledge are equivalent, and scientists and 
local knowledge experts are counterparts, so scientists and local people can be seen as 
equal partners to exchange knowledge and search for mutual benefits and better 
solutions for complicated problems.  
 
In summary, the appropriate way to preserve the diversity of different knowledge is to 
facilitate in situ preservation of local knowledge (or IK in this case) (Agrawal 1995). 
There must be a shift in the balance of power, a reformulation of values, practices and 
knowledge that underlie environmental decision making processes, together with a 
reorientation and reversal of state policies and market forces to permit members of 
threatened communities to determine their own future (Agrawal 1995, Ellis 2005). In 
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situ preservation cannot succeed without local people gaining control over the use of 
lands in which they dwell and the resources on which they rely. Those who are seen to 
possess knowledge must also possess the right to decide on how to save their 
knowledge, how to use it, and who shall use it (Agrawal 1995). In the practice of 
protected area management, authorities should search for ways to secure land tenure 
and sustain traditional ways of living in order to preserve local knowledge which may 
contribute to sustainable development.  
 
3.3.7 Cultural diversity and local knowledge 
 
Today, there is an emerging recognition that the diversity of life comprises both living 
forms (biological diversity) and human beliefs, values, worldviews and cosmologies 
(cultural diversity) (Berkes et al. 2000, Maffi 2005, Pilgrim et al. 2009). The 
maintenance of cultural diversity into the future, and the knowledge, innovations and 
outlooks it contains, increases the capacity of human systems to adapt to change 
(Maffi 2005). Many of the world’s core areas of biodiversity are also important for 
cultural diversity, represented by the density of ethnic groups and linguistic diversity 
(frequently used as proxies for cultural diversity) (Maffi 2005, Pilgrim et al. 2009). 
Many protected areas (national parks or reserves) are, or contain, sacred natural sites, 
because such areas become a refuge for a diversity of species (Pilgrim and Pretty 
2010). 
 
Despite the recognition and appreciation of the value of cultural diversity, TEK and 
practices seem to be declining in many parts of the world due to complex factors 
(Pilgrim et al. 2009, Gomez-Baggethun et al. 2010). Reasons behind this loss include 
the combined influences of acculturation and loss of local languages, changes in land 
use, transition to market economies, loss of access to traditional resources, and more 
generally, industrialization and globalization forces (Gomez-Baggethun et al. 2010). 
For example, culturally inappropriate modernization of services such as healthcare 
and education can lead to language erosion, decrease in cultural knowledge transfer 
and a shift in local knowledge bases (Pilgrim and Pretty 2010). The primary reasons 
are pressures of modernization and cultural homogenization, the auspices of the 
modern nation-state and the international trade system which threaten the lifestyles, 
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practices and cultures of nomadic populations, small agricultural producers, and 
indigenous peoples (Agrawal 1995). Many of these factors may equally apply to local 
knowledge. 
 
Responses to the above threats include local revitalization projects, culturally-
appropriate education schemes, ecotourism projects and language revitalization 
initiatives (Pilgrim et al. 2009). However, many efforts remain fragmented, localized, 
small-scale and limited in both capacity and funding (Pilgrim et al. 2009). Larger-
scale movements that have contributed to the dual protection of biological and 
cultural diversity include the fair-trade movement, certification programmes, land 
rights of indigenous and other rural people and the shift towards education for 
planetary citizenship (Pilgrim et al. 2009). The emergence of international policies 
which favor the joint protection of biological and cultural diversity is also promising 
(CBD 2015b).  
 
Under the above favorable policies, investment into community-based conservation 
and the dissemination of power to grass-roots institutions has increased, strengthening 
the mechanisms that favor long term social and ecological sustainability (Pilgrim et al. 
2009). Projects emphasising entrepreneurship-based conservation development, such 
as the UNDP Equator Initiative, are also emerging (UNDP 2015). However, in the 
absence of an extensive and sensitive accounting of the mutual threats and effective 
policies targeting these issues, loss of cultural diversity such as languages and vast 
knowledge bases are at rates higher than the “natural” extinction rates (Pilgrim et al. 
2009). Loss of cultural diversity will negatively impact the potential for sustainable 
development around protected areas as the chances for alternative ways of 
development have been lost. So preserving cultural diversity may directly lead to 
sustainable ways of living.   
 
3.3.8 Local knowledge in practice 
 
Throughout the world, much local knowledge research has been done or is under way. 
Similar with co-management studies, local knowledge research in natural resources 
and protected areas management has some characteristics associated with geographic 
100 
 
and economic development status. Generally, developed countries with more 
advanced co-management practices often have more successful cases of knowledge 
integration or co-production.  
 
3.3.8.1 Local knowledge research in developed countries 
 
In Canada, there are many co-management studies that document the existence of 
TEK/IEK and its potential value in the management process. Although using different 
terms, the characteristics of such knowledge are similar to local knowledge, so it is 
instructive for this study. As Nadasdy (2003) points out, most Canadian co-
management case studies recorded are success stories, and most authors of such 
studies have positive views of the use of TEK and its integration with science. The 
studies typically conclude that the use of TEK has already significantly improved the 
practice of wildlife management and has helped to give aboriginal people more 
control over local land and resources, although it is noted there is still much to learn 
(Nadasdy 2003). For example, in the Canadian Arctic, co-management institutional 
arrangements are moving beyond specific projects, single resources and individuals to 
the management of resources more generally. Researchers are finding that knowledge 
co-production between co-management actors provide a greater ability to cope with 
variability and builds longer-term adaptive responses to minimize risk and uncertainty 
(Armitage et al. 2011).  
 
Other scholars have carried out research to gather local knowledge on wildlife species 
in Canada (Butler 2004, Gilchrist et al. 2005, Gagnon and Berteaux 2009, Wiber et al. 
2012) and have tried to incorporate local knowledge information into harvest 
management, monitoring and species conservation. Aside from providing important 
indicators that help to direct scientific investigation, local knowledge is an important 
tool to help develop policies on wildlife research that incorporate cultural values 
(Gilchrist et al. 2005). Gilchrist et al. (2005) strongly advocate the use of local 
knowledge in efforts to manage and conserve wildlife. However, given the difficulty 
and complexity of co-management and knowledge integration, it is largely agreed 
among researchers involved in such projects that such positive attitudes seem to be an 




For example, In the case of a Dall sheep co-management project in the Yukon, 
Nadasdy (1999) found in contrast to biologists and government officials involved in 
the Ruby Range Sheep Steering Committee, most First Nation members felt it had 
been an utter failure. Their knowledge was not included in the recommendations 
because biologists did not accept TEK as a valid basis for action in its own right 
(Nadasdy 2003). Nadasdy (2005) argues that co-management, which is supposedly 
empowering First Nation people, in fact helps extend the power of the state and forces 
First Nation people to build their own bureaucratic infrastructures and accept the 
Euro-Canadian values and assumptions. Ellis (2005) similarly points out that, because 
traditional knowledge often challenges the values and beliefs of the Euro-Canadian 
industrial complex, as well as the institutions that uphold them, empowering such 
knowledge means to give voice to a system of understanding that may oppose the 
objectives and practices of Euro-Canadian institutions. So, under the best intentions of 
some traditional knowledge policies and initiatives, they sometimes serve to limit the 
real empowerment of aboriginal people via integration into a different cultural context 
(Ellis 2005). Therefore, some seemingly successful local knowledge cases may be 
partial judgements stemming from the perceptions of researchers and management 
authorities, not from local people. Only by investigating from both sides can it be 
decided if a project really empowered local people and incorporated their knowledge 
meaningfully and effectively.  
 
As the literature points out, researchers should try to investigate and understand local 
knowledge before they try to integrate it. Many studies have done some baseline 
research about local knowledge and its evolution over time. For example, in Spain, 
Gomez-Baggethun et al. (2010) analyzed changes in the level of local knowledge held 
across three generations of resource users as the society made a transition over time. 
They found that both agricultural and livestock farming local knowledge showed an 
intergenerational decline. However, because protected areas are partially buffered 
from market and development pressures, they can be a powerful tool for the 
protection of local knowledge in the short term. In regions dominated by cultural 
landscapes, the exclusion of humans and traditional resource use in natural protected 
areas disrupts the long processes of the storing and transmission of local knowledge 
systems that have great value for sustainable ecosystem management and biodiversity 
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conservation (Gomez-Baggethun et al. 2010). As a result, conservation policies to 
protect and restore local knowledge should adopt human-in-nature perspective (e.g., 
Man and Biosphere). 
 
3.3.8.2 Local knowledge researches in developing countries 
 
Since many developing countries have areas of high biodiversity coinciding with a 
higher concentration of distinct cultures (UNESCO 2011b), much research has been 
conducted in biodiversity hot spots to collect local knowledge. LaRochelle and Berkes 
(2003) carried out research in Mexico aiming at analyzing local knowledge and 
practices on edible wild plants of Raramuri harvesters. Their findings show that 
Raramuri harvesters practice selective harvesting and they only harvest what can be 
consumed (LaRochelle and Berkes 2003). They also carried out diverse harvesting 
strategies by harvesting edible wild plants to supplement maize instead of totally 
relying on maize for larger cash incomes. This may lead to smaller cash incomes from 
maize, but when disease or drought have devastating impacts on maize they can still 
ensure their food stocks (LaRochelle and Berkes 2003). Such strategies are 
completely different from the profit maximization theory of the market economy 
which serves as the norm for western society.  
 
They also found that the transfer of traditional knowledge between generations is 
executed in a dynamic and interpretive way and involves mutual learning (LaRochelle 
and Berkes 2003). There are three ways that people maintained knowledge about 
edible wild plants: by living on the land; by continuing to search and collect wild 
plants; and by teaching their own children the knowledge related to edible wild plants 
(LaRochelle and Berkes 2003). As Pearce et al. (2011) points out, successful 
transmission of many skills is associated with high levels of involvement in 
subsistence activities. So, the key to protect local knowledge from disappearing is to 
ensure the survival, resilience, and flourishing of local peoples’ place-related practices 
(Pilgrim et al. 2009). 
 
In Brazil, Gerhardinger et al. (2009) carried out a study of the role of fishermen’s 
local knowledge in the management of marine protected areas (MPAs). Their findings 
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are representative of many developing countries and their suggestions are also 
applicable in other parts of the world. They found that local knowledge input in 
decision-making of the top-down MPAs was poor to almost non-existent 
(Gerhardinger et al. 2009). Like many other co-management projects in protected 
areas with centralized governance, the purpose of the co-management council in top-
down sites is simply to ‘inform’ the decisions ultimately taken by the officer in charge 
of the MPA. Conventional scientific knowledge was the main source of information 
supporting the management of these sites. However, they found that three 
characteristics favoring the use of local knowledge may also be true for other 
countries: active local representatives, recognized local knowledge value, and 
presence of social science research (Gerhardinger et al. 2009).  
 
According to Gerhardinger et al. (2009) a viewpoint shared by many of the MPA 
managers was that local knowledge is often not readily available nor systematized for 
decision-making, which is true for many other protected areas in the developing world. 
As a result, the responsibility of bringing relevant local knowledge was placed on the 
fishermen themselves. Similar issues also happened in other protected areas because 
of lack of human resources, capability and work overload. The research has illustrated 
that a variety of knowledge held by fishermen can be extremely useful under different 
management conditions and situations. However, most of the MPA management in 
Brazil is science driven, and over-reliance on scientific knowledge limits local 
knowledge incorporation due to the lack of its scientific basis. The results suggest that 
in order to fully engage this alternative knowledge system, local people need to be 
partners at all stages of research and management (Gerhardinger et al. 2009).  
 
Ruddle and Hickey (2008) examined the mismanagement of tropical nearshore 
fisheries in Pacific islands and concluded that the underlying reason was the failure to 
include local knowledge. The implementation of policies and programs was based on 
western models and approaches, coupled with an inability and/or unwillingness to 
consider non-western alternatives, even where they were of empirically proven value. 
Most land and nearshore areas in the Pacific are under customary tenure rather than 
western-style property rights and this forms the foundation of resource management 
where local groups restrict access to resources under their tenure and maintain 
stewardship over the resources and environment by drawing on their local knowledge. 
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Ruddle and Hickey (2008) concluded that their small-scale harvests pose a limited 
threat to global biodiversity compared to industrial countries’ activities like clear-cut 
logging, urban sprawl, pollution of air, soil and water, and industrial fishing. Such 
findings hold true for many culturally diverse areas in the world, since their local 
knowledge has sustained their resources for centuries or even millennia. The authors 
urged an end to cultural arrogance, and for an increased input of non-Western 
concepts and models in project design, together with a strong commitment to 
employing or evaluating all available knowledge (Ruddle and Hickey 2008).  
 
3.3.8.3 Local knowledge evaluation 
 
Yet, it is false to argue that by itself local knowledge could provide comprehensive 
management and development schemes. Because of the widespread changes in belief 
systems, commercial activity, introduced gear types and population growth, local 
knowledge must be evaluated and integrated with scientific knowledge to assist with 
the adaptation of management systems (Ruddle and Hickey 2008). The attitudes of 
some scholars who referred to local knowledge and indigenous attitudes towards 
nature as “sacred” and inevitably sustainable are unwise. Throughout the world, there 
are many examples of failed local ecosystems and depletion of local resources under 
the unsustainable use of local people. Local knowledge sometimes may be wrong or 
partial, so, to treat indigenous or local people as environmentalist role models may be 
misleading. 
 
One example is a study about migratory birds in the Canadian and Greenland Arctic 
carried out by Gilchrist et al. (2005), who found that local knowledge including 
continuing misconceptions held by many local residents may actually be contributing 
to the unsustainable harvest of thick-billed Murres (Gilchrist et al. 2005). Another 
case study from Ruddle and Davis (2011) shows that fisher’s contention that white 
hake (Urophycis tenuis) was the main predator on juvenile lobster (Homarus 
americanus) was wrong. The cases demonstrate that although important, harvester’s 
local experience and observation may not accurately characterize ecosystem processes 
such as predator-prey dynamics, which can only be tested through sampling of 






From the above cases, it is clear that some, but not all, local knowledge systems are a 
logical, sophisticated and often still evolving adaption to risk. Such systems may be 
based on generations of empirical experience and arranged according to principles, 
philosophies and institutions that are radically different from those prevailing in 
western scientific circles (Ruddle and Hickey 2008). Throughout the world, from 
post-colonial and developing counties to marginal areas of developed countries away 
from mainstream development, local knowledge is crucial for survival. An excellent 
example is the three commandments of the nomads in Sahara: Eat only if you are 
hungry; Drink only if you are thirsty; Ride the camel only if you are tired (Robert-
Charrue 2006). Such rules enable the nomads to survive in the harshest of 
environments and conserve insignificant resources for thousands of years. Much in 
the same vein, local communities in tropical forests, islands, temperate grasslands, 
alpine plateaus and wetlands possess local knowledge that promulgates frugality and 
sustainable use (Ferguson et al. 1998, Aswani and Hamilton 2004, Moller et al. 2004, 
Ellen 2007, Garcia-Quijano 2007, Dung and Webb 2008, Copland 2009, Hill et al. 
2010, Demps et al. 2012). In a world of rapid change and resource depletion, such 
knowledge is also valuable for helping communities to adapt to future changes. 
 
As Berkes (2004) points out, knowledge is power, and the use of local knowledge can 
be a mechanism for co-management and potential empowerment. Alternative systems 
of knowledge are of great potential value in the modern world and are valid in their 
own right (Ruddle and Hickey 2008). Provided with support, elements of these 
knowledge systems could be adapted to changing circumstances, providing an 
important information base for resources management, especially where 
conventionally-used data are scarce to non-existent (Pilgrim et al. 2009). Local 
knowledge can also provide a shortcut to pinpoint essential research needs (Baird and 
Flaherty 2005, Bart 2006, Brook and McLachlan 2008). Future local knowledge 
research should start from understanding and organizing local knowledge 
systematically, and then evaluating it against the broad social and cultural context in 
which it is rooted (Davis and Wagner 2003, Mallory et al. 2003, Charnley 2008, 
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Davis and Ruddle 2010, Hill et al. 2010). By adapting environmental decision making 
to include locally distinctive ways of knowing and using resources, communities may 
be empowered and have a greater sense of ownership over resource management 
initiatives, which can lead to greater sustainability (Ellis 2005, Ruddle and Hickey 
2008). 
 
3.4 Local knowledge research in China 
 
Compared to the great number of studies of local knowledge carried out worldwide, 
there are very few studies cited in international literature about China. However, some 
good studies of local knowledge exist in the literature written in Chinese languages 
which appear to have rarely been referenced outside of China. This literature can be 
divided into two groups. One group comprises studies carried out in the social science 
realm about traditional ecological knowledge, or theories which form a broad basis for 
traditional and local knowledge studies in China. The other group comprises research 
on contemporary local knowledge of minority nationalities in remote ethnic areas in 
China. There is a notable scarcity of contemporary local knowledge studies 
concerning Han people, the dominant population of China. This section reviews local 
knowledge studies in China through temporal and spatial scales, finishing with those 
which relate to the Han people. 
 
3.4.1 Traditional ecological knowledge in China 
 
With more than 4,000 years of recorded history, China is one of the few existing 
earliest civilized countries that still flourishes economically and culturally despite the 
political and social upheavals that frequently have ravaged the country (Encyclopædia 
Britannica Inc. 2015). China is unique among nations in its longevity and resilience as 
a discrete politico-cultural unit (Encyclopædia Britannica Inc. 2015) and its long 
lasting approach to ecological protection may be one of the reasons for this longevity. 
For more than 5000 years, Chinese ancestors were constantly enthusiastic about 
sustainable utilization of natural resources balanced with productive development. 
According to Li et al. (2012), all Chinese classical wisdom, associated with the Han 




Laozi (about 3000 years ago) is one of the most famous ancient philosophers in China. 
British scientist Joseph Needham called Laozi the man who knew the nature the best 
(Needham and Wang 1990). Tao is not directly translatable into western language, but 
speaks of a state of existence before time or space. Laozi wrote of the concept of Tao, 
that within the universe there are four things that are great, the Tao, Heaven, Earth 
and human beings (Laozi and Lau 1989). Man should model himself on earth, Earth 
on Heaven, Heaven on the Tao, and Tao on that which is naturally so (Laozi and Lau 
1989). Humans must model nature, obey natural laws and live in harmony with nature. 
The way of heaven is to create balance: to take from what one is in excess to make up 
what is deficient. However, men sometimes act the other way: for example they take 
from those who are in want to give to those who already have more than enough 




Figure 17: Laozi - Tao Te Ching, copy of the Song Dynasty with collective annotations (Laozi 
1910) 
 
Later, Xunzi, another great philosopher who lived about 2300 years ago, said: “The 
course of Nature is constant……If you respond to the constancy of Nature’s course 
with good government, there will be good fortune; if you respond to it with disorder, 
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there will be misfortune” (p. 533). He also said: “If the myriad things obtain their 
appropriate function, affairs as they undergo change obtain a suitable response, the 
natural sequence of the seasons is obtained from the heaven above, the benefit of 
Earth are gained below, and in the middle the concord of humanity is obtained, then 
goods and commodities will come as from inexhaustible spring (p. 289)” (Xunzi 
1999). Although the language is different, the underlying message is one of 
sustainability. 
 
Most ancient Chinese philosophers agreed that humans must respect nature and live in 
harmony with nature to ensure a good environment and human wellbeing (Legge 
1960, Laozi and Lau 1989, Zhuangzi and Palmer 1996, Xunzi 1999). The essence of 
traditional Chinese ecological thinking includes, first: respect nature and be kind to 
everything in the world. Since all things are equal, they all depend on each other and 
on nature to survive so humans should treat everything equally (Li 2010). And on the 
basis of that, people can use natural resources properly to enhance their own welfare. 
Second, the importance of seasonal bans for natural resource harvesting, because all 
living things have their own growth law. For example, harvesting in the growing 
seasons, and harvesting of small and new born things are forbidden to protect natural 
resources. Third, restricted usage as all natural resources have their limits so humans 
should constrain the use of natural resources and give them opportunities to grow and 
reproduce, then people can use them longer and more sustainably (Li 2010).  
 
When researching policies, regulations, and eco-ethical wisdom relating to ancient 
Chinese fisheries, Li et al. (2012) found Chinese ancestors developed numerous 
rigorous policies and regulations to guide people to act according to these 
philosophies. More than 5000 years ago, Yellow Emperor, the father of the Chinese 
nation, taught people to implement seasonal permits and placed strict bans on 
gathering natural products and catching wild animals in order to reap profits 
sustainably (Li 2010). Later, Emperor Ku told his people to exploit natural products 
moderately and utilize them frugally, and this may be the beginning of Chinese people 
having the habit of thrift. During the Xia Dynasty (about 4000 years ago), to solve the 
problem of over-fishing and resource deterioration, Emperor Da Yu formulated a 
national policy that net use was forbidden in waters during the three months of 
summer, so that aquatic animals can grow (Li et al. 2012). This policy actually is the 
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first legislative decree on the protection of fisheries resources in both Chinese and 
global history (Li 2010).  
 
Many scholars agree that as early as in Zhou Dynasty (about 3000 year ago), China 
had a relatively comprehensive scheme to protect biological resources. The 
government established laws and implemented them effectively, enabling China to 
develop productivity as well as protecting the natural environment during that time 
(Li 2010). China also has the earliest environmental protection department (more than 
3000 years ago) to protect natural resources, called Yu and He (Li 2010). There were 
professional officers taking in charge of these departments and implementing the laws 
and regulations rigorously. Further, China also has a long tradition of planting trees 
along roads and in public areas to create a beautiful environment (Li 2010). 
Throughout Chinese history, thrift has been a highly held virtue for all Chinese, from 
the emperor to the common masses. Extravagance and waste were widely believed to 
bring disaster to the country.  
 
As Zhuang Zi (Chinese Classic) said “the sage responds to the influence acting on 
him, and moves as he feels the pressure. He rises to act only when he is obliged to do 
so” (Graham 1981). In this sense, the essence of traditional Chinese wisdom and 
philosophy is: act only when obliged. Such wisdom is aligned with the concept of 
sustainable development and may be the solution for the conservation and 
development dilemma: minimize your demands and live in harmony with nature. 
According to Zhuangzi, the more you depend on, the less freedom you have, and 
freedom is more important than wealth to achieve the ultimate goal of happiness, 
satisfaction and human welfare (Graham 1981). These philosophies underlay China’s 
deliberate inhibition of industrial development and commercialism throughout the 
history, for fear of destroying natural balance. The extent to which these philosophies 
are still adhered to today amongst the Han people, the dominant population of China, 






3.4.2 Local knowledge research in different regions 
 
The majority of local knowledge studies in China have occurred in relatively remote 
places such as Yunnan, Tibet, Gansu and Mongolia, and have found that the minority 
of nationalities such as Tibetan, Mongolian, Jinuo, Hani and Nu people possess 
valuable knowledge on local plants and animal species (Long and Zhou 2001, Shen et 
al. 2010, Ting et al. 2012, Fu et al. 2012, Shen et al. 2012, Jiao et al. 2012). Yunnan 
Province, located in southwestern China, is the homeland of many ethnic groups and a 
refuge for numerous species of wild plants and animals. With 25 officially recognized 
ethnic minority groups comprising more than 14 million people, Yunnan is home to 
diverse indigenous cultures (Xu and Melick 2007) and well illustrates the links 
between cultural and biological diversity. Indigenous people in the region have long 
practiced complex land-use systems, such as agro-pastoralism among Tibetans, 
shifting cultivation among the Lisu and Jinuo, terraced paddy cultivation by the Hani, 
hunting and gathering among the Kucong (Lahu) and Dulong, and intensive lowland 
paddy cultivation among Dai and Bai people (Xu and Melick 2007). Human use has 
clearly modified these environments, but generally the traditional agricultural 
practices in Yunnan have nurtured the diverse landscapes, maintained biodiversity, 
and enhanced agro-biodiversity (Xu et al. 2005b).  
 
3.4.2.1 Minority knowledge in Yunnan 
 
Many studies carried out in Yunnan province have shown that different ethnic groups 
have abundant local knowledge about animal and plant species, land management 
systems, and held traditional beliefs and values (Long and Zhou 2001, Shen et al. 
2010, Jiao et al. 2012). However, they have also found that local knowledge faces the 
risk of disappearing due to increasing modernization, livelihood changes and 
environment degradation. For example, Jinuo’s swidden cultivation was threatened 
because of economic and land reforms, together with the establishment of national 
nature reserves (Long and Zhou 2001). Hani’s local knowledge is increasingly 
threatened by their vulnerable natural environment and the well-intentioned but 
sometimes inconsiderate strategies of local governments to eliminate poverty and 




Efforts have been carried out to collect and protect local knowledge in Yunnan. Zhang 
et al. (2007a) documented the establishment of an indigenous knowledge experts’ 
database to protect local knowledge and intellectual rights. The database included 
experts such as religious followers, village leaders, hunters and herbal medicine 
doctors. Their knowledge involves animal, plants, herbal medicine, non-timber 
products, bio-environmental relationship, forest management, biodiversity, etc. and 
this database has contributed to forest conservation and sustainable utilization (Zhang 
et al. 2007a). In order to recognize such intellectual property rights, some authors 
argue that ecological payments should be made to the ethnic people for using this 
knowledge (Zhang et al. 2007a, Shen et al. 2010, Jiao et al. 2012). Such efforts can 
give self-esteem and prosperity to local knowledge experts and ensure the 
transmission of their valuable knowledge (Zhang et al. 2007a). Other strategies to 
protect local knowledge include increasing the understanding and appreciation of the 
importance of local knowledge, especially local social and religious culture; setting up 
networks to share and disseminate the knowledge locally and nationally; and making 
local knowledge an integrated part of modern knowledge systems (Shen et al. 2010). 
Some authors have argued that the government should build resource management 
and development strategies on the basis of local knowledge and interests to strengthen 
government efforts and empower local people (Long and Zhou 2001, Chen et al. 2012, 
Ting et al. 2012).  
 
3.4.2.2 Minority knowledge in Tibet, Gansu and Mongolia 
 
Other places such as Tibet, Gansu and Mongolia also have cultures and customs 
which have important stabilizing effects on local natural resource management and 
biodiversity conservation. Studies have discovered, for example, that local herders in 
Inner Mongolia and Tibet have developed sustainable grassland management schemes 
in their traditional nomadic way of life (Bijoor et al. 2006, Richard et al. 2006, Li et al. 
2007, Foggin 2008, Wilkes et al. 2010, Liu et al. 2011, Chen 2011). Tibetans hold a 
worldview in which humans are part of an interacting set of living beings, and that 
being kind to other creatures will benefit oneself (Shen et al. 2012). Key elements of 
Tibetan cultural traditions that facilitate conservation include: no killing, care of the 
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wildlife, and worship and protection of sacred sites. As a result, TEK and related local 
institutions are more effective in conserving biodiversity than formal institutions, and 
the loss of TEK and decline in traditional practices may lead to habitat degradation 
and biodiversity loss (Shen et al. 2012).  
 
Similar to the problem of local knowledge decline in Yunnan province, traditional 
knowledge in Mongolia and Tibet is also facing serious threats. Historical policies 
that limit indigenous power over resources and centralize planning have contributed to 
local knowledge loss and also placed large barriers on local knowledge’s integration 
into conservation (Tang and Gavin 2010). Further, in Tibet, because of the 
establishment of the Sanjiangyuan nature reserve, the government tried to relocate 
100,000 people (17% of the population) from the Sanjiangyuan region by 2010 with 
the aim of restoring the grassland ecosystem (Richard et al. 2006, Foggin 2008). 
Compared to the exclusion policy adopted for the conservation of the grasslands, the 
ecological knowledge and traditional management expertise of Tibetan herders were 
based on a long history of survival with a variety of occupations to diversify their 
income and minimize risk in the harsh, often unpredictable environment (Richard et al. 
2006, Foggin 2008). This policy threatens the livelihood and culture of Tibetan 
herders and may negatively impact the conservation of grassland ecosystems. 
 
Minority peoples in China have thus developed diverse local knowledge and 
management practices which may offer alternative conservation strategies for natural 
resource management. Authorities should respect and support such knowledge and 
integrate local cultures and customs with advanced management methods to develop 
local institutions. Such localized rules and regulations can form the basis for co-
management and provide a cost-effective tool for regulating community behavior. 
 
3.4.2.3 Studies of local knowledge of Han people 
 
Compared to the number of studies about local knowledge of minority nationalities in 
China, only a couple of studies of Han people’s contemporary local knowledge were 
found. Turvey et al. (2010) undertook research on local memory of extinct species in 
the middle-lower Yangtze basin fishing communities. They presented new evidence 
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of shifting baselines in local perception of regional species declines and on the 
duration of “community memory” of extinct species (Turvey et al. 2010). However, 
they did not investigate the underlying reasons and broad context of such local 
knowledge decline. Another study carried out by Yang (2015) investigated the 
influence of local knowledge on institutional change in ecological and environmental 
management. The study concerned desertification control in 12 counties in north 
China, and its focus was on attitudes towards the relationships between local 
knowledge, science and institutional change (Yang 2015). With very few details 
concerning the content of local knowledge in desertification control, the study offered 
very limited overall representation of local knowledge in the studied areas. Through 
this literature review, it is evident that the topic of Han people’s contemporary local 
knowledge is under-researched and thus is an opportunity for this research to 
contribute. 
 
3.4.3 Local knowledge and co-management research 
 
Generally, the Chinese research discussed above is either about co-management or 
about local knowledge. Some recent research has addressed both local knowledge and 
co-management, and offers good insights for the potential of co-management projects. 
An example is research undertaken on participatory monitoring in Yunnan province, 
which presented a unique opportunity to integrate local knowledge with co-
management (Van Rijsoort and Zhang 2005, Zhang et al. 2006a, Van Rijsoort et al. 
2010). Participatory monitoring and evaluation (PM&E) means involving local people 
in monitoring and evaluation of co-management projects. Such involvement could be 
valuable for various reasons; for example local people may have a store of knowledge 
about forests and resource use, and local involvement in monitoring may enhance 
villagers’ awareness of and capacity for sustainable resource use as well as enhance 
the transparency of management decision-making (Groombridge et al. 2003). 
Furthermore, it can improve relations between villagers and management staff, and it 
can be more sustainable as it would use locally available capacity and resources (Van 
Rijsoort and Zhang 2005). Van Rijsoort and Zhang (2005) found that participatory 
resource monitoring (PRM) (similar to PM&E), which was implemented in two 
nature reserves in Yunnan, had positive outcomes after one year’s implementation. 
114 
 
There was an indication of social change as villagers and reserve management staff 
came closer together, and villagers felt empowered as they were more involved in 
management decision-making. However, such positive progress stopped after two or 
three years because of a lack of motivation. Since monitoring was not viewed as a 
forest management tool, villagers did not have a true role in this management, and the 
monitoring activity was not institutionalized (Van Rijsoort et al. 2010). 
 
This case study shows that, to be effective, participatory monitoring and evaluation 
should be institutionalized as a formal management responsibility and should be 
carried out regularly to ensure effective management of resources. Further, all 
stakeholders need to evaluate the outputs of the monitoring and give feedback to the 
knowledge contributors to ensure further involvement (Raymond et al. 2010). It is 
important to capture and share the results of the monitoring across researchers, 
external actors (e.g. funding bodies) and local participants, as well as publicize the 
follow-up actions taken on the basis of the monitoring results. In this way, people will 
be motivated to carry on their efforts.  
 
Other research carried out by Wang et al. (2012) examined the changes in livelihood 
and perceptions of local residents after the implementation of the green rice project 
(GRP). The project was funded by WWF on Crested Ibis National Nature Reserve 
(CINNR) in Shanxi Province. Farmers were funded to plant organic rice without 
fertilizer and pesticides in the vicinity of the nature reserve to protect the endangered 
Crested Ibis (Wang et al. 2012).  
 
According to Wang et al. (2012), the GRP project fully represented and secured the 
benefits of multiple stakeholders, and as a result, maximized the active involvement 
of local farmers. After the funding from WWF finished, the project was sustained 
with the compensation mainly coming from local government and with more farmers 
actively involved in the project. However, problems such as unguaranteed funding 
sources, discontinuous techniques and financial support for follow-up industries still 
exist (Wang et al. 2012). This study indicates that households will care more about 
their livelihoods than conservation if there is doubt whether they will be able to 
provide for their basic needs. So, in order to make such co-management projects 
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successful, designers should take full consideration of local residents’ life 
requirements first.  
 
In summary, co-management projects need to draw on local knowledge and local 
perceptions to ensure their success. Only when projects involve local people fully in 
the whole process of design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation, can long-
term success be secured. As Groombridge et al. (2003) point out, one of the most 
important challenges faced by natural resource managers today is to understand 
people’s perceptions towards resources, value judgments towards problems and 
motivations for management actions. If it is understood why and how people perceive, 
analyse and make decisions in resource management, a negotiation between different 
stakeholders about which management action to take can be better facilitated (Van 
Rijsoort and Zhang 2005). So it is necessary for the researchers to start from the 
perceptions and values of local people, and provide assistance and support based on 
their requirements. Only then can we effectively facilitate an equal exchange of 
scientific, technical and local/Indigenous knowledge systems and an integrated 
decision-making process (Van Rijsoort and Zhang 2005). 
 
3.4.4 Challenges and opportunities 
 
In summary, the prevailing international perspective is that since many local 
communities possess valuable cultural knowledge and management systems, which 
are consistent with or contribute to the conservation of biodiversity and natural 
resources on this planet (UNESCO 2008), promoting and integrating local knowledge 
in protected areas management is particularly important (UNESCO 2011a). Place-
centred communities hold locally-specific knowledge, and these communities can 
make a vital contribution if they are empowered to participate in environmental 
management.  Successful co-management requires a knowledge partnership (Berkes 
2009), and different partners have the potential to bring knowledge that is acquired at 
different scales. Strategies such as bridging knowledge, participatory research, and 
collaborative monitoring can facilitate or improve co-management (Berkes 2009). 
Promoting and integrating local and Indigenous knowledge needs to take place in 
conservation, development and research/education functions of protected areas 
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(UNESCO 2011b). However, there are many obstacles to build such knowledge 
partnerships, such as lack of trust toward local knowledge, difficulty in articulating 
local knowledge, and different worldviews. 
 
From the above literature review, it is clear that local knowledge is held both by 
minority nationalities in China and by people of the majority Han nationality, 
although little research has been undertaken on the latter. Such knowledge is 
potentially valuable for conservation and sustainable resource management. However, 
much of this knowledge is under threat and has the risk of disappearing, especially in 
protected areas where exclusive policies forbid traditional resource usage, which can 
displace local community practices and destroy the link between local knowledge and 
its origins. In order to save and sustain this cultural asset, it needs to be acknowledged, 
and the right cultural context and environment created for such knowledge to survive 
and contribute to sustainable management.  
 
The industrialization and commercialization of contemporary China is a serious threat 
to local knowledge. A famous fable in Chinese Classic Literature, Chuang Tzu, tells 
the story of three emperors (Figure 18). They were the emperor of the south sea 
named Fast, the emperor of the north sea who was called Furious and the emperor of 
the center who was called Hun-tun (the primal blob which first divided into heaven 
and earth and then differentiated into a myriad aspects of the world). Because Fast and 
Furious were treated very generously by Hun-tun, they wanted to repay Hun-tun’s 
bounty. As all men have seven holes through which they look, listen, eat and breathe, 
they tried to bore these into Hun-tun who alone didn’t have any. Every day they bored 
one hole, and on the seventh day Hun-tun died (Graham 1981). This may be a 
metaphor for some of the local communities who used to survive self-sufficiently by 
their own local knowledge. However, the nature, rapidity and scale of development 
and growth in China, even within areas that are set aside to protect nature, threaten 
this, as do even well-intended external aid or development projects. Unfortunately 
such outside influences may undermine the integrity of the local knowledge systems 




Figure 18: The Death of Primal Chaos (Hun-tun) (Tsai 2005:26) 
 
To avoid the fate of Hun-tun, and as suggested by this literature review, we should 
leave space and freedom for local knowledge to evolve by itself, and support its 
continuance. This requires a shift from top-down to bottom up governance, and from 
exclusion to inclusion into management of reserves. However, there are many 
obstacles for such a policy shift to conserve local knowledge. For example, frequent 
upheavals of land ownership and user rights create uncertainty and distrust of local 
communities towards government (Xu and Melick 2007). The government, on the 
other hand, may lack confidence in the ability of the residents and the roles they may 
be played at the grassroots level (including local communities and civil society in 
general). China’s current political and developmental situation is far from being a 
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supportive environment for co-management, which itself is a foreign concept being 
introduced as a requirement of international funding. Given the very different 
structural, cultural and tenure arrangements relating to Chinese reserve management, 
it is questionable whether co-management and incorporation of local knowledge will 
be viable in the present socio-political context of China. 
 
The gaps that have been identified in this literature review in the context of nature 
reserve co-management in China, which hamper local knowledge incorporation are as 
follows: 
 Local knowledge about the local environment is under-researched amongst the 
Han people  
 In China there is little historic experience with management mechanisms that 
successfully incorporate local knowledge, especially via a collaborative 
management arrangement 
 China has only recently started to establish protected area co-management that 
incorporates local knowledge (as a requirement of international funding), and so 
far these appear to have had limited success, so there is a need to explore the 
potential for this in China’s political, developmental and cultural context 
 
3.5 Research questions 
 
In order to fill the obvious knowledge gaps in relation to the integration of local 
knowledge in protected area co-management this research seeks to find out the 
existence of local knowledge relating to YNNR, and particularly concerning the 
habitat of the Red-crown Crane and how such knowledge is integrated into the co-
management of YNNR? The following three focused research questions will be the 
guide of this research:  
 
1. What types of local knowledge does the local community possess in YNNR relating 
to the reed ecosystem which is the habitat of the protected Red-crowned Crane, and 





2. What are the perceptions and practices of nature reserve management staff and 
scientific researchers towards the use of the local knowledge held by local community 
members in the management of the reserve? 
 
3. To what extent do current management mechanisms integrate local knowledge, and 
what are the challenges of and opportunities for the integration of local knowledge 
into co-management of YNNR? 
 
In order to answer the above research questions, the following chapter will discuss the 



















The goal of social research is to improve the way we understand the social world, and 
it can be further divided into three purposes: to explore a new topic, describe a social 
phenomenon, and explain why something occurs (Davidson and Tolich 2003, 
Neuman 2006, Yin 2014). There are several strategies commonly used in social 
science research, such as experiments, surveys, archival analysis, histories, and case 
studies (Singleton and Straits 2010, Yin 2014). Case studies are increasingly used as a 
research tool in psychology, sociology, political science, business, social work, 
planning and education (Stake 1995, Simons 2009, Liamputtong 2009, Yin 2014). As 
a research endeavor, a case study contributes uniquely to our knowledge of individual, 
organizational, social, and political phenomena (Yin 2014).  
 
The most important condition for deciding on research strategies is the type of 
research question being asked (Stake 1998, George and Bennett 2005, Neuman 2006, 
Liamputtong 2009, Simons 2009, Yin 2014). Research questions which are more 
explanatory, such as “how” and “why” questions, are more likely to favor the use of 
case studies, experiments, or histories (Liamputtong 2009, Yin 2014). A case study 
method has a distinct advantage when ‘a “how” or “why” question is being asked 
about a contemporary set of events over which the investigator has little or no 
control’(Yin 2014:15).  
 
Because a case study examines both details of each case’s internal features as well as 
the surrounding situation, it helps researchers connect the micro level, and to link the 
actions of individual people to the macro level, or large-scale social structures and 
processes (Neuman 2006). There are several advantages of case study methods that 
make them useful for theory development: conceptual validity; heuristic impact; 
causal mechanisms identification; ability to capture complexity and trace processes; 
calibration; and holistic elaboration (George and Bennett 2005, Neuman 2006). As a 
result, case studies are valuable in refining theory and suggesting complexities for 
further investigation, as well as helping to establish the limits of generalizability 
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(Stake 1998). Another unique strength of a case study is its ability to deal with a full 
variety of evidence – documents, artefacts, interviews, and observations (Stake 1998, 
Neuman 2006, Simons 2009). By drawing from multiple sources of evidence, data can 
be triangulated during analysis (Yin 2014).  
 
Throughout the co-management and local knowledge literature, case studies are a 
common method of conducting research (Pomeroy and Berkes 1997, Nadasdy 1999, 
Agrawal and Ostrom 2001, LaRochelle and Berkes 2003, Spaeder 2005, Coombes 
and Hill 2005, Gilchrist et al. 2005, Robert-Charrue 2006, Moller et al. 2009, Hill et al. 
2011). Given the exploratory nature of the research, the special advantages of a case 
study approach, and the prevalence of this method in the co-management and local 
knowledge research area, the case study method was deemed to be the most 
appropriate to guide the research for this study. The subsequent sections detail the 
approaches followed to conduct this research in relation to case study methodology. 
 
4.2 Case-study Design 
 
A research design consists of a clear statement of the research problem, as well as a 
strategy or procedure that guides the investigator in the process of collecting, 
analyzing, and interpreting observations within a conceptual framework (Singleton 
and Straits 2010, Yin 2014). As Yin (2014) states, there are two types of design for 
the case study method - single case design and multiple case design. Because single–
case studies rely almost exclusively on within-case methods, process-tracing, and 
congruence, it serves the purpose of theory testing particularly well if it is a 
compatible, deviant or crucial case (George and Bennett 2005). A potential 
vulnerability of the single-case design is that a case may later turn out to be different 
from what it was thought to be at the outset (Yin 2014). Therefore, researchers should 
carefully investigate the potential single-case designs to minimize the chances of 
misrepresentation and to maximize the access needed to collect the case study 
evidence (Yin 2014).  
 
Co-management is a relatively new management theory with a short history of 
systematic implementation, and there are very few local knowledge studies 
123 
 
concerning Han nationality, especially its role in nature reserve management in China. 
For these reasons, the research topic suits an exploratory case study. The case study 
site selected was the Yancheng National Nature Reserve (YNNR), and the following 
section will discuss the research design carried out by this case study.   
 
4.2.1 Study Questions 
 
The research questions, as developed in Chapter III, are: 
 
1. What types of local knowledge does the local community possess in YNNR relating 
to the reed ecosystem which is the habitat of the protected Red-crowned Crane, and 
what are their aspirations for the use of this knowledge in the management of the 
reserve? 
2. What are the perceptions and practices of nature reserve management staff and 
scientific researchers towards the use of the local knowledge held by local community 
members in the management of the reserve? 
3. To what extent do current management mechanisms integrate local knowledge, and 
what are the challenges of and opportunities for the integration of local knowledge 
into co-management of YNNR? 
 
4.2.2 Case Selection 
 
The most important rationale for case selection is to take the case from which people 
can learn the most (Stake 1998). According to this rationale, the YNNR was chosen 
for the following reasons. First, as discussed in Chapter II, YNNR is the first and 
largest tidal mudflat nature reserve in China as well as an international Biosphere 
Reserve and a Wetland of International Importance. It covers a large area with high 
species diversity and a high number of keystone species, including the flagship 
species – Red-crowned Crane. Second, there are few studies in China about Han 
people’s local knowledge use and integration in nature reserve management. Since 
YNNR was required to establish co-management from 1999-2008 as one of the GEF 
funded project sites, and since then has been managed with the expectation of co-
management and incorporation of local knowledge (as discussed in Chapter III), this 
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case study will serve well the exploration purposes, and can be a critical test for the 
relevance of co-management and local knowledge incorporation in a Chinese (Han) 
setting. As case studies are good at examining internal features and the surrounding 
situation of each case, it is suitable for carrying out the single case study design to 
explore the practices of co-management, the existence of local knowledge and 
whether such knowledge is effectively included in the nature reserve management. 
Third, the socio-economic settings around YNNR are complex, with a number of land 
use conflicts, such as fishing, farming, industrial development and tourism. The case 
study, being in a large reserve with multiple stakeholders, also has the potential to 
provide insights into issues surrounding co-management in China which may have 
more generic application. Additionally, YNNR is a physically accessible place and the 
researcher, being Han Chinese, would have little difficulty in understanding the local 
dialect and local culture. When combined, the researcher was of the opinion that 
YNNR would be an ideal site in which to conduct a single case study. 
 
4.2.3 Unit of Analysis 
 
The unit of analysis of this research is the YNNR, specifically consisting of the core 
zone, the buffer zone and part of the experimental zone of the YNNR. As local 
knowledge is the focus of the research, the expectation was that all informants should 
have either personal or professional knowledge about reed ecosystems, or be involved 
in the nature reserve management. Research participants therefore included the local 
residents, nature reserve staff and scientific researchers engaged in research projects 
in YNNR. Participants were selected on the basis of their potential knowledge about 
reed ecosystems or nature reserve management in YNNR, which included:   
 People who live within the YNNR Buffer zone or Experimental zone, who are 
mainly small farmers or fishermen with a subsistence lifestyle. These 
participants were selected to represent two groups, one with a long settlement 
history that is more than 3 generations, the other with a short settlement history 
of between 1-2 generations to explore the difference of the knowledge base 
between long-term residence and new immigrants.   
 Representatives of the management staff for the YNNR. 




4.2.4 Case Study Protocol 
 
The case study protocol is a tactic to increase the reliability of case study research and 
is intended to guide the researcher in carrying out the case study (Yin 2014:68). There 
are four steps in this case study’s protocol, including: 
 Gaining access to key organizations and interviewees 
 Field research procedures 
 Compilation and organization 
 Analyzing the evidence and writing the final report  
The case study research was undertaken according to the above protocol and the 
following section will explain the approaches taken to ensure reliability.  
 
4.2.4.1 Gaining access to key organizations and interviewees  
 
The first step in the case study protocol was to contact the potential case organizations 
and obtain consent. Initial contact was made via email and on-line chatting network 
(QQ) to the Tourism Department in Yancheng Municipal Government, regarding the 
research purpose. Upon indicating an interest in participating, a telephone call was 
made to the relevant official and verbal consent was gained. The official also provided 
the names of local contacts and fieldwork related information. With the support from 
the official, contacts were made through telephone to the local nature reserve staff 
who were knowledgeable about local communities. After receiving web-based 
electronic approval from the nature reserve contact person, a formal Human Ethics 
application process was conducted to gain approval from the University of Otago to 
carry out the field work. At the request of the Ethics committee, a formal letter of 
agreement authorizing the research was sent by the University of Otago to an official 
in the nature reserve authority to sign. By signing the agreement, the nature reserve 
provided official consent for the researcher to conduct interviews with nature reserve 
staff and members of the local communities. Upon receiving the signed agreement 
between YNNR and University of Otago, the research gained full ethical approval 
from the university to proceed. The identification of specific people to participate in 
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the study was not done until the researcher was on site as there was no way to contact 
most of these people prior to the visit. 
 
4.2.4.2 Field research procedures 
 
For this study, three complementary sources of evidence were used – document 
analysis, site visits and interviews. According to Yin (2014) the most important use of 
documents for case studies is to corroborate and augment evidence from other sources. 
For example, documents are helpful in verifying the correct spellings and titles, 
providing other specific details for corroboration as well as making inferences and 
gaining an understanding of the rationale, processes, policies and practices (Yin 2014); 
in this case those guiding the nature reserve management. Because of their overall 
value, systematic searches for relevant documents were carried out in the data 
collection phase. Documents included government statistics, maps, meeting records, 
photos, videos, training materials, brochures, leaflets, and project reports.  
 
Another source of evidence came from interviews. Overall, interviews are an essential 
source of case study evidence because most case studies are about human affairs, and 
well-informed respondents can provide important insights into a situation (Yin 2014). 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with the representatives from the nature 
reserve staff, local community members, and scientific researchers. The open-ended 
interview format is advantageous because insights as well as opinions may be 
obtained (Neuman 2006).  
 
4.2.4.2.1 Recruitment of interviewees 
 
Key informants within the local community were partially identified through 
recommendations of well-informed nature reserve staff: the village head and 
managers of state-run companies were recommended because they were thought to be 
more knowledgeable about the nature reserve and able to provide insights. Having 
spent time getting to know the communities, I also selected some local interviewees 
based on the proximity of their household in relation to the nature reserve and their 
knowledge related to the research topics. Some local fishermen and aquaculture 
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farmer were chosen because they lived either in the buffer zone or close to the core 
zone of the nature reserve and they were knowledgeable of local environment and 
livelihood. Then the snowball technique was used to find other interviewees 
(Davidson and Tolich 2003). The advantage of using snowballing is that the contacts 
generated are generally people with the desired knowledge that the researcher is 
interested in exploring, as this is a criteria identified when requests are made for 
potential interviewees. All the local community representatives approached agreed to 
be interviewed or delegated their colleagues to do the interview. However, since all 
the initial contacts provided were men and other interviewees they suggested were 
also men, there was only one woman enrolled as local interviewee. Because Chinese 
rural women are usually shy and subordinate to the household owner (usually the 
men), they generally did not want to talk when we conducted interviews in their 
household. Further, older women (above 50) who may have had traditional livelihood 
knowledge were usually not well educated and they spoke a strong local dialect which 
was very hard to understand. I would have needed to hire a translator to do the 
interviews and there was no budget for this. I tried to contact a woman almost 100 
years old who was an expert for reed handicraft but failed because of time and budget 
constraints. This lack of female representation may result in bias based on gender and 
also impact the contents and viewpoints of local knowledge.  
 
Nature reserve staff and scientific researchers were interviewed to obtain information 
from their perspective and compare with the information given by the local 
community interviewees as a means of triangulation.  
 
The nature reserve staff were chosen to be interviewed on the basis of their 
knowledge either of nature reserve management or community affairs. Four of them 
were contacted before the field work since they were either suggested by the official 
from the supervising department or it was clear from the literature review that they 
were knowledgeable on the research topics. The other four were recommended by the 
former as being more knowledgeable about the locals. Another three nature reserve 
staff who were experienced in related research topics were also approached, but they 
were either too busy or unwilling to be interviewed. As a result, the interview results 
may lack some opinions from the higher level or the general strategic level. Other 
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employees were not approached because their work was either not related to the 
project or they were not knowledgeable concerning the topics to be discussed.  
 
Scientific researchers were contacted on the basis of relevance to the research project 
and their expertise about YNNR. Nine scientists were approached, and five agreed to 
be interviewed personally or through email while two provided no response, one 
stated her research was conducted too long ago and could not provide any useful 
information, and one refused to answer through email since the questions were too 
hard to answer. Consequently, the interview results may lack some aspects of research 
expertise concerning local bird species and nature reserve management. Some 
potential interviewees were not approached or not persistently approached because of 
availability and unwillingness to participate. 
 
Although 12 interviews are usually enough for emergent themes to reach saturation 
point (Guest et al. 2006), a higher number was sought in this study to account for the 
diverse backgrounds of the participants. Altogether, there were 39 person-to-person 
interviews, one internet interview and three email question-and-answer exchanges 
conducted for the case study. Of these, 30 interviews were with local community 
members, eight interviews with nature reserve staff, and five interviews (one person-





Prior to conducting the interviews, guiding questions were developed from the local 
knowledge and co-management literature review as reported in Chapter III, and the 
contextual information gathered as reported in Chapter II. All the interviews were 
semi-structured, based around pre-established opening questions, and followed by 
prompts and more detailed questions which changed according to the specific context 
(Olsen 2012)(see Appendix 1 for detailed question lists). Questions were asked in 
such a manner that respondents were unaware of the researcher’s attempt to formulate 
corroboration (Yin 2014). This type of interview was chosen to encourage 
conversations and allow the participant to talk about the topics that interest them the 
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most, while making sure to cover all the subjects required by the research objectives 
in a set amount of time (Olsen 2012). All interviews were recorded (either audio 
recorded or written in notes when audio record denied) and placed in a case database.  
 
The final source of evidence involved direct observations from site visits. The data 
gathered through direct observation played a corroborating role with other sources of 
evidence and helped provide the researcher with case background and contextual 
understanding (Bryman 2012). Since observational evidence is often useful in adding 
new dimensions for understanding the context or the phenomenon being studied (Yin 
2014), the researcher tried to take photographs whenever possible. The direct 
observation focused on the livelihoods, land uses and natural environment of the 
researched communities, features of the nature reserve, evidence of the nature 
reserve’s biodiversity, reed harvesting, and evidence of co-management. 
 
4.2.4.3 Compilation and organization 
 
The third step was the compilation and organization of the data collected. Where case 
study research procedures are poorly documented, external reviewers can be rightly 
suspicious of the reliability of the case study (Yin 2014). The formation of a case 
database helps to overcome this shortcoming. All sources of evidence gathered 
throughout the data collection, including all available documentation, audio records, 
field notes, photographs etc. constituted the database. 
 
4.2.4.4 Analysing the evidence and writing the final report 
 
The fourth step was using thematic analysis to analyse the data which is a common 
and foundational tool in the understanding of qualitative data (Guest et al. 2012). 
Thematic analysis is a “rigorous, yet inductive, set of procedures designed to identify 
and examine themes from the textual data in a way that is transparent and credible” 
(Guest et al. 2012:15). This method involves the identification of main themes in a 
text, followed by their transformation into codes, and their aggregation into categories 
(Guest et al. 2012). The audio files and interview notes were transcribed from the 
local dialect of Mandarin into written Chinese and then translated into written English 
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for analysis. NVivo 10 was used to analyse the transcripts and facilitate the thematic 
analysis, because it makes the process of coding large data sets (especially above 20 
texts) easier and more systematic (Guest et al. 2012, QSR 2015). It allows the 
exploration, reduction, merging and labelling of the categories in an organized fashion. 
Data can be saved, revisited, adjusted, and replicated, thus enabling verification of the 
accuracy of the coding, and improving overall consistency (Guest et al. 2012).  
 
4.2.5 Validity and Reliability 
 
Yin (2014) identifies four commonly used tests to establish the quality of empirical 
social research: construct validity, internal validity, external validity and reliability. 
Construct validity means establishing correct operational measures for the concepts 
being studied (Yin 2014). This study used multiple sources of evidence in data 
collection, creating a chain of evidence allowing an external observer to follow the 
derivation of any evidence from initial research questions to ultimate case study 
conclusion to ensure construct validity. As internal validity is used for explanatory or 
causal studies only and it is not applicable for descriptive or exploratory studies, it is 
not discussed in relation to this study. External validity refers to establishing the 
domain to which a study’s finding can be generalized. Given its exploratory nature, 
the YNNR case cannot be considered to be representative of reserve management and 
knowledge-sharing in China – but the study is nonetheless relevant as there are very 
few similar studies in China, and may, therefore, serve as a basis for future 
representative studies of more nature reserves.  
 
Unlike statistical generalization where making inference about a population (or 
universe) on the basis of a sample is done, case studies use “analytic generalization”, 
in which a previously developed theory is used to compare the results of the case 
study (Yin 2014). The ultimate goal is to treat the evidence fairly, to produce 
compelling analytic conclusions, and to rule out alternative interpretations, so that the 
findings of this study are generalizable at the theoretical level. Theories discussed in 
the literature review chapter not only facilitate the data collection phase of the study, 





The concept of reliability, i.e. the consistency and replicability of the findings, does 
not apply to qualitative studies (Guest et al. 2012), because individual answers depend 
on the context and the experience of each participant at the time of the interview or 
observation. Dependability is a concept better suited to the assessment of qualitative 
research than reliability, and it requires a consistent data collection approach and 
adherence to the commonly understood rules and conventions governing qualitative 
research (Liamputtong 2009, Guest et al. 2012). The chosen methodology aims to 
strengthen the dependability of the case study in two ways: forming an explicit case 
study protocol and developing a database so that other investigators can review the 
evidence directly and not be limited to the written reports.  
 
As is usual in PhD research, all of the interviews, coding, and analyses were designed 
and carried out by the same researcher (Guest et al. 2012). This approach is both 
common (Kalof et al. 2008, Guest et al. 2012) and has the advantage of applying the 
same logic when coding transcripts, but the lack of cross-coding (Singleton and Straits 
2010) carries the danger of introducing a variety of individual biases (Guest et al. 
2012). The credibility and consistency of the results was assured through data 
collection techniques and triangulation between informants (Kalof et al. 2008, 
Singleton and Straits 2010, Guest et al. 2012). There are particular instances in which 
data from different informants or data sources diverge. In most of these cases, the 
different sources complement, rather than contradict each other. Nevertheless, 
wherever contradictions occur, they are clearly stated and discussed as part of the 




This study is an initial effort to explore the relationship between contemporary local 
knowledge of Han people and nature reserve management in China. The temporal and 
spatial limitations of the single case constrained deeper understanding of social, 
political factors that contributing to the current situation. Further, the necessarily 
limited number of interviewees and scope of questions also narrowed the spectrum of 
local knowledge explored in YNNR. More time and a larger number of interviewees 
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could be employed in future studies to expand the scope of understanding of local 
knowledge in Yancheng, such as the locals’ knowledge of hunting, salt production 
and other traditional sources of livelihood. The collection of a larger knowledge base 
would enhance the understanding of the characteristics and nature of local knowledge 
and therefore its potential to contribute to nature reserve management and sustainable 
development as a whole. 
 
4.3 Methods and Procedures 
 
4.3.1 Human Ethics A approval from University of Otago 
 
Before carrying out field research which involves people as participants, Human 
Ethics approval must be granted from the University of Otago to ensure that research 
is conducted with the highest appropriate standards to protect the interests of 
participants, researchers and the University. The researcher completed a Human 
Ethics Application ‘A’ categorized application, the most stringent category, as the 
research was being undertaken with human participants internationally. The 
information provided included all field work related information, such as purpose and 
research questions of the project, researchers experience and qualifications, 
recruitment of participants, research methods and procedures, privacy and any 
potential problems with the research. The information sheet for participants, the 
consent form for participants and the proposed interview questions were also 
submitted (see Appendix 1, 2, 3). The ethics committee reviewed the research 
protocols and the supporting documents based on internationally accepted ethical 
principles including scientific validity, an acceptable ratio of potential benefits to risks 
of harm, the minimization of risks, adequate informed consent procedures, social and 
cultural sensitivity (including consistencies with the Treaty of Waitangi), measures to 
ensure the protection of vulnerable populations, and the treatment of participants with 
respect and dignity. The ethics committee first sent out a conditional approval 
requesting the researcher supply evidence of formal authorization for the research 
from the YNNR authority. Upon receiving the copy of signed agreement between a 
YNNR official and the University of Otago, the final approval of Human Ethics was 




4.3.2 Field research 
 
 
Figure 20: Reed Harvesting, in Xin Yang Gang Village, Yancheng, Dec 2013 
 
I carried out the field research with practical assistance and support from Hui Wang 
(my husband and research assistant in the field) in Yancheng National Nature Reserve 
from Dec 19, 2013 to Jan 22, 2014. We stayed in Xin Yang Gang (a former township 
and now equivalent to a village beside the core zone of the nature reserve) for 35 days. 
The research method included on-site observations and semi-structured interviews 
with local people, nature reserve staff and scientific researchers. My husband as the 
research assistant helped taking all the photos and recording all the interviews, storing 
and organizing all the documents in our personal computer.  
 
4.3.2.1 Community member interviews 
 
From Dec 22, 2013, I started interviewing people from the name list provided by 
nature reserve staff, and subsequently further people through the snowballing 
technique. Altogether, I interviewed 30 local community people, among them four 
were interviewed twice to get additional information concerning their local 
knowledge and perspective towards the nature reserve management. All the 
interviewees were either locally born or had moved from other counties or towns 
within the boundary of Yancheng City. All interviewees except one were male, and 
their age range was from 25-80, with the majority of participants aged between 40-60. 
134 
 
The time for each interview varied, from less than 20 minutes to over 100 minutes 
(for details of interviews refer to interview summary in Appendix 3). Most people 
were interviewed in their own houses or offices, while some came to be interviewed 
in the meeting room of the nature reserve or the hotel where we lived for the data 
collection period. All the people interviewed signed the Informed Consent form (see 
Appendix 2) and indicated whether they wanted to remain anonymous or not before 
the commencement of interviews. One interviewee from the Reed Company was 
asked to show me the reed harvesting sites, and he agreed and showed several sites for 
on-site observations. Other observations of reed harvesting were conducted with oral 
consent from people engaging in such activities. Although no payment for time was 
offered, a small culturally appropriate gift (equal to NZ$1.00-2.00 in value) was given 
after the interview to show appreciation for their time given.   
 
I also sought permission before using a data recorder and taking photos for each 
interview (as part of the consent form). Every interview was audio recorded and 
photos taken except where consent was withheld. If participants choose not to be 
audio recorded (which occurred in four cases), I made detailed notes and provided 
these to participants to check for accuracy, and incorporated these notes in the data for 
analysis. Interviews usually lasted for 40-60 minutes, and were loosely structured 
around a series of open-ended questions designed to elicit information relevant to the 
research. Questions were asked about the following matters (for a detailed question 
list, refer to Appendix 1): local knowledge about the reed ecosystem and Red-
crowned Crane, local livelihoods and nature reserve management, local perceptions 
on nature reserve management policies and their responses. After each interview, I 
would verbally summarize the key points and ask for confirmation from the 
interviewees, and clarify any points required.  
 
4.3.2.2 Nature reserve staff interviews 
 
For the eight nature reserve staff interviewed, semi-structured interviews of 1-2 hours 
were carried out, some of them interviewed twice to clarify some information 
collected from other sources. All of the nature reserve staff was interviewed in their 
offices and all of them wanted to remain anonymous. Open-ended questions which are 
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different from those of communities were asked since nature reserve staff were 
presumed to have more accurate knowledge concerning the reed ecosystem and Red-
crowned Crane. More general questions were also asked to understand their view 
concerning the following topics (for a detailed question list, refer to Appendix 1): 
 What is local knowledge, and would local knowledge be useful in nature 
reserve management?  
 Do the local community members possess local knowledge relating to reed 
ecosystems? 
 Who possess such knowledge? What could be the use of such knowledge in the 
reserve management? 
 How to integrate such knowledge in the reserve management and what are the 
challenges? 
 
4.3.2.3 Scientist interviews 
 
I interviewed five scientific researchers. Only one of them, Dr. Pin Zuo was 
interviewed personally in YNNR. I approached the other four scientific researchers 
through telephone and email. I conducted an on-line interview with Dr. Yang Fan Li 
through audio conversation. The other three researchers answered the interview 
questions through email and gave consent to use their interview material and their 
names in my thesis (for detailed questions refer to Appendix 1).  
 
In order to understand the background of each interviewee, the following personal 
information was collected. Some of the responses to these questions have personal 
elements to them. All personal information was kept confidential unless the 
interviewees consented to disclose such information:  
 Local community members: Name, age, and years of residence in YNNR, major 
occupation, and community affiliation.   
 Nature reserve staff: Name, years of working in YNNR and professional role. 







As an important means of triangulation, I carried out various forms of on-site 
observation. First, I attended the 10 year review meeting for Yancheng Man and 
Biosphere Reserve on Dec 21, 2013 as an observer. This was a communication 
meeting involving participants from local community representatives, nature reserve 
staff and scientific researchers. I made detailed notes and took photos of the meeting 
after permission was given by the organizer. The notes were included in the research 
data for analysis. Second, I conducted on-site observations of reed harvesting by the 
Reed Company, and other reed fields in the nature reserve in order to check the 
validity of the information given by the local community interviewees about reed 
ecosystems and as a means of triangulation. Oral consents were given by any 
participants before recording conversations and taking photographs of the harvesting 
event. Field notes were taken of on-site discussions and used in the data analysis. My 
husband also took photos of people harvesting, transporting and bundling reed and all 
those photos became part of the database.  
 
Over Jan 12-13, 2014, my husband and I volunteered to help with a community 
survey which was the first comprehensive survey of this kind conducted by the nature 
reserve. The survey was carried out by Dr. Pin Zuo and two of her students from 
Nanjing University. Our team visited 10 communities in Da Feng and Dong Tai 
County which were located in the south experimental zone of the nature reserve. Dr. 
Zuo conducted semi-structured interviews with local community people to collect 
baseline information (such as size, population, production income and history) about 
those communities. The communities visited included those associated with river dam 
administration, villages, agricultural farms, a wind farm and two forest farms. All the 
information was summarized to form the nature reserve community database. We 
took pictures and also asked the interviewees some general questions about birds and 
the relationship between them and the reserve during the survey. The photos and the 
field notes taken through interviews and on-site observation were included in the 
database to facilitate triangulation and analysis of context in the experimental zone of 
the reserve. None of the interviews conducted in the survey were included in the 




Finally, during the course of processing the research data, whenever I found any 
questions I contacted the nature reserve staff and scientific researchers through the 
internet or telephone for more information. However, the local community people 
were not contacted for clarification due to lack of convenient forms of communication.  
 
4.3.3 Description of participants 
 
4.3.3.1 Local community members 
 
Altogether 30 local people were interviewed; 29 were male and one was female 
(Table 6). All of the interviewees lived in the municipality of Yancheng, and they 
were mainly from Xin Yang Gang Village, She Yang County, Da Feng County, Xing 
Nong Village, and Xia Ba Village, most of which were located either in the buffer 
zone of YNNR or close to the buffer or core zone (Figure 21). All except Participant 
13, who was born in nearby Huai’an County, were from the Yancheng Region, and all 
except three were from local families, (i.e. their fathers are also locals). Ten 
interviewees were engaged in the fishing industry, eight of them were engaged in 
farming, three were working for a reed company, six were working in She Yang Salt 
Farm, and the rest were engaged in other forms of business. Although some of the 
local interviewees agreed to be named, in order to protect their privacy and safety, I 





Table 6: Interview summary (all interviewees listed below signed the consent form) 
No. Name Occupation Expertise 
1.  Participant 1  aquaculture fishery, aquaculture 
2.  Participant 2  aquaculture aquaculture 
3.  Participant 3 farmer reed production  
4.  Participant 4 fishermen fishery, farming 
5.  Participant 5 manager farming 
6.  Participant 6  worker salt production 
7.  Participant 7 worker salt production 
8.  Participant 8  worker salt production 
9.  Participant 9 worker salt production 
10.  Participant 10 manager salt production 
11.  Participant 11 worker salt production, bird hunting 
12.  Participant 12 manager farming, management  
13.  Participant 13 worker farming  
14.  Participant 14 manager reed production 
15.  Participant 15 worker reed production 
16.  Participant 16 farmer farming 
17.  Participant 17  farmer farming 
18.  Participant 18 fisherman fishery 
19.  Participant 19 manager management 
20.  Participant 20 manager fishery 
21.  Participant 21 fisherman fishery 
22.  Participant 22 business man fertilizer, chemicals 
23.  Participant 23 worker reed production 
24.  Participant 24 fisherman fishery 
25.  Participant 25 manager forestry, farming 
26.  Participant 26 fisherman fishery  
27.  Participant 27 fisherman fishery 
28.  Participant 28 fisherman fishery 
29.  Participant 29 manager reed handicraft production, 
management 
30.  Participant 30 manager management 





Figure 21: Yancheng National Nature Reserve Map (core zone and part of buffer zone, 
showing main locations of interviewees), adopted from Google map, 2014 
 
4.3.3.2 Nature reserve staff 
 
Altogether there were 62 employees in the nature reserve at the time of this study, and 
their responsibilities included: environmental management and protection, scientific 
research and monitoring, office administration, education and community 
management. Among the eight interviewees, three were involved in scientific research, 
three were engaged in environmental protection, one worked in office administration 
and one in community affairs. All of them were male and seven of them were born in 
the municipality of Yancheng. Four of them started working in the nature reserve in 
1980s and three started in the 1990s. For the sake of identity protection, all reserve 




4.3.3.3 Scientific researchers 
 
Altogether five scientific researchers were interviewed; their research is all relevant to 
this research project and they all have expertise about Yancheng National Nature 
reserve. Professor Pei Qin is the Professor of Ecology, in School of Life Science, 
Nanjing University (Nanjing, China). He is the expert in the applied studies on 
Spartina and coastal saline agriculture, ecological engineering and halophyte research. 
He has been doing research in Yancheng coastal area for several decades and he is 
now retired. Professor Zhi Jun Ma teaches in the School of Life Sciences, Fudan 
University (Shanghai, China). He is an expert in bird ecology, including migration 
ecology, habitat ecology, and conservation ecology. He has been studying Red-
crowned Crane for over a decade, and Yancheng National Nature Reserve is an 
important site for his study. Dr. Pin Zuo is an Associate Professor in the Coastal and 
Oceanographic Science Department of the Geographic and Oceanographic Sciences 
Institute at Nanjing University. She is the expert on coastal wetland ecosystems and 
coastal landscape changes and the driving forces. She has been doing research in 
Yancheng coastal area for more than 10 years. Dr. Yang Fan Li is the Associate 
Professor in College of the Environment & Ecology, Xiamen University (Xiamen, 
China). He has expertise in coastal wetlands and sustainability science. He has carried 
out several research projects in Yancheng National Nature Reserve on coastal wetland 
ecosystems. Dr. Wei Xin Ou is an Associate Professor in the College of Public 
Administration and College of Land Management, Nanjing Agricultural University. 
He has expertise in coastal resources utilization and impact studies, land use planning 
and management, and wetland resources utilization and management.  
 
Among them, only Dr. Pin Zuo was interviewed personally at Yancheng National 
Nature Reserve. The other four researchers were approached through telephone and 
email. Dr. Yang Fan Li was interviewed on-line through audio conversation. The 
other three researchers answered the interview questions through email and agreed 




4.3.4 Data analysis 
 
The recordings of all of the interviews were transcribed from local dialect to written 
Chinese, some phrases with no equivalent in Mandarin were indicated with Chinese 
Pin Yin (the official phonetic system for transcribing the Mandarin pronunciations of 
Chinese characters). All the data from all interviews were analyzed and common 
themes concerning local knowledge, co-management and other related contents were 
identified and translated into written English. Besides translating themes I also 
translated some quotes containing phrases and metaphors which do not have a direct 
English equivalent to the closest meaning in English. In total, more than 50 individual 
themes emerged from either literature review or from the interview results (related to 
the common topics of our interview questions) inductively, which form the most basic 
level of thematic analysis (Guest et al. 2012). These themes (including some de-
identified quotations) were used for the research analysis. In order to avoid 
unnecessary repercussion from their remarks, all the interviewees were given 
pseudonyms to ensure their anonymity although some of them agreed to be named. 
The transcripts were then imported into a single large data set in NVivo ver. 10 (QSR 
2015) and analyzed using the same codes, regardless of the type of participant 
(Bryman 2012). Segments of text were coded to capture a full thought or argument, 
and occasionally included a few extra lines to clarify the context (Guest et al. 2012). 
The coding focused on content, rather than specific questions except for the scientific 
researchers’ responses which were coded mainly according to the questions asked. As 
much detail as possible was captured through the themes, and often segments were 
coded for two or more different purposes (Guest et al. 2012).  
 
Once identified, the themes were aggregated into codes in an iterative process, and 
finally subdivided to form hierarchical code groupings. For instance, the overarching 
code “local knowledge” is divided into seven, more detailed, codes, which in turn 
include several specific themes (code is a general concept and theme concerning 




Figure 22: Example of the coding structure by codes and themes 
 
After dividing into three groups as: local interviewees, nature reserve staff and 
scientific researchers, the themes were arranged into overarching topics, which were 
in turn subdivided into specific subjects comprising all of the relevant statements 
made by the participants. Themes and quotes are presented in the Results chapter 




3) Nature reserve management 
4) Local knowledge 
5) Co-management 
 
When writing the results, if there were differences in views within a participant group, 
these different views were summarized and the number of people holding each of the 
views is presented respectively. If there were conflicting views between groups, these 







In summary, the research used a single case study design to carry out an exploratory 
study in YNNR. I conducted semi-structured interviews with local community people, 
nature reserve staff and scientific researchers to investigate their knowledge and 
perceptions concerning reed ecosystem, Red-crowned Crane and nature reserve 
management. The research used multiple sources of evidence such as documents and 
on-site observations to corroborate findings. All such data collected from the field trip 
were archived to form a case study database to enhance validity and reliability. Data 
were analyzed through NVivo program and arranged into themes and codes to 
increase accuracy and comprehensiveness. The results of data analysis are presented 











Figure 23: The Xin Yang Gang River, the northern border of the core zone of YNNR, 





5 Chapter V: Results 
 
This chapter presents the interview results in the order of the local people (30 
interviewees), the nature reserve staff (8 interviewees) and the scientific researchers 
(5 interviewees). For each of these three groups, interviews were analyzed according 
to the themes that emerged from the data analysis either from the literature review or 
the interview results concerning the questions asked. For the local people’s interviews, 
the themes include: the environment and development, nature reserve management, 
local knowledge concerning reed, Red-crowned Crane and also of local livelihoods, 
and co-management. The analysis of the nature reserve staff interviews is arranged 
similarly to the themes of local people. The main difference relates to local 
knowledge as the nature reserve staff were asked about their perceptions concerning 
such knowledge possessed by local people. For the scientific researchers the interview 
results are mainly arranged according to the eight questions they answered through 
email or conversations concerning nature reserve management and local knowledge. 
Other topics specially mentioned by the scientific researchers interviewed are also 
included. 
 
5.1 Local people interview analysis 
 
 






Yancheng National Nature Reserve was established in 1980s to protect the Red-
crowned Crane (Table 7). Before the establishment of the nature reserve, the local 
interviewees reported that local people were mainly engaged in fishing and farming, 
and were based in villages along the coast. All of the coastal villages and townships 
had a proportion of mud flat for their members to access to collect food and other 
resources. In the fishing villages, young and middle aged men went fishing, whilst 
their family members collected clam, crab, sea slug, Korean mud snail (Bullacta 
exarata) etc., from the mud flats for extra family income. Before the establishment of 
the nature reserve, there were no restrictions on local people collecting mud flat 
resources. The coastal communities (including villages and state own enterprises) 
would also organize people to harvest reed and grass growing on the coast for sale or 
for household uses. All the local fishermen interviewed mentioned that most of them 
did not own land, and they had similar Hu Kou
3
 as did urban residences. So they had 
the same food quota (20 kg of grain/month/per adult) as urban residences, supplied by 
the government. Other workers from state run enterprises were mainly engaged in salt, 
reed, and forest production.  
 
 
Figure 25: common local people’s house in the buffer zone of YNNR, Yancheng, 2014 
 
                                                     
3
 The individual residence permit corresponding to China’s planned economy before 
1980s, which divided into rural and urban residences, and determines the bundle of 
property and other rights allowed to different individuals. 
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According to on-site observation, the locals living in and around YNNR lived a 
relatively well-off life. They usually have their own house with necessary household 
electrical appliances (see Figure 24, 25). People usually do not own expensive 
commodities, such as cars and luxuries. Most people travel by their own electric 
bicycle or motorcycle. Their lifestyles are relatively simple compared with city 
dwellers, for example there are no big shopping centers or recreational facilities for 
people to entertain themselves. The local restaurants are small and plain with 
relatively cheap and simple food.  
 
During the early stage of nature reserve establishment, the entire coast of Yancheng 
was dedicated as experimental zone in addition to the core zone and buffer zones. 
However, locals could still collect some mud flat resources. Around the 1990s, the 
mud flats along the core zone were fenced and local people could not enter the area 
any more. Later, local governments took over the management of the rest of the coast 
line alongside the experimental and buffer zones and most parts were leased to 
contractors for commercial use. Locals could no longer freely access the mud flats, 
and as a result, lost family income. As China’s economic reform and open policy was 
fully implemented in Yancheng in the 1990s, fishermen’s food quota supplies were 
cancelled, and they had to produce their own food. Around the same period, China’s 
inshore fish stocks started to decline. More and more fishermen shifted to other 
occupations such as farming and aquaculture production. Around 2000, inshore fish 
stocks collapsed in most parts of China’s east coast, and consequently, many 
fishermen became unemployed. Some coastal township governments became 
bankrupt and had to sell public assets. Local fishermen received no compensation and 





Table 7: Key events timetable 
Time  Event 
1983 Yancheng Nature Reserve approved at provincial level 
1992 Yancheng Nature Reserve was approved as a National Nature 
Reserve and a member of UNSECO’s Man and Biosphere reserve 
network; Strict protection placed on rare birds and animal species 
1990s Economic reform and open policy fully implemented in Yancheng: 
 household responsibility system enforced in farming 
villages,  
 end of planned economy, cancelling of all food quota 
supplies,  
 many state owned enterprises become bankrupt 
1997 Private gun confiscation for all local people 
2000 Townships merge, several township governments merged as one, 
and many public assets are sold as a result 
2000 onward Near shore fish stock collapse along east coast of China, many 
fishermen unemployed 
 
According to local interviewees, prior to the establishment of the nature reserve, some 
local people used to engage in wild animal hunting. They would hunt wild duck, 
rabbit and pheasants for food or for sale, using primitive guns, nets and traps. Some 
migrating bird species were also hunted, including Red-crowned Crane. Following the 
establishment of the nature reserve, strict protection was placed on rare birds and 
other wildlife species such as Red-crowned Crane and water deer. Further, from 1997, 
it was illegal to own private guns and all local guns were confiscated. As a result, 
these animals are generally no longer hunted. However, local interviewees mentioned 
that some people still poached wild ducks for sale at markets. Instead of shooting, 
people used nets and poison to catch wild duck. Red-crowned Crane and other 
migrating birds might have also become the victim of poaching, especially by 
poisoning.  
 
5.1.2 Quality of the Environment  
 
While the natural environment in Yancheng is cleaner than other areas within Jiangsu 
Province, environmental quality is degrading. Local people considered that such 
degradation has mainly occurred in the past two decades in the experimental zone of 
the nature reserve where industrial developments have occurred. A typical example 
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was given by Participant 10: “Before the establishment of chemical plants, the 
environment (in Xiang Shui County - the northern experimental zone) was the same 
as here (YNNR)…… Now Guan Xi Salt Farm also becomes chemical industry park, 
many, many (plants), water pollution makes soil turn red, very serious.” In the core 
zone and the buffer zone the degradation seems more subtle and the locals see “no 
difference of the environment”. All local interviewees liked the environment where 
they lived, and thought the natural environment around them was relatively clean 
compared to nearby counties and big cities. When asked what they like the most about 
their living environment, twenty six interviewees mentioned “good air quality since 
no factories and no pollution here”. Participant 1 also mentioned less noise as a 
benefit because “without noise, birds will come, there are habitats for them”. However, 
most local fishermen and farmers said they want the area to develop faster to offer 
them more economic opportunities. Only Participant 11 thought “if now restore all the 
fish ponds to wetland, it would definitely be better for our workers. Every year cutting 
reeds can exchange for some money”. 
 
 
Figure 26: No.1 Reservoir in She Yang Salt Farm, She Yang County, Yancheng, in Dec 2013 
 
Participant 10 said he changed working locations from Xiang Shui County to She 
Yang County because “the Xiang Shui County where I lived, northwest is the Guan 
Xi Salt Farm, belongs to a chemical industry park of Lian Yun Gang (city); southwest 
is the Xiang Shui chemical industry park; east is the Bin Hai chemical industry park. 
So no matter where the wind comes, there is no escape. Recently, the north of our 
home also established a row of smelting and steel plants, lots of chimneys, fuming 
150 
 
continuously. The air is unbearable, and (we) seldom go back”. Participant 7 from the 
She Yang salt farm said “when I was small I remember quite clearly, we drank that 
water …… the water from the river, Chao He, officially called Guan He”. Participant 
25 also recalled: “we originally drank the river water, and people said the water in 
Yang He was very sweet”. Nowadays, the water of Guan He and Yang He is polluted 
by chemical discharge and city sewage from upstream, so they can only drink salty 
and tainted underground water which is not healthy. Changes in perceptions of 
environmental quality are relevant to reserve management as the reserve does not 
allow industrial development in this area. As Participant 14 said: “It is the little birds 




Development is common along the Yancheng coastal mud flat regardless of its 
designation as an experimental zone, buffer zone or core zone of the nature reserve 
(Figure 6). Such development is generally contradictory to the Regulations of the 
People's Republic of China on Nature Reserves. Although some production activities 
existed before the establishment of the nature reserve, such as She Yang Salt Farm, 
Fang Qiang Farm and several villages along the coast, many new production and 
trading activities occurred after the establishment of the nature reserve. These 
developments involve changing natural wetlands, mainly grass flats and reed flats, to 
aquaculture ponds and farmlands, which as will be discussed later, greatly affects 
wildlife habitat.  
 
5.1.3.1 Development in the core zone  
 
Several developments have occurred within the core zone of Yancheng National 
Nature Reserve that contravenes biosphere and nature reserve regulations. These 
contraventions are important for understanding the tensions over reserve management 
and the potential for co-management, as will be discussed later in this chapter. As 
discussed in chapter II, the core area of YNNR should protect intact natural 
ecosystems and the rare and endangered animals or plants, and no company or 
individuals are allowed to enter. Despite these regulations, ten local interviewees 
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mentioned the existence of constructed fish ponds inside the core zone. Nine locals 
also said the mud flat inside the core zone was leased out to contractors to raise and 
harvest Korean mud snails, and five mentioned that the nature reserve employs 
outside workers to harvest reed inside the core zone for sale. One local interviewee 
mentioned: “they (nature reserve) contract the land to someone to raise fish, another 
land contract to someone to raise rag worm. So some place is for rag worm farming, 
some for Hai Gang Zi (crab) farming, some for fish farming, and some for Korean 
mud snails. So the place, they all leased out. Originally, local people can collect 
something to earn some income, but now they all contract out.” Another interviewee 
said: “they (nature reserve) also have no choice, they are short of funding……they 
cannot help at the beginning, if you have 100 employees, but only have 30 people’s 
headcounts, the rest must be earned by yourself, the director is also in a dilemma, 
‘where can I earn the money?’” According to one interviewee, more than 20,000 mu 
(or about 1,400 ha) of the southern section of the core zone was leased out for fish 
farming around 2000. “One person could rent 1,000 mu (around 70 ha)……you 
earned 100 Yuan (NZ$ 20) per mu was rather fine. Harvesting a little with cultivating 
extensively. Put some fry in, then you could earn the money back…… They (nature 
reserve) would regulate us, no feed etc. all with regulations, no feed was allowed, just 
ate grass, natural feeding…… by the end of the year you could harvest the fish, it was 
wild then, taste really good.” Around 2005, his lease of the fish pond was terminated, 
because the core zone is under exclusive management which means no outsiders can 
go inside the core zone except the nature reserve staff. This exclusive management 
contracting has led to current contract disputes with the nature reserve management 
(see aquaculture in the core zone section later in this chapter).  
 
5.1.3.2 Development in the buffer zone  
 
Similar to the core zone, many developments have occurred in the buffer zone. Again, 
this contravenes the nature reserve regulations. As mentioned in Chapter II, only 
scientific observations and other research activities are allowed in the buffer zone; 
tourism, production and trading activities are prohibited. However, twenty eight 
interviewees mentioned that many natural wetlands, such as reed flats and grass flats, 
have been developed into artificial fish ponds and farm land in the buffer zone. As 
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indicated on the map (Fig 21), She Yang Salt Farm, the Reed Company, Fang Qiang 
Farm and Da Feng Coastal development zone are either partially or completely inside 
the buffer zone. According to two interviewees, She Yang Salt Farm used to have 
10,700 ha of salt fields, including many salt water reservoirs. The east part of the salt 
farm, which accounted for 60% of the whole farm, was located in the buffer zone. 
Now only about 67 ha of salt field and only one reservoir - the No. 1 reservoir (667 ha) 
is left unchanged in the buffer zone, while the rest (about 5,500 ha) has been changed 
to aquaculture ponds. As one interviewee said: “the No.1 reservoir is the last piece of 
pure land in She Yang Salt Farm and if it too is converted to an aquaculture pond, 
there will be no birds.”  
 
The Reed Company has experienced the same trend. According to Participant 14, 
there were about 14,670 ha of reed flat in the buffer zone in 1980s, and now only 
about 1200 ha of reed ecosystem remains. All the rest has been converted to either 
aquaculture ponds or farm land. Fang Qiang Farm has also impacted on the natural 
environment. Some 15,000 mu (about 1000 ha) of the farm land is located in the 
buffer zone, and a former farm worker reported that reed used to account for a third to 
a half of their fields in 1980s, but now the reed lands are all changed to farmland. 
These land use changes are contradictory to the nature reserve regulations. According 
to local informants the nature reserve management had tried to stop some of the 
conversions. However, since the land within the buffer zone belongs to local 
government, the nature reserve has no administrative power over it. For the sake of 
local revenue and political performance, local governments usually find ways to 
circumvent the regulations and enable some companies to implement most of the 
conversions.    
 
5.1.3.3 Development in the experimental zone 
 
The experimental zone has been undergoing even more extensive developments than 
the buffer and core zones. As a result, the experimental zone is not only dramatically 
reduced in size, as mentioned in Chapter II, (from 388,900 ha in 1983 to 167,922 ha 
in 2013) but there has also been little enforcement of regulations. As discussed in 
Chapter II, no production installations that cause environmental pollution or do 
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damage to the natural resources or landscapes shall be built in the experimental zone. 
In reality, a number of factories causing environmental pollution have been built in 
the experimental zone, such as the Shuang Deng Paper Factory in Huang Sha Gang 
Township (as discussed in the pollution section later in this Chapter). In general, 
under the current development pressure, the core zone is managed as the buffer zone, 
the buffer zone as the experimental zone, and the experimental zone almost has no 
protection at all.  
 
5.1.3.4 Local people’s perspectives of development 
 
Views about whether development should occur were mixed. Half of the interviewees 
thought these developments would affect the wildlife that used to live in the natural 
wetlands. In contrast, most fishermen and farmers interviewed want some 
development, such as more farmland and aquaculture ponds, and even factories, to 
offer them employment opportunities and economic improvement. Participant 11 felt 
“generally speaking, why there are fewer birds now? I think it is related to 
development, you see, (the land) is developed all the way down to the sea now. 
Originally, the mudflat was huge, now it is all gone.” He thought: “birds are definitely 
afraid of people, why they were not afraid before? Why they were everywhere? First 
because their number was large then, second, you people come to this place, I (bird) 
can go to another place. Now people are everywhere, how could they stay? Nowhere 
to go, then just don’t come again.” Similarly, one interviewee thought: “just the recent 
five to six years, after the fish pond developed in the middle (the core zone), it (bird) 
cannot go into the water, since it (fish pond) is so deep for fish farming. It then flies 
over the fish pond to our village, since fish pond has nothing to eat.” One interviewee 
mentioned: “our plan during the 12th Five-Year Guideline period is to change sea 
water (aquaculture) to fresh water (aquaculture), and change freshwater to farming, 
this is our slogan.” Another interviewee questioned the legality of such conversions, 
since it is inside the buffer zone of the nature reserve. “Why you establish a 
development company in the nature reserve? You should protect, why you call the 
company development company? You should call it Mudflat Protection Company. 
Since you have already exploiting the nature reserve, how could you protect it? If 
because of economic activities……such as the development project now, it will 
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definitely impact the nature reserve, no matter what you say.” Although fifteen 
interviewees thought these developments would affect birds and other wildlife they 
were not deeply concerned about the survival of wildlife since they are not related to 
their daily livelihood. 
 
Twenty four interviewees agreed that economic benefits are the main driving factor 
behind such development while the local governments are the main enablers. One 
interviewee said: “how to examine (officials)…… I don’t measure your GDP 
performance, if you protect well, I will promote you. Otherwise no promotion, then 
people will do it (protection)…… that is to say, I cannot develop, whichever official 
breach this guideline, I will punish you, and arrest you for breaking the rules. Now, 
the mayor may know which bureau director is violating disciplines, but he won’t 
punish him for such violation.” Further, “no matter how well you protect the nature 
reserve, local official cannot feel his political achievements, his performance for 
examination……still based on economy.” One interviewee mentioned the coastal 
development plan: “why change the plan? You say it is for the economic development 
of Yancheng. Which one is more important, economic development or nature reserve? 
The mayor and the secretary don’t know? They are in charge, they need political 
achievements…… For the nature reserve, different level government officials must 
control development. That is to limit the changes of current status. This land is not for 
whatever I want to maximize profit.” As agreed by another interviewee: “people are 
pursuing economic benefits, so they develop the land towards the sea relentlessly, as 
long as there is spare land, it will be developed.” In order to get maximum profit, 
every inch of spare land has been developed for production purposes as the natural 
wetlands are less productive and profitable compared to man-made land use types.  
 
Generally, local interviewees’ perspectives towards development differ greatly among 
occupation groups. For example, fishermen and farmers who had either lost their 
income sources or were economically affected by conservation wished for more 
development. Some companies are also keen on developing and reclaiming land as 
profit maximization is the goal of their company. However, some state-owned 
enterprise workers and managers who have secured income sources cared more about 
the negative impacts of development. For example, Participant 12 was unhappy about 
the development activities along the coast, he thought such activities will deplete the 
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land. Several interviewees have sustainable development concepts in their minds, for 
example, Participant 21 said, “If our country can economically ensure our people have 
enough to eat now, then this piece of land will not be developed, and it will be left for 
the future generations. So the significance is great.” 
 
5.1.4 Nature reserve management 
 
All local interviewees had concerns and opinions about the management of the nature 
reserve. They were generally supportive toward the establishment and wildlife 
protection of the nature reserve, but they all think the management could improve and 
be more inclusive towards local opinions.   
 
5.1.4.1 Management effectiveness 
 
Ten interviewees thought the management of the nature reserve was ineffective, since 
there were more birds of all different species before the establishment of the nature 
reserve, “seems more protection, fewer animals”. In contrast, nine interviewees said 
there were more birds after the nature reserve establishment because the birds were 
under protection and nobody hunted them openly any more. Participant 25 admitted: 
“when there was water in the land, there might be birds in the reed flats, but we 
probably not observed very carefully, I am not a professional bird photographer, so I 
am not concerned. Later, it converted to farmland in 2011……there are no 
obstructions, you see in that wheat field, birds are everywhere. My place becomes the 
birds’ recreational center, but I am suffering.” Three interviewees said since they did 
not pay much attention to birds before the establishment of the nature reserve, they 
could not compare the abundance of birds before and after the establishment of the 
reserve. The discrepancy among opinions reflects the inaccuracy of some locals’ 
knowledge concerning birds and shows their detachment from all kinds of birds (see 






5.1.4.2 Regulation enforcement 
 
Twenty nine interviewees agreed that the locals generally obey the regulations of the 
nature reserve. Most local people say they would not hunt, poison or hurt wild 
animals including all kinds of common birds and animals, such as sparrows and 
rabbits. However, farmers will try to scare the birds away by making noises such as 
using fireworks and banging metal plates when the birds (mainly common crane, wild 
goose and duck) damage the crops in their field.  
 
Participant 11 said he no longer owned a gun as he had been to prison for shooting 
wild duck using primitive guns. “One old worker in our company (the Reed Company) 
had been convicted, in prison for eight years because of  hunting wildlife, quite 
serious, just for water deer, eight of them” (Participant 14). Eleven interviewees said 
there were some people poaching wild duck in the buffer zone until recently. One 
example is “a couple of years ago, two persons tried to poison duck, while wild duck 
were not poisoned, over 10,000 domestic ducks raised by a local farmer were killed, 
(they) ended up in prison” (Participant 1). The nature reserve staff patrol the core zone 
and some parts of the buffer zone, whilst the state owned enterprises in the buffer 
zone also organize staff to patrol their territory. For example, “Our company has a 
wildlife protection leading group, our general manager is the leader……each of our 
administration zone also has a team, our company established an inspection team, and 
a wildlife patrol team” (Participant 14). However, as the area is vast, patrolling and 
monitoring are limited and poaching is hard to eliminate altogether.  
 
Further, some migratory birds may be poisoned to death accidentally since local 
farmers soak seeds in pesticides or other chemicals before sowing, and the birds may 
eat these. “Why there are often a couple of Red-crowned Crane dead in the Reed 
Company in the south and including the Shuang Yang farm under our company? Just 
because eating the rice causes their death” (Participant 11). Participant 15 had rescued 
several poisoned Red-crowned Cranes inside the Reed Company and sent them to the 
nature reserve a couple of years ago. Participant 25 said the rice field in their 
company should be ploughed deeply after harvesting since “the company is afraid of 
people putting poison, that is if you have rice left in the field, somebody may put 






As mentioned in Chapter II, all damages caused by protected animals are to be 
compensated for by the local government. Compensation is the key concern of locals 
and it is critical for the relationship between the nature reserve and local communities. 
Twenty six interviewees talked about the lack of compensation for their economic 
losses in the buffer zone resulting from the establishment of the nature reserve. These 
losses included:  
 Migratory birds eating crops in farm land (reported by ten farmers interviewed) 
 Milu (Père David's Deer) eating crops and damaging farmland (five interviewees)  
 Locals cannot access the mud flat to collect clams, crabs and other resources for 
extra income since 1990s (five fishermen interviewed)  
 The No.1 reservoir of the She Yang Salt farm was located in the buffer zone, and 
it was not allowed to be changed to aquaculture ponds. That caused economic 
loss of around 10 million Yuan (about NZ$ 2 million) per year for the company 
(two interviewees).  
 
Participant 25 mentioned “Local farmer’s corn was eaten by milu (Père David's Deer), 
the family had a handicapped man, and his wife was farming to support two kids to go 
to school. They (the nature reserve) let him appeal to the government, but how? They 
(the farmer’s family) had no choice, then pushed the handicapped man (with the 
wheelchair) to the nature reserve (to appeal). Finally, the nature reserve came forward 
and gave some (compensation).” Some farmers and fishermen have appealed to the 
higher government authority for help. For example, Participant 1 said his brother went 
to Yancheng Municipal government to ask for compensation but has not yet had a 
result. Participant 4, Participant 16, and Participant 25 all made compensation claims 
to the nature reserve. “But the nature reserve replied, we have national financial 
funding, according to Wildlife Protection Law, local government should compensate 
the people. Local government said they cannot give so much money now. We are 
trying all the time; I asked the district finance for the money yesterday. In autumn, I 
asked the Environmental Department officer to inspect our site, he also confirmed (the 
loss), but just nobody compensate” (Participant 4). Most of such claims for 
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compensation are ignored, because “the local governments now are very poor, they 
are all in debt (Participant 4).” Although there are tax incomes, “it is far from enough, 
you need development, need infrastructures, need government image, such as building 
a road…….” (Participant 4). 
 
Five interviewees said they have already lost confidence in getting any compensation 
at all, since “the local government and the nature reserve are both pushing aside (the 
responsibility)” (Participant 4). Participant 25 rented the land (in buffer zone) for 6 
years, “while three years almost passed, another three years I will finish (the contract), 
I have already lost money, if the compensation don’t come, I will die for sure.” 
Appealing to local or higher government is generally useless, since “nobody will 
listen to you. Better don’t go again, just try to live on your own” (Participant 18). As 
Participant 1 said: “When the state plans the nature reserve, they should also think 
about our people’s basic rights. We also need profit; we also need food……Just they 
seems thinking too little about our people.” Such irresponsiveness and indifference 
cause resentment among locals toward the nature reserve as well as towards the 
wildlife they try to protect. As a result, the locals do not believe the nature reserve 
would take any genuine action towards co-management.    
 
5.1.4.4 Aquaculture in the core zone  
 
Ten interviewees talked about the conflict concerning attempts to close the 
aquaculture ponds and restore them to natural wetlands inside the core zone of the 
nature reserve. They are aware that the nature reserve used to lease out land in the 
core zone to contractors to raise fish in aquaculture ponds. One interviewee said “the 
nature reserve is now trying to kick out the former fish farmers. They are protecting 
the wetland, not allowing fish farming……tried over a year still (haven’t settled), 
headstrong folks, they refused, want some compensation.” Another interviewee knew 
that when the fish ponds contract ended in 2012, it was quite difficult for the nature 
reserve to take back the land. Because the contractors did not have other alternative 
sources of livelihood and they were attracted by the economic benefit, they refused to 
leave the aquaculture ponds. One interviewee mentioned that the contractors fought 
with the nature reserve staff and tried to stop the pond from being drained. This 
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caused great trouble to the nature reserve and the reserve staff who have since had to 
go to court to settle the dispute with the contractors. Even though the nature reserve 
won the court verdict to terminate the fish ponds, the contractors continued using the 
ponds and tried to ask for more compensation. Consequently, the nature reserve spent 
a great amount of time and money on court and conflict resolution and involved many 
personnel in the process. 
 
5.1.4.5 Conflict  
 
In addition to conflict over wetland restoration, conflict has also occurred between 
fisherman and reserve staff over access to mud flat resources. One interviewee 
described this very clearly: “our township used to be a fishing town, upon the 
establishment of the nature reserve, we always have conflicts with the nature reserve, 
and the conflict is prominent. This reason is our mudflat, generations after generations, 
we are harvesting on this mudflat. When the nature reserve came, they took the entire 
mudflat over, all belong to them. My point was you taking care of the birds, we 
support you, but the time should be six months the most, the rest time you should 
allow us to carry out some habitual production, right? But nothing is allowed.” Four 
local fishermen interviewed mentioned “a local fishing village had organized dozens 
of fishermen go down the coast to harvest mud flat resources, breaching the mudflat 
(of the core zone) and caused conflict with the nature reserve, later mediated, 
probably the nature reserve gave some money to the local government.” One 
interviewee said: “we are trying to solve fishermen’s living problem, you (the nature 
reserve) are for profit, we are for basic living, survival is the basic condition, you 
don’t give us this, how can we do? But now it is over, for what? Some of the old 
fishermen are either getting old or have died and the younger generation is no longer 
collecting this (mud flat resource) anymore, there are generally fewer conflicts now.”  
 
Twenty six interviewees thought there was no big conflict with the nature reserve 
except for compensation issues. However all the local fisherman and farmers 
interviewed said they do not have the power and means to pursue their claims. One 
interviewee, who has an aquaculture pond in the buffer zone, said: “the only thing I 
can do is to absorb the loss and wait for better alternatives.” If he cannot bear the loss 
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any more, he will have to abandon the aquaculture pond and move outside the buffer 
zone. It appears that locals who depend on the land and natural resources for their 
livelihood are more concerned about compensation than the workers and managers 
who earn regular salaries in state run enterprises.  
 
5.1.5 Local knowledge  
 
All local interviewees have some local knowledge related to their occupation, living 
environment and former experiences. Their knowledge includes not only everyday life 
experiences, but also broad political and ecological understandings and insight. 
However, as the local livelihood and natural environment have changed over time, 
their local knowledge is disappearing, especially fishermen’s knowledge and 
everyday knowledge of the harvest and uses of reed. 
 
 




As reed ecosystem is an important type of habitat for Red-crowned Crane (see 
Chapter II), knowledge concerning reed is relevant to Red-crowned Crane and its 
protection. Questions about reed harvesting, reed former usage and reed ecology were 




5.1.5.1.1 Reed harvesting 
 
Twenty eight interviewees knew that the reed is harvested either by hand or by small 
machines in winter (around November) when it turns yellow and dry. Participant 4 
said: “in autumn, reed height is almost fixed, generally after Li Qiu, around 
September and October, when reed flower is growing, the height is fixed. In October, 
it no longer grows, then cut them all.” Most interviewees mentioned that reed can be 
completely clear cut because it will grow again next spring. Further, ten interviewees 
said the reed should be harvested to grow better next year. The local fishermen, local 
farmers and the salt workers interviewed all mentioned that in the past they were 
organized by their villages or the salt farm to harvest the reed. Although all the reed 
harvested belonged to the village or the salt farm, each individual had some share for 
their own use. The knowledge about reeds is very basic and superficial, which 
indicates that locals do not regard reed as an important resource, although it would 
have been in the past as it was used for many everyday purposes. Twenty seven 
interviewees mentioned that locals do not use reed any more. The reed is mainly 
harvested by contractors now for sale to other provinces (such as Shandong and Hebei) 
as building materials. 
 
5.1.5.1.2 Former usage 
 
Former usages of reed reported by the locals included lighting fires, weaving 
mattresses, making containers, brooms, drying mats, building materials (ceiling, wall, 
and curtains), and making paper. Participant 11 also mentioned: “upon the Duan Wu 
Festival (in mid-summer) to collect reed leaves for wrapping Zong Zi (a traditional 
Chinese food) before 1993 or 1994. (He will pick leaves) relatively wider, greener in 
color and looks more nutritious (for wrapping).” Participant 15 from the Reed 
Company mentioned the reeds were used to build storehouses for crops since they can 
keep the rain off. Now that storehouses are built with cement and steel, reed is no 
longer used. “But building houses, reed is better, wood board after many years will 
turn yellow, but reed won’t change color after 40, 50 years”(Participant 15). 
Participant 18 said he used to weave reed baskets to catch crabs in the mud flat, but 




However, new uses of reed have emerged. Participant 29 from the Tao Yuan 
Decoration Company said reed is highly valued as decoration materials for modern 
and high-end interior home decoration. It can be made into curtains, wall paper, 
screens and all kinds of handicrafts. “It needs at least dozens of procedures (to 
produce a handicraft). First is design, the designer has an idea, then draw a blue print, 
and then put color on the blue print, first black and white, then colored. Next, consider 
choosing material, then paste, cut, step by step” (Participant 29). According to 
Participant 29: “In the past, 100-200 kilometers around Yancheng, there were no 
mountains, no stones, and no trees. Building houses, including the things for cushion, 
cover, wear and use, which one is not made by reed? It is only different now.” When 
we asked when such changes happened, he said: “just after the reform and open policy, 
since the economy is better now”.  
 
As a professional reed handcraft manufacturer, Participant 29 said: “Here the 
handicraft also has several hundred years’ history. We have made this for four 
hundred years; our family has four hundred years’ historical records. I am the tenth 
generation, that’s my nephew, the eleventh generation”. He said: “Our products are 
mainly for export, currently export to 55 countries. In China, first, second and third 
tier cities all have (our product), Beijing also buy, people engaged in special 
renovation (buy our product), as decoration material.” When we asked what 
advantage does this decoration material have compared with common material? He 
answered: “First, high-end, because our products belong to handicraft. But we turned 
traditional reed to practical decoration materials. Second, it is natural, pure natural 
material, natural plant fiber. You can say it has no pollution, completely handmade”. 
Further, “Somebody tried to arrange me a sort of environmental certificate, I said 
‘sorry I don’t want it’. Where my product attached it is an environmental certificate. 
Moreover, it has the feeling of return to nature, and sound insulation, it can absorb 
sound. Additionally, you see our room inside is quite cool. In summer, 39˚C outside, 
my room is only 31˚C” (Participant 29). However, since most people have ceased 
using reed, the knowledge associated with reed processing and manufacturing has 
been lost among most locals except the managers and workers in the Reed Company 




5.1.5.1.3 Reed ecology 
 
Interviewees from the Reed Company have extensive knowledge about reed ecology. 
For example, Participant 23 from the Reed Company noticed that when irrigated with 
fresh water, calamus (Acorus calamus) will grow in reed fields. All three interviewees 
from the reed company mentioned three floods and three drains as the irrigation 
method to improve reed production, “because in the growth season, it (the reed) must 
have water. But it still needs drain sometimes, otherwise it will cause swamping, and 
Pu (calamus) will grow……that is drain, flood, drain, flood……another thing is to 
guarantee reed’s quality, soak in the water too long, the root of the reed will turn 
black, and whiskers will grow, it is hard to process and will affect the quality” 
(Participant 14). Participant 15 also mentioned they used to set fire to the reed fields 
after harvesting to increase production and eliminate pests, “fire is good for our reed, 
more than twenty years now, setting fire or not, the reed in the next year is different.” 
However, as burning of crop stalks is forbidden now in the nature reserve their 
company no longer does so. He also admitted that burning reed fields will affect birds: 
“after burning, those foods for birds are gone, without burning, fish, grass, etc. will 
leave, after burning, nothing left.”  
 
Besides the interviewees from the Reed Company, Participant 4 and Participant 7 also 
demonstrated that they have detailed knowledge about reed ecology. Participant 7 said: 
“the reed depends on the ebb and surge of the sea water and precipitation, appropriate 
rain water. For example, around Duan wu (mid-summer) when the reed is growing 
leaves, if there are plenty of rain water, it will definitely grow well.” Participant 4 said: 
“Red-crowned Crane mainly depends on reed flat to stay over winter. When northwest 
wind (strong cold wind) comes, reed flat can break wind. Outside is -5˚C, inside the 
reed flat is -1˚C, just right for Red-crowned Crane. One part of reed flat in the nature 
reserve is not harvested during winter; it won’t be harvested until the next spring. That 
part of reed is left for help it (Red-crowned Crane) wintering.” Eight local 
interviewees noticed that many birds liked to live in the reed field since it was home 
to food such as small fish, crabs, and crustaceans. High and dense reeds also provide 
good shelter for birds against cold and human disturbance. According to Participant 
13: “(reed) growing with different height, not only reed but also grass etc. generally 
out of the wind, south facing places, birds and other animals are all hiding there.” 
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Participant 11 noticed there used to be water deer in the reed flats, but as most of the 
reed flats in She Yang salt farm are now converted to aquaculture ponds, there are 
very few water deer. Participant 1 and Participant 10 mentioned there were birds 
nesting in the reed flats, and Participant 10 used to collect eggs from the nests when 
he was young.  
 
Five interviewees mentioned the reed used to be 3 meters high, and the tallest would 
be 4-5 meters. The interviewees from the Reed Company and Participant 29 said the 
reeds that grew in alternating sea water and fresh water along coastal areas without 
sea dykes were stronger and thicker. Although some interviewees said the local reed 
is not good in quality, Participant 29 stated: “She Yang’s reed is the best throughout 
the world currently, the structure of She Yang’s reed, because it is hard, not crispy but 
hard, its fiber content is around 48%, or a little bit more. Northeast China’s (reed), 
only Ying Kou’s is a little bit better, yet just around 38-39%, Bai Yang Dian’s (a 
famous North China place to produce reed) only has 33-34% (fiber content), other 
places are even worse.” Six interviewees considered that reeds were weaker and 
thinner than before. Participant 10 thought pollution might be the reason, whereas 
others thought the rise of the land caused by siltation is the main reason.  
 
Overall, the locals have limited knowledge concerning reed ecosystems, apart from 
the Reed company workers and Participant 29. Since more and more reed flats have 
changed to aquaculture ponds or farmland, whole reed ecosystems together with some 
unique wildlife such as water deer have disappeared as well. As Participant 11 said 
the next generation would not see the wildlife that used to live in the reed, and they 
would never know such things have ever existed. Locals usually consider reed flats as 
barren land with very low economic value, so they consider it is appropriate to 
convert reed to farmland or aquaculture ponds. For example, one interviewee rented 
4000 mu (about 260 ha) of reed flat besides the core zone of the nature reserve and 
when it was reed and fish co-production “the annual profit is only several hundred 
thousand Yuan (around NZ$ 40,000-50,000)…….Now after reclamation, he (the land 
owner) contracted (the land) to someone, achieved 2,600,000 Yuan (about 
NZ$ 500,000) a year. Without using a single person, he achieved 2.6 million Yuan, 
the profit increase is enormous.” Such value increases will certainly attract more 




5.1.5.2 Red-crowned Crane 
 
 




Ten interviewees said there were more Red-crowned Cranes before the establishment 
of the nature reserve in 1980s, while 12 said there are more Red-crowned Cranes now 
than in 1980s. The five interviewees from She Yang Salt farm all agreed that there 
were more Red-crowned Crane (in groups of dozens or even hundreds) in their salt 
field before the 1980s than now. The situation is the same in Fang Qiang Farm, “Red-
crowned Crane’s number is relatively small (now), a group at most 4 to 6 
birds……we used to see Red-crowned Crane, even could see 40-50 birds……we 
could see very often then, by that time (we) went to the field, when we wanted to see 
them, we rode a bicycle, we could see not one group, but several groups…….when 
there were more Red-crowned Cranes, just before 1980s” (Participant 13). Before the 
establishment of the nature reserve, most of the local farmers and fishermen did not 
know or could not recognize Red-crowned Crane even if they saw them. For example, 
Participant 26, 27 said: “don’t know what Red-crowned Crane is, we didn’t know then, 
and didn’t care either.” Or “how could I know such thing as Red-crowned Crane when 
I was a child? Never seen, and never heard of” (Participant 17). Four interviewees 
thought that there were no Red-crowned Cranes before the nature reserve 
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establishment in 1980s, and that the Red-crowned Cranes were brought here by the 




Fifteen interviewees knew Red-crowned Crane like to eat small fish, crabs, and 
crustaceans. They noticed that the Red-crowned Crane like to stand in shallow water 
to search for food. Participant 1 said: “the Red-crowned Crane come to (harvested 
reed fields) to dig the crab hole, Chinese mitten-handed crab’s hole, dig down, catch 
some then eat, catch nothing, then give up.” Three farmers interviewed said Red-
crowned Cranes like to eat corn and often go to farm land to search for scattered corn. 
Participant 16 mentioned: “two years ago, maybe the coldest year, they spread corn in 
the nature reserve (the core zone), for the birds, spread at night to feed the birds.” 
However, Participant 11 knew that the Red-crowned Crane prefers fish and shrimps, 
but “it has nothing to eat, it has to eat rice. Birds are always trying to find food when 
they are hungry, when it has nothing else to eat; it has to eat vegetarian food.”  
 
5.1.5.2.3 Habitat loss 
 
Participant 4, Participant 11, and Participant 13 mentioned habitat for Red-crowned 
Crane has been lost, and considered the loss of natural wetland has led to fewer Red-
crowned Cranes. Participant 11 said the salt farm used to have lots of reed flats, grass 
flats and salt water reservoirs, “originally, there were No.1, No.2, No.3, No.4 
Reservoir……lining up all along the road toward the west, all the way to the sea dyke 
here, all reservoirs, and also this side, No.5, No.6 reservoir, so many reservoirs before. 
Inside the reservoir, there were many birds, for example in the No.1 Reservoir, when 
the duck reached its maximum, they would cover 1/3 of the reservoir.” Since most of 
the reservoir had been converted to aquaculture ponds, they only found Red-crowned 
Crane in small groups of 4-5 individuals in their fields. He felt the main reason for the 
decrease in numbers was that natural wetlands are being converted to fish ponds. 
“Fish ponds have such deep water, 1.4-1.5 meters, how could you, what can you eat? 
It used to be shallow water, there were clams, little fish and shrimp inside, so it (Red-
crowned Crane) liked to stay here.” “Red-crowned Cranes won’t come to land in fish 
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pond, like here, mostly are fish pond now, the water is deep, Red-crowned Crane does 
not lie on water, but mainly stand in water, under 30 cm, when water is deep it won’t 
come.” Participant 13 noticed the same trend as he used to see several groups of Red-
crowned Crane very often in their farm in the 1980s and now he only sees a few of 
them occasionally. He thought conversion of reed flats to farmland is the main reason. 
This knowledge could be used as reference for the nature reserve to help determine 
which types of habitat are more suitable for Red-crowned Crane and to which extent 
the conversion should stop, when they try to restore the wetlands in the core zone and 
manage the land in the buffer zone.  
 
5.1.5.2.4 Emotional attachment   
 
None of the interviewees expressed any emotional attachment towards the Red-
crowned Crane, although most of them know the Red-crowned Crane as the fairy 
crane, and that it can live a very long life. Even though Participant 11 had detailed 
knowledge concerning all kinds of birds, he was only interested in edible birds such as 
wild duck, grey heron (Ardea cinerea) and Eurasian Coot (Fulica atra). As he said: “to 
speak the truth, it is just a bird, and people all think it doesn’t taste good, so nobody 
try to catch it.” Since Red-crowned Crane has very tough meat and is very difficult to 
hunt, locals are not interested in it. One interviewee talked about how to hunt Red-
crowned Crane using a primitive gun and trap, “that is, I see this crane always stay 
here, landing on this place every day, then measure the distance clearly, dig a deep 
hole in day time, put some grass inside, or set up a primitive gun there, he (the hunter) 
comes here in day time and fire the primitive gun, then catch several.” He said: “it 
didn’t cost too much, maybe 10 Yuan (about NZ$ 2) each. It was not very big though, 
about 20 Jin (10 kg). It looks big, but not much meat.” It appears that the locals do not 
care about Red-crowned Crane and other migratory birds because they are not related 
to their livelihood or income. As one interviewee said: “like my father’s generation, 
they are illiterate, who cares about birds? Trying to have three meals per day, it is 
difficult to get enough to eat and wear, like we have 6 brothers and sisters, it is hard 




All the local farmers interviewed dislike all kinds of birds including Red-crowned 
Crane since they damage their crops. They feel annoyed when they see Red-crowned 
Crane and other migratory birds such as common crane and goose. Participant 25 
hired two farmers to scare the birds away from his land: “1,000 Yuan (NZ$ 200) per 
month, shoo the birds every day, very tiresome, in the peak season I hired a dozen of 
people, too exhausting, finally give up. Let it be, you shoo here, they fly to there, shoo 
every day, the expense is unbearable.” Other interviewees were mainly indifferent to 
Red-crowned Crane and other migratory birds. For example, Participant 28 said: “this 
crane, we all know, this thing you cannot touch, as you say how much emotion you 
really put into? That is all counterfeit. Because you are not (specialized) in this area, 
you must survive.” These birds are too common to be appreciated for their beauty or 
rarity. “For people living in the city, they seldom see this, feel very pleasant. But for 
us who see them every day, when I see it trample on my wheat, I’m really bothered” 
(Participant 25). However, all interviewees knew that Red-crowned Crane is a 
national level protected bird and it is very rare throughout the world now. This 
knowledge is mainly gained from the education given by nature reserve staff and strict 
enforcement of wildlife protection laws. In general, such detachment of Red-crowned 
Crane from the locals is a poor foundation for its protection at the grass root level and 
may mean that regulation enforcement needs to be used more than if the public were 
interested in the welfare of the birds.   
 




All of the ten local fishermen interviewed talked about fish stock decline and collapse 
in recent years along the coast of China. They all noticed the dramatic decline in the 
abundance and variety of near shore fish stock. All the fishermen said fish stocks were 
quite abundant until the mid-1990s, Participant 4 said: “around 1960s, off the coast 
10-20 sea miles, you could catch fish, lots of fish, and big fish. (They) returned in 3-4 
days the quickest…….I think around 500-600 m
2
 (fishing area), this area’s fish could 
fill our whole boat up quite heavily.” According to Participant 21: “when my father’s 
generation go fishing, they didn’t want big yellow croakers, called it stinky bone, 
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since it used lots of salt, not worthy for the salt, not enough money (to buy salt), so 
leave it. Now big yellow croaker is a great thing, it costs over 100 Yuan (about 
NZ$ 20) a kilogram.” Even local farmers noticed the decline of fish stocks, since 
there were very few fishing boats in the ports and harbors near their village now.  
 
 
Figure 29: Jiang Gang Water Dam, Dong Tai County, Yancheng, 2014 
 
5.1.5.3.2 Causes of fishery decline – pollution 
 
All local fishermen think near shore pollution is one of the reasons for fish stock 
decline. All the sewage, industrial discharge and agricultural run-off go directly to 
rivers or discharge directly to the sea. Most rivers in China are polluted and the water 
is not drinkable. For example Participant 4 said: “now you go to the Yangtze River 
mouth (about 300 km south of Yancheng), as long as you smell the odor, you know 
fish cannot survive. Even we feel the smell is pungent, fish definitely gone.” Similarly, 
Participant 20 mentioned: “the Yangtze River water, when we are around 40 sea miles 
away from the Yangtze River mouth, the water has distinct colors, you can see clearly, 
it is black, quite different from the dark blue water.” Participant 18 said pollution in 
the ocean is very serious because all the fishermen throw their garbage in the ocean 
and nobody monitors the open sea environment. Four interviewees also mentioned the 
decline of mud flat resources such as clam, crab and other crustacean animals due to 
water pollution. Eight thought the Shuang Deng Paper Factory is the largest pollution 
source near the nature reserve. “The paper factory’s pollution discharge is very 
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serious, after the discharge go to the sea, it goes along the sea dyke, when tides rise, 
the mudflat is polluted” (Participant 4). As a result, “all the clams in it (the mudflat) 
died, so clam farming is not doable in our place, that the reason” (Participant 1). 
Participant 10 said: “the sea food from Xiang Shui and Bin Hai County (north part of 
the nature reserve, in experimental zone) is not edible now, the fish caught from the 
sea is also not edible, since they have a very strong odor, you just cannot eat them.” 
Participant 10 described the green industrial zone in Xiang Shui and Bin Hai County, 
saying: “What’s green in the zone? Only the air is green! And the smoke is green!” 
 
5.1.5.3.3 Causes of fishery decline – Overfishing 
 
Six fisherman interviewed thought overfishing is another reason for fish stock decline. 
According to four fishermen interviewed, they used to use small sail boats and fish 
around 10 to 20 sea miles off the shore. “In 1970s, mackerel became relatively less, 
the stock already moved towards deeper sea……in 1980s, around 1987, 1988, the 
fishing ground had already 150 sea miles away from us here…… In accordance with 
the outward movement of fish group, our motor boats’ horse power was also 
increasing” (Participant 4). According to Participant 18, the motor started from 12hp 
to 80hp, 120hp, 240hp and now 400-500hp. As fishing boats become bigger and 
bigger they sailed further and further away, initially catching more and more fish. As 
Participant 28 described, when one ship locates the fish they communicate to others 
from other provinces such as Shandong, Liaoning, Zhejiang, Fujian, and even ships 
from Taiwan, South Korea and Japan who would come to the same spot. He said: 
“When all ships lit up their lights, it looks like a middle-sized city upon the sea.”  
 
The length of the fishing season also changed. Participant 4 said their father’s 
generation “60 to 70 years ago, they went fishing two seasons per year……that is 
spring, the time between spring and summer, only 2-3 months’ fishing season a year. 
In spring, Li Yu (a kind of fish) and Chinese mackerel (Scomberomorus commerson) 
came near shore to spawn, we went fishing here at that time. When canola flowering, 
it was the cobia (Rachycentron canadum) season.” Their father’s generation also used 
boat to transport goods in non-fishing season: “(they) went to Shandong, load pear, 
date, apple and salt in autumn……deliver to south, to Shanghai.” Participant 28 said 
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in the 1980s they would fish for around 10 months a year and rest in summer to repair 
their nets. “At that time, there were no ice, all depends on salt for salting……during 
summer, it was hot, fish caught at that time would easily deteriorate (so no fishing).” 
And from the 1990s till now, fishermen would fish all year round unless there are 
typhoons or a fishing ban. Participant 4 and Participant 21 both said that under such 
catching pressure in recent years, fish could not breed and their offspring had no time 
to grow. They considered that such increases both in temporal and spatial scale of 
fishing has led to fish stock decline and the eventual collapse.  
 
Another reason for overfishing is that fishermen do not own land and lost their quota 
for food allowance as mentioned earlier in this chapter, therefore have to catch 
enough fish to feed their families. Although from the 1990s there has been a three 
month fishing ban to protect fish stock, the term is not long enough and the law 
enforcement has not been strict. Three interviewees mentioned that some fishermen 
fished illegally during the fishing ban or went beyond their own territory to fish by 
bribing the Fishery Administration. In this way corruption and maladministration 
accelerated overfishing. When asked what they think about preserving the fish stock 
and fishing more sustainably, all the fishermen interviewed said: “you don’t catch, 
they will catch. Our place don’t catch, people in other places will catch.” There is, 
therefore, no incentive to preserve their fish stock. “If I protect the resources, harm the 
interests of our local fishermen, and you catch it, then we’d better catch it all and 
nothing left that’s the end, everyone will starve that’s fine” (Participant 20). That is 
what Participant 4 said: “feed my generation is enough, next generation we don’t care. 
Protect the marine resources for the next generation can only be controlled by the 
country. You should solve people’s subsistence problem, without enough to eat and 
wear, he won’t care he catch today and nothing left for tomorrow.” 
 
5.1.5.3.4 Causes of fishery decline - Fishing gear 
 
Participant 4 and Participant 20 both mentioned advanced fishing gear also leads to 
overfishing. Participant 20 said the nets had developed from 90cm to 3.5 meters, so 
the net coverage increased fivefold. Participant 4 and Participant 18 both said their 
father’s generation used linen nets which would break when there were too many fish 
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in the net, but they now all use strong polyethylene nets and the net mesh is smaller. 
Participant 4 mentioned the trawl nets “the mesh is very, very small, such tiny fish 
cannot escape.” Further “now it is chase and capture, use trawl nets, two ship drag the 
nets, (their speed) exceed the swimming speed of fish, once in the net, you cannot 
escape, I am faster than you.” Participant 18 said when he started fishing in the 1970s 
there were no radios on boats, but now there are satellite phones and TVs installed 
which can broadcast weather forecasts and warnings of typhoons. Such equipment has 
improved safety and the ability to locate fish and communicate to other ships. As a 
result, overfishing has become easier. As Participant 20 said: “the ocean is just this 
big, just so much (resources), you don’t say the ocean is vast, after hundreds and 
thousands of ship go fishing, how many fish are there for catching? That is, the more 
advance the technology and the fishing gear, the more intense the catching pressure, 
the higher the pressure, the fewer the marine resources.” Since the amount of fish 
stock is finite, in the end fish stock decline and collapse is unavoidable. 
 
The fish stock collapse caused unemployment of many fishermen, and since most of 
them have no other skills and livelihoods, they have lived a very hard life since then. 
Some local fishermen appealed to the provincial government for compensation, but 
only a few old captains (who were born before 1949) got subsidies from the 
government (360 Yuan per year, equals NZ$ 72 ). This hardship is the root cause of 
the conflict between the fishermen and the nature reserve over mud flat access, and 
their longing for more development to give them more employment opportunities. 
However, as most fishermen are getting old or have died, and the next generations are 
largely not engaged in fishing any more, the conflict is becoming less intense. The 
decline of the fishing industry also prevents the transferring of fishermen’s knowledge 
to the following generations, so such knowledge will disappear together with the fish 
stock.  
 
5.1.5.3.5 Sea slug (Onchidium verrulatum cuvier) 
 
Four interviewees mentioned that local people collect a kind of sea slug for food and 
sale. Sea slugs live in the mud where there is no vegetation at all, and it emerges from 
the mud to breathe on rainy days. “Especially in summer, Li Xia (beginning of 
173 
 
summer) to Da Shu (Great Heat), collect sea slug is quite profitable. It is easy to pick, 
come out at night, and pick at night. Flash your torch, it crawls very slowly. Now 
fresh ones sell for over 20 Yuan (NZ$ 4) per kilo, one night can catch dozens of kilo 
the most, the income is pretty good” (Participant 26). The locals have the knowledge 
of where and when to collect them according to weather and tide conditions. The loss 
of access to the mud flats for the locals to collect sea slug is another cause of 
resentment towards the nature reserve, as the residents have lost an important income 
source.  
 
5.1.5.3.6 Jelly fish boom 
 
Participant 16 and Participant 28 mentioned a jelly fish boom, “in 1996 and 1997, we 
had lots of jelly fish here, plenty of them, two years. Just our Xin Yang Gang here, 
produced lots of jelly fish for two years. Now no jelly fish left, nothing left.” 
Participant 16 still remembers the jelly fish boom very clearly, “on the year of jelly 
fish bumper harvest, our harbor was full of people, our food store here were selling 
cooked food, at noon time was sold out, at night, nothing left.” Jelly fish is a 
traditional Chinese food, and can be served as salad in both households and 
restaurants. It commands quite a high price. As Participant 16 said: “our township’s 
big office building, costed more than a million Yuan (about NZ$ 200,000) at that time, 
the money all came from the tax levied on the jelly fish.” Sadly, after this the near-
shore fish stock collapsed almost completely and people could only catch baby shrimp 
and baby fish from the sea. 
 
5.1.5.4 Tide and water speed 
 
Participant 4 and Participant 20 are both knowledgeable about tide and water speed. 
The tide along Yancheng is very complicated, there are swirl currents 100 km off 
shore and constant currents near shore. Most of the fishermen know high tides and 
low tides in different seasons and the water speed in different places. They use this 
knowledge for sailing and to collect clams and other crustacean resources along the 
coast. Participant 21 is recognized as an expert in tides by the nature reserve staff. The 
nature reserve staff used to consult him about when to go to the mud flats to do 
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research. He can predict the tide to the exact minute based on a traditional tide 
timetable and adjust it according to weather, wind direction, and season. However, he 
said his prediction is only applicable from Xin Yang Gang to Dou Long Gang (just 
the area of the core zone) because different places have different tides. This is a good 




Aquaculture is a new industry for Yancheng. It was introduced to the coastal area 
about twenty years ago. All the interviewees from She Yang Salt farm said from the 
1990s, the salt fields had been gradually changed to aquaculture ponds to enhance 
financial opportunity. This is done by excavating large ponds and filling them with 
water. According to Participant 10, there are more than 50,000 mu (about 3,500 ha) of 
fresh water aquaculture ponds and 70,000 mu (about 5,000 ha) of salt water 
aquaculture ponds in She Yang Salt Farm (Figure 21). They leased out their ponds to 
contractors and charged 800 Yuan (about NZ$160) each mu per year. This is more 
profitable than salt production and their workers only need to do management work. 
Participant 14 said the Reed Company also developed about 15,000 mu (about 1,000 
ha) of aquaculture ponds from former reed flats, since it is more profitable than reed 
production. “We originally tried to build a 10,000 mu (about 670 ha) rice field. It 
would definitely produce economic benefits…….for reed, we probably earn 300 Yuan 
(about NZ$ 60) per mu (1/15 ha), for farm land, we probably earn 1,000 Yuan (about 
NZ$ 200) per mu, that is for sure.” 
 
Participant 1 is an expert in aquaculture production, however, he is not optimistic 
about the future of aquaculture in Xin Yang Gang. He said most of the intensive fish 
farms use pesticides to cure fish diseases, and use hormones in the feed to reduce the 
time it takes to grow the fish to maturity. According to Participant 1: “usually fish 
from fry to mature fish for sell, it will normally take three years and now it only takes 
one and a half years.” Participant 1 and Participant 25 both said the locals seldom eat 
the fast growing fish from the local fish ponds, because the fish eat too much feed and 
pesticide and they know it is not healthy to eat them. Instead, the locals usually eat 
wild fish and shrimps from the natural rivers and lakes in the local area. As the feed, 
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labor and contracting fees have continued to rise in recent years, Participant 1 said it 
becomes less and less profitable to run an aquaculture pond. However there are still 
lots of people trying to invest in aquaculture, whereas some like him think aquaculture 
is unprofitable and wants to quit. Participant 1 described the aquaculture industry in 
local dialect: “the dead ones out and the alive in.”  
 
5.1.5.6 Farming  
 
All the interviewees engaged in farming mentioned methods used to reduce salinity of 
the soil. Some use the leaves of a special local tree to cover the soil to neutralize 
salinity. Others said a rice paddy can reduce salinity by flooding the field and washing 
off the salt in the soil. According to Participant 16, local farmers used to plant a kind 
of leguminous plant to increase fertility of the soil. Participant 18 remembered: 
“Originally, the rice, millet we ate, after cooking, there was a layer of oil on top, rice 
oil, very delicious. Now we need production volume, the quality of rice decreased.  It 
used to produce 300-400 kilo per mu, now one mu produce 1,000 kilo. We used to use 
organic fertilizer, we all carried straw when we were small, after all straw were 
carried over, we dug a pit, put the straw down to ferment, then dug out the sludge 
from the lake, covered it up, and later put them in the rice field.” Generally, the 
fertility of the land in Yancheng is related to the distance to the sea so the closer to the 
coast the less fertile the land. For example, as the land Participant 25 rents for farming 
is close to the coast, the land is barren. He has to put lots of chemical fertilizer on his 
land to grow crops; otherwise the production volume would be very low. As 
Participant 20 said it will take decades to improve the soil and it may need more than 
10,000 Yuan (about NZ$ 2,000) per mu to convert mud flats to farmland.  
 
China has a policy to retain 1.8 billion mu (about 120,000,000 ha) of farmland and 
every local government has a quota of farmland to retain. As Jiangsu province has 
used too much land for industrial development, every piece of spare land is important 
for achieving the required farmland quota. The mud flats in Yancheng have become a 
critical backup land resource and, politically, reclamation is more important than 
conservation. This is also one of the reasons why so many natural wetlands have been 




5.1.5.7 Salt production 
 
Four interviewees from She Yang Salt Farm mentioned the traditional salt production 
method has been substituted by a new one. They said the salt used to be extracted 
from sea water, which means from 1.5˚ salinity to 25˚; so it takes a long time to 
produce the salt. Now, other factories extract salt from salt mines. The bittern 
extracted from the mines has a much higher concentration of salinity, around 15˚, so it 
takes a shorter time and is much cheaper to produce salt. For this reason the salt farm 
is changing from salt production to aquaculture production. However, they think the 
traditional salt extracted from sea water tastes better than the mined salt. “Our Jiangsu 
Province’s Huai salt, the salt originally dry in sun naturally, its taste and natural purity 
is rather high” (Participant 7) 
 
5.1.5.8 Traditional values and beliefs 
 
Some local interviewees still held the traditional values, such as frugality, hard work 
and contentment, which are evident through their simple lifestyles. Three interviewees 
mentioned waste problems, one said people used to use handkerchiefs and clean it 
regularly, but now people use paper tissues and throw them everywhere thus create 
more garbage than before. The other two said fishermen used to use willow or reed 
basket to take their food on boat, but now they use plastic bag and throw their waste 
to the sea thus cause serious pollution in the sea. Participant 21 said: “We went out 
(fishing) a month each time, we never washed our face, because no water. Even didn’t 
brush our teeth, didn’t wash cloth either……at that time we used small sail boat, with 
just a small cell, couldn’t carry much water, the bit of water was just for cooking 
meals. At that time we didn’t feel the hardship, we were young and healthy.” 
Participant 1 also said: “it is enough to have food to eat and clothes to wear, our 
requirement is just like this, nothing else. As long as we can live a safe and sound life, 








All the local interviewees want to be involved more in the management of the nature 
reserve. They want to make some suggestions about management and get more 
benefit from conservation. Six interviewees, mainly managers of companies and 
farms of the buffer zone, think they are helping the nature reserve to manage the 
buffer zone, but feel there has been no cooperation at all. Since the nature reserve 
lacks personnel and resources, they consider that co-management is currently just in 
words but not in action. Eight of the interviewees thought co-management might be 
effective in the future, but currently because of lack of communication and power 




All interviewees think communication between the local community and the nature 
reserve is scarce. The nature reserve staff seldom visit the local community, unless 
there are law breaking activities, “arrest the duck poachers, they (nature reserve) are 
good at this, otherwise they won’t pay any attention to you” (Participant 11). One 
interviewee said the nature reserve staff only came to his fish pond when there was 
avian flu and ordered him to kill all the live poultry he kept for extra income. One 
interviewee said he always quarrels with the nature reserve staff concerning resource 
access, and that the nature reserve staff never communicate any policies or regulations 
concerning nature reserve management to local communities. As one interviewee said: 
“The only thing the nature reserve made clear is that the place is mine, you guys can 




Twenty three interviewees mentioned eco-compensation as the top priority for co-
management. If the compensation is in place, they considered that the locals will be 
more cooperative and will be more willing to change to environmentally friendly 
production, such as organic farming and organic aquaculture. As Participant 20 said, 
“we try to grow canola (in winter), because wheat will be eaten by Red-crowned 
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Crane, after eaten, farmers may suffer loss. She (Environmental Department official) 
said ‘no, if you don’t grow wheat, I won’t let you change……I will give you funding.’ 
‘Oh dear,’ I said, ‘as long as you give me funding, I’d rather grow wheat all year 
around.’” Similarly, there are many occurrences of milu eating crops all year round in 
one village, “it (milu) loves the wheat the most, we all grow wheat in winter. In 
summer and autumn it (milu) eats corn and soy bean. Count altogether, the whole 
village needs 100,000 Yuan (NZ$ 20,000) (for compensation) per year. But we very 
occasionally give compensation to villagers, the year before last, we probably gave 
10,000 Yuan (NZ$ 2,000), it came from the nature reserve……last year, no money, 
this year no money yet until now” (Participant 4). Participant 4 also suggested: “you 
give villagers compensation, we usually sow 30 Jin (15 kg) seed per mu, we can sow 
40 Jin (20 kg), the 10 Jin (5 kg) is for birds to eat. No matter what you say, if you give 
enough compensation, they will support you. I say, you give me 20 Yuan (NZ$ 4) per 
mu, buy 10 Jin (5 kg) seed, 30 Yuan (NZ$ 6) per mu if seeds cost 3 Yuan per Jin. 
People will listen to you immediately.” but nobody listened to him until recently. 
According to Participant 1, if the nature reserve staff thought more about benefitting 




Fifteen interviewees thought inequity exists between the nature reserve and local 
communities. They were particularly concerned about the commercial fish ponds 
inside the core zone of the nature reserve, feeling it is unfair when they forbid the 
locals to dig fish ponds or raise live poultry in the buffer zone. One interviewee 
questioned: “we are in the same area, this place allowed, and my place not allowed, 
what’s the reason for not allowing? What’s the reason for allowing in your place? 
You should persuade the folks, and then they won’t rebel.” They also said the nature 
reserve had contracted harvesting of the mud flats in core zone to raise Korean mud 
snail for profit, but would not allow locals to access the mud flats for their subsistence 
needs. As one interviewee said it is like a traditional Chinese saying: “the magistrates 
were allowed to burn down houses, while the common people were forbidden even to 
light lamps.” Further, two interviewees said such contracting would only make a few 
people wealthy, especially the powerful and rich ones. The common people will not 
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get any benefit from such production and have lost their former share of those 
common resources as well. These are the main causes of resentment from the locals 
towards the nature reserve.  
 
5.1.6.4 Power imbalance 
 
Eight interviewees mentioned power imbalances between the local community and 
the nature reserve. All the local fishermen and local farmers interviewed said the 
nature reserve is a state owned government authority, which is above the local 
communities and separate from common people. One interviewee said the nature 
reserve is one level higher than local county government so the reserve always uses its 
power to force local government to obey them. He felt such a coercive policy was 
sometimes unbearable for local communities. Another interviewee said: “foreign 
countries are different from China, our state-ran enterprises have our higher 
authorities, our headquarter makes decisions……if we don’t have such outside, higher 
level company, also without county government (interfering), the nature reserve also 
has no others (in charge), just the several parties among us with equal power, like the 
foreign countries, then we can realize co-management…… (But we are) all unequal, 
no way to co-manage. First, status must be equal; second, you can make your own 
decision.” So, the hierarchical power and complicated multi-agency governance make 
co-management very difficult in China. Participant 12 said as the nature reserve 
depends on the municipal government to assign personnel, it sometimes lost 
independence for decision making. If the nature reserve does not listen to the local 
government they may lose jobs. The implications of this dual management scheme 
will be discussed later in the nature reserve interviewees’ analysis section.  
 
5.1.6.5 Mutual benefit 
 
Ten interviewees talked about mutual benefits between the reserve and the local 
community. These interviewees were either company managers or village heads. They 
were aware that the nature reserve was now propagating mutual benefits and win-win 
solutions to gain local support. For example the nature reserve has bought 600 mu 
(about 40 ha) of farmland to experiment with organic rice production. They think this 
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kind of production will benefit the protected animals and locals simultaneously. If 
they succeed, they will promote this model among local communities to gain mutual 
benefit. But as one interviewee said: “mutual benefits should not speak in your mouth, 
but be practical and realistic and put in action, since everything we should seek his 
(nature reserve) approval, it is good for them to give you some ideas, and you don’t 
have to invest blindly.” Without real action, such as providing compensation and 
managing the different zones more equally to gain the trust of the local communities, 
local communities will not believe in the propaganda of the nature reserve staff.  
 
When asked if the nature reserve brings any benefit to local communities, 15 
interviewees (9 fishermen, 4 farmers and 2 workers) said there is no benefit at all, 
except restrictions for economic development and damage to their crops. Eight 
interviewees thought there are some benefits such as less pollution and a better 
environment. They all think it is necessary for the state government to preserve this 
area for the good of future generations. Participant 10 said: “I’d rather not develop, 
even preserve more things in their original form, only through preserving original 
ecology, human and nature can maintain a harmonious, long-term development……I 
am willing, even though my quality of life is lower, as long as I have better living 
environment, I prefer that.” However, most interviewees do not feel gratitude for the 
establishment of the nature reserve, and such discontent will not help building trust 
and mutual benefit for co-management.  
   
5.1.6.6 Eco-tourism  
 
Twenty interviewees were interested in eco-tourism, and think tourism can bring 
economic benefits to local communities. They do not consider there to be many 
negative effects of tourism, such as noise or pollution. In their opinion, tourists are 
well-educated and will improve local incomes and help sell local products. However, 
tourism development needs investment to build infrastructure such as roads and 
accommodation. Locals do not have financial resources to invest, so it is difficult to 
develop tourism by themselves. They believe they need the help of the nature reserve 
and outside investment to make this happen. Most of the interviewees think it would 
be difficult to develop tourism in Yancheng, as there are no other scenic spots apart 
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from the He Le Yuan (a sightseeing place in the experimental zone operated by the 
nature reserve where they raise Red-crowned Crane besides the core zone) in the 
nature reserve and no other attractions promoting tourists to stay and consume local 
products. Participant 15 thought: “the nature reserve is in charge of tourism, all the 
birds belong to the core zone, they benefit, the nature reserve. They don’t allow you to 
make big construction here, it will affect the birds.” Another reason is the nature 
reserve raises some Red-crowned Crane in He Le Yuan, so most of the tourists go 
there to view the raised Red-crowned Crane all year round instead of going to other 
places to wait for wild migratory birds in the winter.  
 
Further, some interviewees knew it is difficult to invest in tourism facilities in the 
buffer and experimental zones. For example, both Mr.15 and Participant 25 
mentioned the land one interviewee had contracted inside the buffer zone, which was 
originally rented by a Shanghai businessman to develop eco-tourism. The 
businessman had planned to invest 200 million Yuan (about NZ $ 40 million) to build 
holiday resorts to entertain tourists. However, the nature reserve forbids large 
construction and did not allow him to build anything higher than a one-storied 
building. As a result, the project was abandoned and the land was first changed to a 
reed-fish co-production pond and then converted to farmland.    
 
5.1.6.7 United branding 
 
Four interviewees mentioned united branding as an example of possible practical 
cooperation between the nature reserve and local communities. They all suggested the 
nature reserve should take the lead to brand the whole area as a green and 
environmentally friendly production area, which would help in the promotion of local 
products. If the nature reserve does not take the lead, they said it will be very difficult 
and expensive for each individual enterprise to do the marketing on their own. 
Participant 12 said the Fang Qiang Farm experimented with 40 ha of organic rice and 
was certified, however, it was not profitable at all. The rice can only be used as gifts 
and a premium for government officials and leaders of other organizations. Many 
other obstacles were identified such as the small market, obscure standards, loose 
regulations and weak monitoring of organic products. According to Participant 12, it 
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is very difficult to promote organic products and it may take decades to develop the 
market, “the nature reserve itself also doesn’t have the strength to do it well, his 
funding and other abilities are not enough, definitely far from enough.” So the future 
of the nature reserve’s experiment with organic rice is also bleak. 
 
5.1.6.8 Merge and purchase 
 
Three interviewees mentioned the possibility of merging their land with the nature 
reserve as one entity, because their communities (the Xing Nong Village, the Xia Ba 
Village and the Reed Company) are all next to the core zone. If the nature reserve 
acquires its land, all the people on the land will become nature reserve staff. They feel 
that consequently, the villagers will be able to get compensation more easily and will 
be more willing to protect wildlife. Participant 1 also mentioned the nature reserve 
had talked about acquiring his fish pond in the buffer zone but no final decision has 
been reached yet. However, as Participant 15 said, the nature reserve only wanted the 
land, not the people on it. It is impossible for the nature reserve to feed the entire 
village or the entire company staff, so the locals still need to struggle for their 
livelihoods and wait for other alternatives. As Participant 17 said: “No matter if you 
are the common people, the government officials or researchers, you need some stable 
income sources, without income nobody can survive.”  
 
5.1.7 Summary  
 
In summary, all local interviewees liked their environment, and most of them put this 
down to the existence of the nature reserve since polluting factories are not allowed to 
be built there. However, most fishermen and farmers interviewed want some 
development in their area in order to have more employment opportunities and 
income sources. Most local interviewees were not happy about the unequal treatment 
of development activities inside and outside the core zone of the nature reserve. They 
believed such behaviour will damage law enforcement and the nature reserve’s 
authority. Although most interviewees thought there is not enough compensation for 





As for local knowledge, overall, fishermen have detailed knowledge about the fishery, 
tides and water speeds and mud flat resources; farmers have detailed knowledge about 
farming, soil and weather conditions; salt workers have detailed knowledge about salt 
production and reed workers know about reed ecology and production. However, 
most interviewees have very limited knowledge concerning birds and other wildlife. 
Such lack of knowledge reduced their opportunities to cooperate with the nature 
reserve for conservation. Additionally, most interviewees have very superficial 
knowledge about reed and its ecosystem. As a result, reed has been undervalued and 
reed ecosystems destroyed. Although some interviewees are quite knowledgeable 
about birds and mud flat ecosystems, they generally think the nature reserve staff will 
be more professional and knowledgeable, and they believe that their own knowledge 
would not be useful for the nature reserve management.  
 
Fishermen appear to be the most deprived group among the locals. Their resentment 
towards the nature reserve is the strongest, and their claims for compensation are the 
most urgent (concerning mud flat resources). The local farmers are also affected by 
the nature reserve, but the birds only damage a proportion of their crops and it is very 
hard to evaluate the loss and find the culprits. So, most of the farmers can only 
complain to their village heads and absorb the loss themselves. Besides these two 
groups, other interviewees do not think they have any relationship with the nature 
reserve and each party just minds their own business and does not care about the other. 
Such distant relationships will hamper the cooperation between the nature reserve and 
the local communities.  
 
Some interviewees see development as a fundamental challenge to conservation, 
because most developments create environmental degradation. They think the higher 
levels of government must change their perception of development, and shift the GDP 
oriented economy to include ecological considerations. Some interviewees show their 
awareness of the limits of natural resources and preliminary thoughts of sustainability, 
however, the development trend and market force stop them from being sustainable. 
In order to get current benefit people tends to downplay or overlook long-term risks, 
for example the fishery collapse due to overfishing and environmental degradation 
because of industrial development in the experimental zone. Although some 
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interviewees could foresee bad consequences of overexploitation, they have to ensure 
their own survival first instead of making far sighted decisions for the future 
generation. Fortunately, most locals still have a relatively simple life style, while 
frugality, hardworking and contentment are still common among locals, despite the 
wide spread of western industrial culture and consumerism throughout China in the 
past two decades.  
 
5.2 Nature reserve staff interview Analysis 
 
 




According to the nature reserve staff, Yancheng National Nature Reserve was 
approved in 1983 as a provincial nature reserve, and officially established in 1984 to 
protect the Red-crowned Crane and its habitat. Two interviewees said it was 
established because lots of birds and animals lived in the natural wetlands in this area, 
and wild animal hunting was rampant among local people, including the killing of 
many Red-crowned Cranes. Experts suggested establishing a nature reserve to protect 
the Red-crowned Crane and other rare animal species in this area. Following the 
establishment of the nature reserve, hunting wild animal became illegal pursuant to 
the Wildlife Protection Law which was a beneficial factor for wildlife protection 




5.2.2 Quality of the Environment  
 
Overall, all the local born interviewees thought the environmental quality in 
Yancheng is degrading (the non-local interviewee was not asked because he was 
unable to compare the environmental changes). Six interviewees mentioned there are 
air, water and soil pollution problems in the coastal area of Yancheng. Among them, 
four said the water in the local rivers was clean and drinkable in the past, but now 
most rivers are polluted and not drinkable. Further, sea water is also polluted in the 
near shore area, and according to one interviewee, red tides (algal bloom) occur every 
year. Another three mentioned there were more occurrences of smog in Yancheng, 
which indicated that the air quality is decreasing. The main pollution sources were 
thought to be industrial discharge and agriculture run off upstream and along the coast. 
As mentioned by one interviewee, industrial discharge caused soil pollution and 
resulted in some heavy metal loadings that exceed the state standards. Another 
interviewee commented that the odor of paper factories and chemical factories in the 
experimental zone were so strong that it is difficult for people to breathe; and that all 
such pollutants will affect wild animals in certain ways.  
 
Another aspect of environmental quality is the environmental degradation caused by 
humans. For example, one interviewee mentioned mud flat reclamation reduced food 
sources and cut the energy flow of the environment which may result in coastal 
erosion as the balance for siltation is broken. Further, ports, piers, channels and banks 
built along the coast changed tidal current dynamics which are difficult to restore. He 
also said, because of siltation and sea dyke construction, many salt water ecosystems 
had changed to fresh water ecosystems. For example, there were sea water and crabs 
in the courtyard of the nature reserve office in late 1980s, but now there is no salt 
water ecosystem around their office. He believed that such changes were 80% due to 
human related factors, and the rest was attributed to cord grass siltation. In general, as 
one interviewee said: “The whole environment is an entity; the entire environment is 
degrading now, from top to bottom, water, soil and air are all getting worse. It is 
impossible to reverse these trends, because all factors are negative towards positive 
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changes, this is the domino effect, falling one by one, and then the whole environment 




All interviewees mentioned development along Yancheng coastal mud flat. They 
thought the development trend was inevitable because of the coastal development 
strategy at the provincial and the national level (refer to the Context chapter for 
details). One interviewee said Yancheng National Nature Reserve can hardly resist the 
development trend and the pressure for development around the reserve is huge 
because it is located inside an economically developed area. Another interviewee said 
because of people’s greediness and restlessness, there is no hope for conservation as 
people will always search for profit maximization.    
 
5.2.3.1 Development in the core zone  
 
Four nature reserve interviewees tried to clarify that the so called fish ponds in the 
core zone which were the locals’ major complaints (see section 5.1) were artificial 
wetlands experiments established by the nature reserve to rehydrate dehydrated 
wetlands and provide food and habitats for the birds. One interviewee said because of 
a serious drought in early 1990s, all the wetlands in the core zone dried up and 
creatures that lived in the water died. As a result, birds had nothing to eat in the 
wetland and dispersed all over the area. The nature reserve then decided to make an 
artificial wetland inside the core zone and it was approved by the government. They 
built a wall and diverted water into the land and put some fish in it as well. The types 
and number of birds that came to the artificial wetland were completely different from 
the original wetland. They noticed 300 pairs of White-winged Tern (Chlidonias 
leucopterus) nested in the artificial wetland which had never happened before. Further, 
the largest group of Red-crowned Crane ever observed in the history of the nature 





Nature reserve staff felt that the experiment was quite successful in the beginning, as 
it achieved ecological benefit as well as social and economic benefit (however no 
detailed social benefits were mentioned) at the same time. However, later it diverged 
slightly from its original purpose when the experiment was scaled up. According to 
one interviewee, since the nature reserve had limited human resources, they had to 
employ local people to manage the newly built artificial wetlands. Because of 
mismanagement, the artificial wetlands turned into some intensive fish farming ponds. 
But the nature reserve tried to correct the mistake by taking back the land after the 
contract ended in 2012. One interviewee mentioned that the local contractors refused 
to leave the fish pond because of economic benefits, and they had to go to court for 
dispute resolution. Lack of credibility between the nature reserve and contractors was 
the reason for such contract disputes, as stated by one interviewee, since the 
contractors misunderstood the nature reserve would subcontract the land to other 
contractors for higher revenue instead of restore them back to wetland for 
conservation purposes. Although such aquaculture production was against the 
regulations for the nature reserve management, as admitted by one interviewee; the 
rationale given was that since they had limited financial resources in the early stage, 
they had to earn their own salary through these production activities (this situation is 
further discussed later in this chapter).   
 
5.2.3.2 Development in the buffer zone and the experimental zone 
 
All interviewees said the development in the buffer and experimental zone was quite 
intense. Because the land of buffer and experimental zones did not belong to the 
nature reserve, the reserve had very little control over that land. The local government 
who owns the land usually acquiesced to development, especially reclamation for the 
economic or political benefits, and according to one interviewee, they do not monitor 
such developments strictly. Another interviewee said the nature reserve used to 
constrain the development of the buffer zone. Whenever there were constructions 
against the Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Nature Reserves (The 
Regulations), they would try to stop them and sometimes tear them down. For 
example, two interviewees mentioned that a pig farm had been constructed in the 
buffer zone by a Shanghai businessman; the nature reserve then ordered the whole 
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construction to be torn down which resulted in tremendous loss for the businessman. 
However, as the tensions built up and the conflict became more and more intense, the 
nature reserve realized that they could not always take such extreme actions, because 
they should build better relationship with the surrounding communities for better 
conservation results, as stated by one interviewee. That is why they try to search for 
win-win solutions for the nature reserve and local communities now.     
 
5.2.3.3 Perspectives of development 
 
The nature reserve interviewees’ view towards development varied greatly. Three 
interviewees thought these developments would affect birds and other wildlife 
negatively. One interviewee said the buffer zone has already lost its protection value, 
since its biodiversity has been lost due to development. Another interviewee said 
industrial development in the experimental zone had caused air and water pollution in 
the coastal area of Yancheng, which inevitably affected the core zone of the nature 
reserve. As one interviewee asserted, development is the largest threat to wildlife, and 
such environmental changes are the reason for fewer and fewer wild animals now. By 
contrast, the other five interviewees held neutral opinions about development, since 
they thought wild animals can adapt to environmental changes. One interviewee 
stated that the distribution, number and variety of some species have their own 
dynamics regardless of protection. As long as such changes are within a controllable 
range, they did not perceive any problems. Four interviewees mentioned organic 
farming and aquaculture as the win-win development model the nature reserve 
proposed for local development, since organic rice paddy and fish ponds can provide 
food for water birds as well as income for the local community.  
 
Further, one interviewee said some conversion of natural wetlands may bring benefit 
to wildlife instead of doing harm. For example, converting the cord grass area to 
aquaculture ponds would have positive effects on water birds, such as enlarging water 
space and providing food for birds, as long as chemical input is carefully controlled 
(details of cord grass management will be discussed later in this chapter). Although 
some kinds of developments are acceptable according to five interviewees, such 
developments must be based on ecological values and with no destructive effects on 
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the environment. All interviewees agreed that industrial development is not viable in 
the nature reserve; however, some projects were supported by the local government 
and passed the environment assessment regardless of obvious pollution. The reason 
why such projects were approved was the economic and political benefit for local 
government which encouraged governors to persuade experts to overlook the 
environmental impacts. As one interviewee said, “the municipal government did not 
pay much attention to environment protection in the past, they wished there were 
fewer protected areas the better, land is economic value for them, they want to have 
the largest economic benefit, that’s their goal.” 
 
5.2.4 Nature reserve management 
 
Generally, nature reserve interviewees had many concerns about nature reserve 
management, such as biodiversity, habitat protection, carrying capacity, and invasive 
species. They carried out some research such as breeding of Red-crowned Crane and 
other rare birds, reed management, cord grass control, and artificial wetlands. They 
managed some natural resources in the core zone, such as Korean mud snails, crab, 
rag worm and sea slug in the mud flat and reed flats inland. Although some 
interviewees thought the nature reserve management has had some good results, they 
admitted that problems exist.  
 
5.2.4.1 Management effectiveness 
 
The nature reserve interviewees’ opinions about management effectiveness are mixed. 
Five interviewees thought the management of the nature reserve is effective, since the 
population of Red-crowned Crane and other important bird species is relatively stable 
and the ecosystem is relatively intact and the changes in the core zone are of a 
controllable scale. However, two interviewees said the management of the nature 
reserve is ineffective since there are fewer birds and suitable habitats. According to 
one interviewee, during the 1980s and 1990s, as long as there was surface water 
beyond the sea dyke, there were millions of birds, especially geese and wild duck. 
When they flew up, they could blot out the sun, but now there are fewer and fewer 
birds due to development and environmental destruction. Another interviewee 
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asserted that the nature reserve can only slow down the speed of environment 
degradation but not reverse it. Since the core zone is losing its biodiversity function, 
many species may go extinct and the future of the nature reserve is bleak. As one 
interviewee stated: “As long as economic development is the No.1 goal for China, this 
result is unavoidable, and it is an unbreakable vicious cycle.”  
 
5.2.4.2 Regulation enforcement 
 
Concerning regulation enforcement, four interviewees agreed that the locals generally 
know that Red-crowned Crane is a national level protected bird and no one should 
touch it (the others did not mention this specific topic). Hunting, poisoning or hurting 
Red-crowned Crane or other protected animals will lead to severe punishment 
including imprisonment. However, besides the wildlife protection law, the only law 
the nature reserve can rely on is the Regulations. Five interviewees thought the 
Regulations were outdated and not suitable for wetland nature reserves as there are 
more variations in wetlands compared to forest or grassland ecosystems. Further, two 
interviewees said regulation enforcement is not strong enough, because the 
Regulations only provide power to the nature reserve to ask for an environmental 
assessment before the approval of development projects. As many projects were 
constructed before approval, it is very hard to control such construction without an 
individual law for each individual nature reserve. The nature reserve has to rely on the 
local government to solve such disputes and the processes are usually very 
complicated and ineffective according to one interviewee. By contrast, the law 
enforcement is much stronger in the police department, since they can seize people 
and put them into prison, as explained by one interviewee. For the people who obey 
the nature reserve the regulation is strict, but for the ones who disobey it, the nature 
reserve has no power to regulate their behaviors. For example, one interviewee said 
some reclamation projects against the Regulations in the buffer and experimental 
zones are supported by local government and passed the environmental assessment, so 
the nature reserve cannot change them. As one interviewee said: “China is a country 
that always governed by people not by law, the outcome of governance by people is 
that power can override law in the end.” There was no indication that reserve staff had 
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ever attempted to work with local government or police to address regulation 
enforcement concerns except for poaching. 
 
Another regulation issue raised by interviewees was wildlife poaching. Four 
interviewees mentioned poaching wild duck, especially by poisoning, as a big 
problem for nature reserve management. Red-crowned Crane and other rare animals 
may accidentally eat the poisoned bait for wild duck and die, this will cause great 
trouble for the nature reserve staff. One interviewee said the locals or some outsiders 
will use Furadan (Carbofuran) – a kind of pesticide banned for being too poisonous 
and too long lasting in the soil – to poison wild ducks which are then sold to local 
restaurants. A dead duck can sell for 40-50 Yuan (about NZ$8-10), and a poacher can 
poison thousands of ducks in one night according to one interviewee. Although it was 
poisoned, local restaurants would soak the duck in water and store it in the freezer for 
some time, then sell it to local customers. Because wild duck is very delicious, it is 
usually served as duck soup for a dozen people on each table, so the taste of poison is 
not so strong for each person, one interviewee stated. High profit and demand in the 
market make poaching lucrative and very difficult to eliminate. The nature reserve 
had cooperated with the local governments to deal with illegal hunting and poisoning 
in 1999 according to one interview. However, even though the nature reserve has 
assigned more staff to patrol the area and has built two stations in the buffer zone to 




All interviewees were aware that compensation is the key concern of locals and it is 
critical for the relationship between the nature reserve and local communities. They 
all thought the compensation for the local community, especially local farmers and 
fishermen, is insufficient, so locals always asked the nature reserve for more 
compensation. However, as mentioned in the local interviewee analysis, according to 
the Wildlife Protection Law, all damages caused by protected wildlife should be 
compensated by local government; but the nature reserve does not have the 
responsibility and financial resources to fulfill such claims. Three interviewees 
mentioned that there was compensation money allocated to each county government, 
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but the money had been appropriated to other uses instead of giving it to the 
individuals who suffered the loss. Another three interviewees said a formal eco-
compensation program should start in 2014, and the money will go directly to each 
sufferer and may solve the problem, but only partially since the fund cannot fully 
cover the losses. One interviewee felt that fairer compensation considerations would 
require the nature reserve to have more voice in assessing the losses borne by the local 
community, as they are well placed to provide information for the local government 
as to the compensation extent and appropriate recipients.    
 
5.2.4.4 Conflict  
 
As some interviewees do not contact the local people very often, few of the 
interviewees mentioned conflicts between the nature reserve and the local 
communities. Only two interviewees stated that there were conflicts between local 
fisherman and reserve staff over access to mud flat resources. One mentioned the 
event of an illegal landing on the coast of the core zone by local fishermen, as 
described by locals in the previous section. However, according to him the scene was 
rather dramatic, with hundreds of locals in big fishing vessels that landed on the coast 
and robbed all the Korean mud snails (for selling as a local food delicacy) that the 
nature reserve had raised for several months. Another confirmed the occasion of 
locals blocking the gate of the nature reserve office building for compensation several 
years ago, so nobody could leave or enter. Such conflicts drove the nature reserve to 
search for better ways of working with local communities.  
  
5.2.4.5 Resource management 
 
The nature reserve manages some natural resources in the core zone for economic 
benefits which include the mud flat resources and reeds (see later discussions in this 
chapter). Four interviewees were aware that mud flat resources are (or were) the main 
source of extra income for local fishermen, so they try to share a little of the resources 
with the locals. Three said they allowed a certain number of locals to collect mud flat 
resources such as Korean mud snails, crabs and sea slugs in spring, summer and 
autumn, and to sell these to the contractors to earn some labor fee. However, in winter 
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when migratory birds arrive, nobody is allowed to enter the mud flat of the core zone 
to collect resources. According to the three interviewees, this is to avoid 
overharvesting, and collection activities must be managed by the contractor 
designated by the nature reserve, since the locals will easily over exploit the resources 
(as mentioned in the case of robbing the Korean mud snail by the locals). In contrast, 
the locals complained that the money paid by the nature reserve for collecting mud 
flat resources was too little to be worthwhile for the labor (see local interviewees 
section). This is one of the reasons why the locals are so dissatisfied with the nature 
reserve’s management of mud flat resources in the core zone.  
 
Another resource managed for economic benefit is reed, which was contracted by the 
nature reserve to an outside contractor to harvest and sell. All interviewees agreed that 
high and dense reed should be harvested to let big birds such as Red-crowned Crane, 
common crane and geese to enter. Four interviewees said if the reed is not harvested, 
big birds cannot go inside to feed and therefore some important food sources inside 
the reed are lost. Additionally, if high and dense reed is left unharvested, it may catch 
fire in the next spring. However, low and thin reeds can remain there as birds can 
easily access the food underneath.  
 
One interviewee said the human disturbance involved in reed harvesting can scare the 
birds away. As a result, reed harvesting inside the core zone needed to be well 
planned and some areas were prioritized to be harvested as fast as possible in order to 
minimize disturbance. He also said the nature reserve is considering reducing the area 
of reed to minimize reed harvesting. Another interviewee said reed harvesting should 
start earlier to finish earlier to provide more habitat for large sized birds. 
 
5.2.4.6 Cord grass 
 
As an invasive species, the cord grass ecosystem in the tidal zone has very poor 
biodiversity, and was considered by the nature reserve as bad for conservation, 
according to three interviewees. They said cord grass was introduced from abroad to 
China to control coastal erosion, however, as it had no natural enemies, it spread 
widely and destroyed some natural habitats such as seep weed flats. According to one 
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interviewee, another nature reserve spent 1.08 billion Yuan (NZ$ 200 million) to 
control the cord grass, and it is a growing problem for YNNR as well. As very few 
benthos (organisms living at the lowest level of a body of water, such as an ocean or a 
lake) live in the cord grass flats, food resources are scarce in such habitats, so very 
few birds go there. Further, cord grass can cause siltation and block the salt water 
from coming inland, leading to dehydration of the core zone. As a result, they 
concluded that cord grass should be eliminated and restored to a seep weed flat which 




Funding was a big problem for the nature reserve in the early stage of its 
establishment. According to one interviewee, for the size of YNNR, it needs 150 staff 
to manage it properly, but they only had a headcount of 30 staff in the early stage. 
One interviewee said, in the beginning, the nature reserve only had 100,000 Yuan 
(about NZ$20,000) to pay the 30 staff per year. This was not even enough to feed 
their families, let alone protect the wildlife. As a result the nature reserve staff had to 
earn their own salary by managing (usually through contracting and claim contract 
fees) the natural resources inside the core zone, such as the mud flat resources, the 
reeds and the artificial wetlands (for fish production). Three interviewees mentioned 
all those incomes were used for staff salaries and for some research projects, such as 
the breeding program and the sightseeing area (He Le Yuan). Later, as the financial 
support from the central government got bigger, there was no salary shortage, so the 
nature reserve is now trying to stop the aquaculture production and restore the ponds 
back to wetlands in the core zone.    
 
5.2.5 Local knowledge  
 
All interviewees thought the locals lack knowledge related to the birds and their 
habitats which are important in nature reserve management. Only one interviewee 
stated locals have detailed knowledge concerning tide and mud flat resources which is 
useful for scientific research and management of the nature reserve. However, another 
interviewee said the tide is very regular without many changes, so the local 
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knowledge is simple and just common sense. Such perceptions of local knowledge 
make the nature reserve staff overlook the potential role that the locals can play in 
nature reserve management. Consequently, very little local knowledge was considered 




Six interviewees thought locals have some knowledge about reed and its usage, but 
that such knowledge is unrelated to nature reserve management since high and dense 
reed is not beneficial for large sized birds’ protection. As a result, it appears that 
nature reserve staff lack interest in reed production and its economic value which may 
be beneficial to local communities.  
 
5.2.5.1.1 Former usage 
 
As for the usage of reed, seven interviewees mentioned that locals no longer use reed. 
Consistent with the information provided by local interviewees, the reeds harvested 
are mainly sold to other provinces (such as Shandong and Hebei) as building materials. 
One interviewee mentioned the top of the calamus (Acorus calamus) can be used to 
make mattress, as it is soft but will not deform like a common spring mattress. He also 
said such mattresses can be used as cushions in railway stations for unloading cargoes. 
Another interviewee mentioned the smallest left over reeds can be crushed and sent to 
power plants to generate electricity. However, none of the interviewees seemed to be 
aware that there is a professional reed processing company (Tao Yuan Decoration 
Company) in Yancheng specializing in processing and producing all kinds of reed 
products. One interviewee said they thought the reed market would shrink more and 
more from now on as there are fewer and fewer people using reed to build houses. 
They recalled that many locally harvested reeds were stacked and harvesters were 
unable to sell them, so he said there must be too many reeds now. Over all, seven 
interviewees thought it is not profitable to produce and process reed as the price for 
reed products is too low. There may be an international market for reed handicrafts 
and other high-end products, but locals do not have the knowledge and ability to 
engage in such a business, one interviewee stated. One interviewee mentioned that 
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because there are no local markets and a very small domestic market (only high-end 
market like the organic products) for reed products, local people do not have the 
incentive to be involved in reed processing and manufacturing. As he said, only after 
eco-tourism is developed better in the future and there is more local demand from 
tourists for reed products can reed become more valuable for locals.     
 
5.2.5.1.2 Reed ecology 
 
The nature reserve interviewees appeared more knowledgeable than most local 
interviewees except the Reed Company staff and Participant 29 with regard to reed 
ecology. Two interviewees admitted that they learned a lot about the reed ecosystems 
from the Reed Company staff, such as the three drains and three floods method for 
reed production. From the overall habitat protection perspective, the reed ecosystem is 
valuable to some small bird species which can nest inside dense reeds, as mentioned 
by three interviewees. However, six interviewees said high and dense reeds are not 
suitable habitats for cranes and other big sized birds, so they must be harvested to 
reveal the space and food underneath. According to one interviewee, reeds in patches 
intermingled with open water are good habitat because it can offer both food and 
shelter for birds. Generally, as the reed inside the core zone tends to grow high and 
dense, the nature reserve interviewees do not highly value the reed ecosystem as they 
are more focused on large bird species and suitable habitats related to them. Only two 
interviewees agreed that reed is valuable and should be profitable if processed in 
value-added ways (e.g. handicrafts). 
 
5.2.5.2 Red-crowned Crane 
 
Since Red-crowned Crane is the flagship species of the nature reserve, all 
interviewees had detailed knowledge concerning the distribution and habits of Red-
crowned Crane. As the nature reserve carries out a monitoring program each year to 
count the number of Red-crowned Cranes in the wild, all interviewees knew the exact 
number. They all agreed that the number of Red-crowned Crane has been relatively 
stable during the past few years, which means the environment of the core zone is still 
suitable for wintering Red-crowned Crane. However, they all noticed the trend of 
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increased concentration of Red-crowned Cranes in the core zone which indicates that 
the outside environment is not so suitable for them. As there are more and more 
developments in the buffer and experimental zones, habitat loss for Red-crowned 
Crane outside the core zone is inevitable. One interviewee said the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) wetland restoration project is aimed at enhancing the eco-
environment inside the core zone and at helping reduce the damage to crops and fish 
ponds in the surrounding areas caused by protected birds. According to him, the 
carrying capacity of the core zone is sufficient for all the Red-crowned Crane and 
other migratory birds, as long as it has enough food resources. However, another 
interviewee said the food sources in the core zone are insufficient for all the birds, 
especially when there are droughts or other natural disasters. Further, one interviewee 
said they want all the big sized protected birds concentrated in the core zone, as it is 
easier for them to manage and avoid poaching and poisoning.  
 
As there are breeding programs going on for Red-crowned Crane in He Le Yuan, all 
the interviewees know the habits of Red-crowned Crane. They all knew Red-crowned 
Crane prefers fish and shrimp rather than other vegetarian food, but that they will eat 
other food when such resources decline. Since Red-crowned Crane is omnivorous, it 
can adapt to various environments and search for any food it can find. In this way it 
has survived until now, otherwise it would have gone extinct long ago, as one 
interviewee stated. All interviewees thought locals were unconcerned about Red-
crowned Crane and other birds before the establishment of the nature reserve. 
However because of their education in the past decades, locals now know the 
importance of Red-crowned Crane. Generally, all interviewees cared more about the 
large sized birds which are represented by Red-crowned Crane. Although one 
interviewee disagreed with the popular name of the nature reserve as Red-crowned 
Crane Nature Reserve and thought it was misleading (narrowing the protection 
purpose of YNNR from all kinds of rare birds to only Red-crowned Crane), the 
reserve invested most of their financial and human resources in Red-crowned Crane 
protection. One interviewee mentioned there is a crane culture among the locals and 
Red-crowned Crane is popular among the youth because of a popular song about Xu 
Xiu Juan (a former employee of YNNR, see Figure 4) and cranes. Other interviewees 
did not believe such culture exists locally, given that most local people have little 
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knowledge about the Red-crowned Crane. There may be some who believe in the 
fairy crane and longevity, but such beliefs are not deeply embedded as in Japan.  
 
Most nature reserve staff believe that the reed ecosystem is not the most important 
habitat for Red-crowned Crane, since high and dense reeds are inaccessible for them 
due to their large body size. Only when high and dense reeds were harvested, can 
Red-crowned Crane enter such area to search for food. The most favorable habitat for 
Red-crowned Crane is the seep weed flats, according to one interviewee, as there are 
more food sources. However, intermingled patterns of reed, seep weed and grass are 
the ideal habitat for Red-crowned Crane for both hiding and food benefits as one 
interviewee stated.  
 
5.2.5.3 Fishery stock 
 
Although fishing used to be a major livelihood for locals, and was very important to 
local communities, only three interviewees mentioned fish stock decline and collapse 
as a local livelihood change. Two of them mentioned pollution, over fishing and 
advanced fishing gear as the main reasons for fishery decline, which are consistent 
with the local interviewees’ opinions. However, all interviewees did not care too 
much about such livelihood changes nor did they pay much attention to discussing 
alternative livelihoods for local fishermen. One interviewee mentioned eco-tourism as 
a general livelihood alternative but did not state any practical ways to implement it. 
Another four interviewees mentioned organic farming and aquaculture as alternatives, 
and said they are trying out a pilot project of organic rice in the buffer zone now, but 
it still needs several years to see the result. Such detachment of concern for local 
livelihoods not only demonstrates the nature reserve does not care about the wellbeing 
of the local communities, but also shows that community affairs and co-management 




As an introduced concept from the western world, co-management has been practiced 
around China for about two decades. Although the nature reserve only started some 
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co-management trials, such as communication meetings with local communities every 
year and the pilot organic rice field in the buffer zone started from 2013, six 
interviewees thought co-management with the surrounding communities may bring 
benefit to both sides. They are willing to co-manage the buffer zone with the local 
communities, but feel the core zone has no need for cooperation since it is their sole 
responsibility. One interviewee said the experimental zone is too far away from the 
nature reserve so neither the nature reserve nor the local community wants to co-
manage it. Concerning the practice of co-management, two interviewees said it was 
always practiced but the word did not exist before 2000. The definition of co-
management was introduced into China from Canada and such practice as community 
meetings and conservation education had previously occurred even without any 
foreign aid project such as the ADB project, according to one interviewee. Generally, 
the current focus for co-management at YNNR is trialing a model for organic farming 
and aquaculture in the buffer zone in order to promote such a model at a larger scale 
in collaboration with the local people, according to four interviewees. But one 
interviewee thought it is impossible to co-manage because locals were always 
searching for maximum profit. Unless all the locals were employed as nature reserve 
staff or got benefits without utilizing the resources, he felt the locals would not protect 




According to the literature reviewed, communication is crucial for co-management, 
but communication between the nature reserve and the local communities appears to 
be limited. Four interviewees described some examples of communication between 
the two sides, such as education programs in local schools and meetings with local 
representatives several times a year. But they are aware that they should organize 
more events and send out more brochures and leaflets for the education of the locals 
(mainly for young people). However, as there are limited staff and financial resources, 
it is difficult for them to conduct more communication activities. According to one 
interviewee, the nature reserve has not conducted a complete survey of surrounding 
communities until now, so there is a lack of baseline data (size, boundaries and 
demographic figures) for local communities inside the nature reserve. This lack of 
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communication has caused misunderstanding and mistrust from local communities 
which may ultimately lead to conflict. With the establishment of the community 
affairs branch of the reserve and the roll out of the organic rice project, there should 
be more communication with the locals, one interviewee stated. 
 
As most of the nature reserve staff interviewed thought locals possess no relevant 
knowledge concerning the rare birds and their habitats, they seldom consult local 
knowledge in reserve management. One interviewee said they may consult locals 
about basic social and economic information for scientific research, but other 
viewpoints or perceptions of local communities are seldom incorporated in 
management decision making processes.  
  
5.2.6.2 Power imbalance 
 
Although local communities thought the nature reserve is powerful, seven 
interviewees said local governments are much more dominant than the reserve. Three 
interviewees said the nature reserve is a dual management institutional organization. 
While the human resources of the nature reserve are managed by the municipal 
government of Yancheng, the conservation responsibilities are supervised by the 
Environmental Protection Bureau in Jiangsu Province. So, if the nature reserve staff 
do not listen to the municipal government, they may lose their jobs. One interviewee 
said it would be better for the nature reserve to establish a management committee 
which is equal to a level of government, then they can manage all the surrounding 
communities as an entity. Only in this way did he feel the nature reserve could assert 
more power on land use planning and development projects. 
 
5.2.6.3 Mutual benefit 
 
According to the literature, mutual benefits are the basis for co-management, but the 
views of interviewees about benefits were varied. Five interviewees believed there are 
mutual benefits between the reserve and the local communities, which is why the 
nature reserve has been promoting activities such as organic farming and aquaculture 
as win-win solutions in communication meetings to gain local support. However, 
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three interviewees thought there are conflicts between human needs and wildlife 
protection, and that fulfilling one would harm the other. Currently, as human 
development is the priority, wild animals suffer. As one interviewee said: “if people 
are starving, how could they protect wild animals? The foreigners may protect the 
animals better, because they have enough to eat now.” Further, he also said: “in the 
eyes of rich city dwellers, the countryside has green mountains and clear water, 
however, in the eyes of poor farmers such things become barren hills and treacherous 
rapids.” Since conservation usually does not show obvious economic values in the 
short term, and organic farming and aquaculture may lose money in the beginning, it 
is very difficult for the nature reserve to persuade locals to acknowledge the mutual 
benefits for conservation.  
 
5.2.6.4 Eco-tourism  
 
Eco-tourism is sometimes considered an environmentally friendly development model 
for communities surrounding nature reserves. Five interviewees mentioned eco-
tourism as an alternative livelihood for locals, and they are optimistic about the future 
of eco-tourism there. One interviewee said if eco-tourism developed successfully in 
the nature reserve, it would surely bring great economic benefits to local communities, 
because a large number of tourists will boost the sale of local products and all local 
restaurants and hotels will be fully occupied. However, another interviewee said eco-
tourism must be operated within certain limits; otherwise it will bring more harm than 
benefits. Four interviewees admitted they are not familiar with eco-tourism principles, 
so they need to learn from others and practice carefully if it is to be implemented. 
Although eco-tourism is allowed in the experimental zone, such projects still need 
environment assessment before approval. Consequently, some projects were stopped 
before passing the assessment according to one interviewee. As there are bad 
examples of tourism development in other nature reserves around China, such as too 
many tourists and habitat destruction, one interviewee said they should be more 





5.2.6.5 United branding 
 
The nature reserve has proposed organic farming and organic aquaculture as win-win 
development models to produce green branding for the whole area. As organic 
farming and organic aquaculture use less chemical fertilizers and pesticides, there is 
less run off from the fields and healthier food for both humans and wild animals. Such 
practices could benefit the nature reserve and local communities simultaneously, 
according to four interviewees. Interviewees knew the nature reserve should take the 
lead to brand the whole area as a green and environmental friendly production area, 
but with limited human and financial resources, they felt it is hard for them to achieve 
the goal. One interviewee said that as there is a three-year transition period for organic 
rice to be certified, during this time the price will remain the same as the common rice. 
Since the organic rice needs more human labour to do weeding and pest control, the 
cost is higher than common rice, but the production volume is about half. So, the issue 
of who will compensate such losses in the transition period is a big obstacle to the 
promotion of the organic model locally, as most local people need income. He felt the 
locals are unable and unwilling to afford such loss for the good of the society as a 
whole.  
 
5.2.7 Summary  
 
In summary, all nature reserve interviewees were aware of the environmental 
degradation and concerned about the effects on wildlife conservation. They all 
acknowledged the development trend and its negative impacts on nature reserve 
management. However, as such problems cannot be solved locally, they have to hope 
for more environmental friendly development policies from the central government 
and wish for more effective implementation of such strategies from provincial or 
higher level governments. Although views concerning the effectiveness of nature 
reserve management varied, all interviewees were aware of the hardships experienced 
by the local community and knew they are owed more compensation. None of those 
interviewed appeared to feel the suffering of locals, since they have secured salaries 
and benefits. Whatever the reserve staff did to help the local community is a kind of 
benevolence done out of their kindness but not from their sense of responsibility or 
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their heartfelt empathy. As a result their actions are perceived by the locals as 
superficial and slow in pace whenever there are obstacles.  
 
As for local knowledge, all interviewees thought the locals lacked knowledge of birds 
and their habitats, and that the locals’ other livelihood knowledge is unrelated to 
nature reserve management. Such perception suggests that nature reserve staff 
underestimate the value of local knowledge and this may explain why they seldom 
consult locals for their opinions on nature reserve management. As a result, there is 
very little communications between the nature reserve and the local community, 
which often leads to misunderstanding and mistrust. All these factors contribute to a 
poor foundation for co-management and promoting mutually beneficial activities. 
Although the nature reserve is trying to promote co-management and a win-win 
development model, limited personnel working in community liaison compared to 
other management areas, and lack of financial resources, hamper the momentum. 
Overall, the nature reserve staff appear to lack the ability and willingness to 
communicate with local people, and this is a significant obstacle for co-management.  
 
5.3 Scientists interview analysis 
 
 
Figure 31: Billboard with description of YNNR Wetland Protection Project, in the buffer zone 






As mentioned in Chapter IV and the introduction of this chapter, the results of the 
interviews with scientists familiar with the nature reserve are arranged according to 
the questions asked of them concerning nature reserve management and local 
knowledge. Since most researchers answered the questions directly from their emails, 
the analysis is arranged accordingly, and other aspects mentioned in personal and on-
line interviews are discussed after the general questions. The main questions asked of 
the scientists are the following:  
1. Lots of local people thought the nature reserve’s ban on them to go to the mud 
flat to collect clams and crabs. They said if they collected clams and crabs in 
summer the wintering migrate bird would not be affected. Do you think their 
opinion is correct?  
2. Currently, the development in the buffer and experimental zone is very intense, 
with lots of mud flat developed into fish ponds and farm land. What do you 
think about such development? Will they affect bird conservation? Some 
experts think such development will finally affect the core zone, and the nature 
reserve can only slow down the trend but cannot reverse it. Environment 
degradation of the nature reserve is getting worse and the reserve will be 
unable to protect the rare bird species in the end. Do you agree with such a 
point of view? 
3. The latest adjustment of the nature reserve moved some coastal areas outside 
the experimental zone which caused fragmentation of the nature reserve. Will 
such adjustment affect bird conservation? What are the criteria for nature 
reserve adjustment? Is the priority for bird conservation or human needs? 
4. Is it possible to enlarge the nature reserve core zone under the increasing 
pressure of development currently? How can the protection of bird species in 
Yancheng National Nature Reserve be maximized?  
5. Many local people we interviewed in communities throughout the reserve 
thought the nature reserve hindered community development. How can a 
compromise between conservation and development conflict be found? Are 
there any win-win solutions?  
6. According to your experience, do the local communities possess any local 
knowledge that will be helpful for nature reserve management? 
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7. What is the real value of the reed ecosystem in the nature reserve? Does it 
provide important ecosystem services and vital habitat to bird species? 
8. Currently reed has a low economic value for the local community, but we 
found a reed factory which manufactures all kinds of reed handicrafts and 
decoration materials and such production significantly increased the value of 
reed. Is it possible to increase reed and fish co-production to enhance both the 
economic and ecological value for reed? 
 
5.3.2 Question results analysis 
 
5.3.2.1 Q1: Mud flat Resources 
 
Prof Qin, Dr. Li, and Dr. Ou thought collecting mud flat resources in summer would 
affect birds, such as reducing the food resources and scaring the nesting birds in 
summer. Prof Ma thought collecting mud flat resources such as Korean mud snail 
would not affect birds as it is not their food. If the collection is well controlled in the 
summer time it would not have an obvious impact on wintering birds. Dr. Zuo thought 
denying locals’ access to mud flat resources affected their livelihood and it was unfair 
to the locals. It was noted that such actions are common in China and many people 
have sacrificed their benefits for the good of the whole country without any 
compensation.  
 
5.3.2.2 Q2: Development 
 
All researchers agreed development has negative impacts on bird conservation and 
such a trend is difficult to change. Dr. Zuo said all profit making operations in the 
nature reserve are contrary to bird protection, including the aquaculture ponds and 
farmlands. If there are birds inside farmland it is because they used to be natural 
wetlands and the birds are accustomed to feeding in these areas before the 
transformation. According to Dr. Ou, development outside the core zone not only 
reduced habitat and food resources for birds, but also disturbed bird’s activities and 
produced pollution. Both Prof Ma and Dr. Ou thought the nature reserve can not only 
rely on the core zone to protect birds, and environmental degradation for the whole 
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area is unavoidable. However Prof Qin thought there is no need to be pessimistic, 
because many other nature reserves are also facing huge development pressure, such 
as Mai Po Nature Reserve in Hong Kong. As Yancheng National Nature Reserve is 
larger than Mai Po, they can learn from each other in terms of management options.  
 
5.3.2.3 Q3: Fragmentation  
 
All researchers agreed fragmentation of YNNR would affect bird protection. Dr. Zuo 
said such fragmentation would break up the corridor for bird migration and add man 
made obstacles for birds. Prof Qin was of the opinion that such fragmentation of the 
nature reserve is wrong, and that although setting the boundary of the nature reserve 
should depend on birds as well as human needs. Prof Qin made the point that the 
criterions for boundaries are very hard to control, and the experts usually do not have 
final decision making power. As Dr. Ou said such decisions were usually made by 
government agencies, and development and utilization are always their priorities.  
 
5.3.2.4 Q4: Nature Reserve Management 
 
The views about core zone management varied among researchers. Dr. Zuo suggested 
enlarging the core zone by protecting the buffer zone as the core zone and strictly 
controlling industrial development in the surrounding areas of the nature reserve. 
Others thought it was impossible to enlarge the core zone, and that on the contrary it 
is quite hard to stop encroachment of the core zone under the coastal development 
strategy. The only viable way they saw was to strictly manage the existing habitat of 
the core zone and promote an eco-friendly development model in the buffer and 
experimental zones. As Dr. Ou said, the conflict between development and 
conservation will become more prominent in the future, and the key for protection 
depends on the attitudes of the government, especially if they really want to protect 






5.3.2.5 Q5: Conflict 
 
The researchers’ viewpoints concerning conflict between local community 
development and conservation varied. Prof Ma, Dr. Li and Dr. Ou agreed that the 
existence of the nature reserve impeded the development of local communities, so the 
locals have complaints about the nature reserve. However, Dr. Ou believed that since 
the development forces from surrounding areas of the nature reserve have not 
diminished, it shows that the existence of the nature reserve is not totally 
contradictory to development. The real reason for local communities’ resentment is 
they can seldom get any benefit from the development of mud flat resources as most 
of the profit is reaped by rich companies or businessmen. So the locals blame the 
nature reserve as the reason for their economic disadvantages is partial. Dr. Zuo and 
Prof Qin had contrary views, and thought the nature reserve did not affect local 
development, but it is the locals placing too much importance on economic benefits 
that causes conflict between the nature reserve and the local communities. All 
researchers except Dr. Zuo said an eco-friendly development model which will 
engage locals and distribute benefits more equally among each individual such as 
organic farming, organic aquaculture and eco-tourism would be win-win solutions for 
both the nature reserve and local communities.  
  
5.3.2.6 Q6: Local Knowledge 
 
The researchers had different views on whether the locals possess useful local 
knowledge for nature reserve management. Prof Qin and Dr. Zuo agreed the locals 
have relevant local knowledge, relating to topics such as freshwater, sea, flora and 
fauna, and local customs and conditions. Dr. Zuo thought some old, experienced 
hunters would have very detailed knowledge about wildlife resources, including what 
they used to hunt, how many they hunted, why they do not hunt anymore and when 
they stopped hunting, and that such knowledge could indicate when a particular 
species started to decline and the dynamics of species changes. In contrast, the other 
three interviewees thought the locals do not have enough knowledge to help nature 
reserve management. Dr. Ou said as long as locals do not take part in the destruction 




5.3.2.7 Q7: Reed Ecology 
 
As for the role of the reed ecosystem in bird protection, the views of researchers also 
varied. Dr. Zuo and Prof Qin thought reeds provide good shelter for birds to rest and 
feed. However, although Dr. Ou and Prof Ma agreed high and dense reed are helpful 
for birds to hide, many birds, especially large sized birds, cannot access such habitat. 
Only after harvesting can large birds such as Red-crowned Crane enter such places to 
feed. Because of this it is crucial to keep a balance between the preservation and 
harvesting of reed in order to provide optimal habitat for birds. 
 
5.3.2.8 Q8: Reed Economic Value 
 
Dr. Ou and Dr. Li have not studied the economic value of reed, so they did not answer 
this question. Prof Qin and Prof Ma both agreed that reed processing can add to its 
economic value, so it is a viable option to increase local incomes. They also said eco-
tourism together with reed production could enhance the local economy, however 
compared to higher valued aquaculture, such as juvenile crab farming, the economic 




In discussing co-management between the nature reserve and the local community, Dr. 
Zuo was of the opinion that the nature reserve had done very well in community 
affairs in recent years. She stated that they used to be hostile to each other, and gave 
the example that when the locals dug fish ponds and the nature reserve stopped them, 
this caused conflict. Now they are meeting each other every year to talk about 
development and protection issues together, and the relationship is greatly improved. 
Dr. Li mentioned that the nature reserve had proposed organic aquaculture as a win-
win solution for both sides ten years ago, but now they are trying to restore the 
aquaculture ponds to natural wetlands. The point is that mutual benefits are hard to 




5.3.4 Cord grass 
 
Dr. Zuo mentioned Spartina (cord grass) and she disagreed with the common 
perception that it is an invasive species. In her opinion, spartina has important 
ecological functions, such as land forming, as a carbon sink, and as an initial producer 
in the food chain. Cord grass can also provide food and nesting areas for small birds 
such as larks (Alaudidae). In this respect, she believes it is arbitrary to define spartina 




Dr. Zuo also mentioned lack of education as the root cause of environmental 
degradation and conflict between development and conservation. She felt that as there 
is insufficient education for the general population of the area, people do not 
understand the value of conservation and sustainable development. Further, as most 
locals are poorly educated, they usually rely on only one livelihood to earn money. If 
this livelihood disappears, they have no other options. This is why the locals pay so 
much attention to monetary gains and refuse to leave the artificial wetland (or fish 
pond in the local terms) in the core zone, according to Dr. Zuo.  
 
5.3.6 Summary  
 
In summary, all researchers agreed that development and fragmentation will 
negatively affect nature reserve management, but they cannot control the decisions 
about boundary adjustment. Concerning local knowledge and nature reserve 
management, their views varied. Some researchers’ views align with the nature 
reserve staff’s views that the locals lack useful local knowledge for nature reserve 
management, and some hold contrary views. Some suggested that eco-friendly 
development models for surrounding communities may be a solution for YNNR 






Overall, the results reveal that the locals have detailed knowledge concerning their 
livelihoods and the local resources that they rely on, including some ecological and 
political insights that may be useful for YNNR management. However, as most locals 
have limited local knowledge concerning rare birds and their habitats, most of the 
nature reserve staff interviewed ignored or underestimated the value of local 
knowledge for reserve management. Further, there is a common perception among 
nature reserve staff that although local communities are aware of ecological limits 
they are only concerned about making money, therefore outsiders are needed to 
manage resources. As the priority for YNNR is clearly ecological rather than social 
issues, co-management and livelihood changes (which could offer an alternative to 
degrading environmental quality in the buffer zone) appear to be an afterthought. 
 
In general most interviewees agreed the current development model has negative 
impact on environment. However it seems very hard to stop or change the direction of 
such development. The market forces and the growing desires for people to improve 
their living standard accelerate the current rapid development. Some of the 
interviewees felt they are powerless to influence this, and some locals considered that 
this relentless pressure on resources will ultimately lead to ecological crash and 
starvation. Just like the story of Hun Tun (see Chapter III), development may lead to 
the destruction of a self-sustained social system. As some interviewees asserted, only 
the state government has the power to change the orientation of development and shift 








Figure 32: Reed handicrafts in the exhibition room of Tao Yuan Decoration Company, Chen 











Figure 33: Wooden reed weaving machine in the exhibition room of Tao Yuan Decoration 





6 Chapter VI    Discussion 
 
From Chapter V it is clear that there are many challenges for implementing co-
management and incorporating local knowledge in YNNR. This chapter discusses the 
main challenges and opportunities in relation to the broader context and literature as 
discussed in Chapters II and III. This discussion is grouped under the following three 
themes: development vs conservation, co-management, and local knowledge. 
 
6.1 Development vs Conservation 
 
Throughout the world, protected areas are generally established to adequately protect 
all elements of biodiversity (e.g., genes, populations and landscapes) (Adams et al. 
2004). Yancheng National Nature Reserve was originally set aside to protect the Red-
crowned Crane and its habitat. Although it is a necessary process to legitimise 
protection mechanisms on ecological grounds, protected areas often restrict many 
existing land use options of local residents (Wilshusen et al. 2002, Miller et al. 2011). 
In YNNR, the designation has deprived local farmers and fishermen of their previous 
access to mud flat resources as well as forced them to tolerate the presence of a large 
number of migratory birds and other roaming animals which they believe threaten 
their livelihoods. Furthermore, people of Xin Yang Gang Village lost their former 
share of reed flats and mud flats due to evictions resulting from the establishment of 
the YNNR. As Wilshusen (2002) pointed out, for resource-dependent local 
communities, protected areas are not necessarily understood as a means of providing 
ecological and economic services but rather as territorial control strategies. Some 
members of the local communities in Yancheng have not been told that they live near 
a nature reserve and even if they do know, they were not familiar with the strategies 
employed by it. As the results have shown, many people living in and near YNNR 
perceive their private/individual interests as tangible and immediate and the “common” 
interest as unclear and intangible which is in keeping with Wilshusen et al. (2002). 
Residents of YNNR complained about their economic losses and expressed 




Through the designation as a Biosphere Reserve, YNNR was supposed to improve the 
relationships between people and their environment, and increase people’s ability to 
manage environmental resources sustainably into the future (UNESCO 1996). 
However, in reality, it has been challenging to implement the biosphere reserve 
concept. This is particularly true for developing countries such as China, where the 
need for socio-economic development (and sometimes poverty alleviation) is 
prioritised over nature conservation (Coetzer et al. 2014). Under this circumstance, 
nature reserve management objectives frequently conflict with other economic 
development objectives. The results from the research in Yancheng fully demonstrate 
that development and conservation may compromise each other, and there are trade-
offs and hard choices to be made to achieve either goal, and particularly to pursue 
both simultaneously.   
 
6.1.1 Biodiversity protection vs sustainable development  
 
As mentioned in the literature review chapter, emphasizing development alone will 
almost inevitably decrease the diversity of life because of overexploitation (Robinson 
1993, Miller et al. 2011). Meanwhile, strict conservation will slow down economic 
growth and reduce human welfare (Wilshusen et al. 2002, Miller et al. 2011). 
Currently, the model of economic growth and development which first emerged from 
the global north is prevalent throughout the world, and it is hard to reverse or change 
the trend. However, increased economic welfare resulting from such development 
does not necessarily lead to increased life satisfaction and personal happiness 
(Kubiszewski et al. 2013). As a local interviewee described, “even though you have 
lots of money, you have private airplane and limousine, if you can only live 50 years 
old and the earth is destroyed, what you want the money for?”  
 
Since the development model in the western industrial countries is not applicable to 
other developing countries, the conservation models developed and used in western 
nations may also not be directly practicable to the circumstances of developing 
countries. From the YNNR evidence, it is questionable whether successful 
conservation cases in the western world stem from their better management such as 
co-management or public involvement, or whether they are largely due to the smaller 
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population size in a relatively larger territory, so less population and development 
pressure. Equivalent success may be unachievable in developing countries with large 
populations and scarce resources. In these situations there is simply no buffer between 
humans and wildlife, so hard choices have to be made: either sacrifice nature for 
humans or sacrifice human welfare for nature.  
 
All the above points are well illustrated in the case of Yancheng. On the conservation 
side, under the coastal development strategy, more and more areas of the experimental 
zone and buffer zone have been converted to farmland and aquaculture ponds, and 
habitats for wildlife are decreasing continuously. Migratory birds are increasingly 
concentrating in the core zone of the reserve, as the other parts become less suitable 
for feeding and resting for most bird species. Sustainable human use seems impossible 
as more biologically diverse wetland ecosystems are less productive. Only intensive 
agriculture and aquaculture farms can meet the socioeconomic needs of users because 
they are consistent with the high input/high output model of economic development. 
An example is the No.1 reservoir. This is the last paradise for birds and it is under 
constant threat of being converted to aquaculture ponds, since a large, more 
biologically diverse reservoir is less economically productive than smaller intensively 
managed aquaculture ponds. The Reed Company also experienced the same process 
where natural wetlands have been changed to cultivated reed flats, then to reed-fish 
co-production ponds and then to farmland. As the economic gains increased, 
biodiversity decreased.  
 
Trade-offs that have favoured development have meant that wildlife has been lost due 
to shrinking habitat; and small farmers and fishermen have lost out because of 
restrictions to their production activities (even though they are relatively low impact) 
for the purpose of conservation. Only big farms and aquaculture companies have 
gained in this circumstance, because they are politically well aligned, and have access 
to resources in the name of public interests, as well as large capital and human 
resources to carry out intensive farming and aquaculture production to ensure their 
profit. Such trade-offs are like the ancient Chinese saying that “every advantage has a 
disadvantage behind it”. As with the metaphor of Huntun, when he gained the senses 
of sight, hearing, smelling and taste, he lost his original wholesomeness, and 
eventually died. In the case of Yancheng, when locals engaged in subsistence living 
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prior to 1949, they just harvested whatever they needed, such as fish, the mudflat 
resources, reeds and grasses. Later, when the nation changed to a planned economy 
after the 1950s, fishing quotas and catch limits were imposed through policy and 
technological constraints, in order to prevent overexploitation. However, with the 
transformation to a free market economy around the 1990s, limits for catches and 
technologies were removed or loosened, and everyone caught whatever they could, 
and technologies advanced dramatically and spread rapidly. As there is no traditional 
tenure or regulation system for sustainable resource use, the fish stock eventually 
collapsed because of over-fishing, thus causing a typical tragedy of the commons 
(Hardin 1968).  
 
A similar story emerges regarding land resources. Land is a scarce commodity in 
China, especially in Jiangsu Province, so everyone tries to get the most out of, and 
maximize the value of, every piece of land. The case of YNNR shows how, despite 
the reserve status, long term benefits such as conservation value were discarded for 
the sake of short term economic gains. Conservation needs gave way to economic 
development needs such as farming, aquaculture and industrial development after 
economic reforms fully unfolded in Yancheng. Similar to the case of the Mornington 
Peninsula and Western Port Biosphere Reserve in Australia (Mercer and Hyman 
2009), both local and state governments put economic development as a priority and 
the need for productive land use took precedence over conservation, thus causing 
conflicts between developers, local communities and the nature reserve. In YNNR, 
local government fiscal shortages are the main driver of developments such as 
wetland reclamation, industrialization and commercialization of land, and unplanned 
developments are a common occurrence in the coastal area. Once permitted, such 
activities are very hard to stop, and cause serious habitat fragmentation and 
degradation. 
 
In terms of development, the YNNR case also demonstrates several points elaborated 
on in the literature. First, the establishment of YNNR restricted access to mud flat 
resources and forbade locals to hunt or hurt birds when they damaged farmer’s crops 
or ate fish from fish ponds. Such restrictions inflicted economic loss on local 
community members. Second, as economic development in YNNR has lagged behind 
other areas in Jiangsu Province, the quality of life for local people has been hindered. 
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There is a shortage of roads, hospitals, schools and other public facilities considered 
important to improve living conditions. Consequently, locals attribute the lack of 
programs and services to the restrictions imposed by the nature reserve and blame the 
conservation measures taken. This opinion may be biased, since there are other factors 
limiting development, such as fisherman from outside of the area taking fish, and a 
lack of education and government jobs (Xu and Wall 2007, Ma et al. 2009), but is at 
least partially relevant.  
 
One surprising finding was that, contrary to expectations from the literature, there was 
no evidence from the interviews with the local people that they had ecological 
knowledge about Red-crowned Crane or other rare bird species, or any institutions or 
tenure systems prior to the creation of the reserve, so conservation could not have 
disrupted such traditions. In contrast, it is the nature reserve that has educated the 
local people on the value of Red-crowned Crane and other rare wild birds. Although 
many scholars no longer believe the myth of “ecologically noble savage” (Wilshusen 
et al. 2002), such lack of local ecological knowledge is not generally mentioned in the 
literature. Although the locals have other types of local ecological knowledge, it does 
not generally contribute to sustainable resource use and conservation. For example, 
the fishermen know about limits of fish stock and mud flat resources, but they still 
over harvest these resources due to the fear of losing their share and the desire to 
maximize profit. In this regard, the local people in Yancheng appear to reflect the 
view of some conservationists as well as the nature reserve interviewees that resource-
dependent peoples act only to maximize short-term gains instead of preserve long 
term value (Wilshusen et al. 2002).   
 
Although the reserve has the dual goals of conservation and development under the 
biosphere reserve model, it is hard to implement, and the management authority does 
not have the power and ability to reverse the trend of development on the reserve 
lands for economic reasons. Similar to the case of Changbai Mountain Biosphere 
Reserve (Yuan et al. 2008), the YNNR has allowed profit-making enterprises to be 
established inside the core zone and elsewhere, and exploit the resources that the zone 
was meant to protect. Because of this, together with apparent favouritism to external 
developers, they have failed to gain genuine support from local communities for 
conservation. Biodiversity in YNNR is increasingly under threat and there are added 
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conflicts and tensions between development and conservation because of insufficient 
compensation and unequal benefit distribution. All the above problems suggest that it 
is hard to balance the dual goals of conservation and development especially in an 
economically developed and densely populated province in China, where 
development pressure from outside and inside push the management authority away 
from adhering to the goal of conservation.  
 
Since the current development model still emphasises GDP increase, industrial 
development is preferable for its high input and output. However, some chemical 
pollution caused by industrial development is irreversible, and some may take 
hundreds or thousands of years to recover from. If YNNR cannot enforce the 
regulations strictly, environmental degradation will get worse and worse until there is 
nothing left to preserve. As in many cases throughout the world, people only start to 
realize the value of something after it has been lost. Unfortunately, human beings are 
not good at prediction and far sighted decision making, they always prefer current 
benefits and downplay or overlook long-term risks – whether fiscal, environmental or 
social. In order to achieve conservation goals, the higher levels of government must 
change their perception of development, and put more emphasis on environmental and 
ecological issues.  
 
6.1.2 Nature reserve management issues 
 
Besides the above general strategic problems for nature reserve management, there 
are many other issues confronting the management authority. Land tenure is a 
significant issue, since the nature reserve only owns the land in the core zone (and a 
tiny part of the experimental zone), while all the lands in the buffer and experimental 
zones belong to the local government or a collective (local village). As mentioned in 
chapter II, owners of collective land have the legal right to make a profit from the land 
and natural resources, so villagers may conduct profit-making activities against the 
interests of conservation, such as converting natural wetlands to aquaculture ponds or 
farmland. It is illegal for the nature reserve to stop such conversions without giving 
the landowners compensation. However, since the nature reserve has no financial 
resources to pay such compensation, they cannot stop conversions of this kind 
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legitimately and effectively. As a result, environmental degradation and habitat 
fragmentation occurs throughout the buffer and experimental zones.  
 
Another structural problem is the dual management scheme of nature reserves in 
China. As mentioned previously in the context chapter, the dual management scheme 
of YNNR places the reserve under two authorities, one in charge of conservation and 
the other in charge of human resources. According to the nature reserve interviewees, 
if they do not heed the municipal government’s order for local economic development, 
they may lose their job. This problematic management structure affects the regulation 
enforcement in the nature reserve, because if the reserve staff stuck to the law and 
intervened in local development projects in the buffer or experimental zone, their 
careers would be doomed and the city government could have a more obedient person 
to take charge. The fear of this career loss hampered the motivation of reserve staff to 
halt projects that might conflict with conservation objectives, such as mud flat 
reclamation and industrial zone development in the buffer and experimental zones.  
 
One solution a nature reserve interviewee mentioned was to establish a management 
committee which is equal to a level of government in order to manage all the 
surrounding communities as one entity. This is the situation in Changbai Mountain 
Biosphere Reserve (as mentioned in Chapter III) where an independent administrative 
management committee was set up in 2006 to manage not only the reserve area, but 
also its neighbouring villages and towns (Yuan et al. 2008). The ultimate goal of the 
committee is to help bring about ecologically sustainable economic development 
(Yuan et al. 2008). If, in this way, the Changbai Mountain Biosphere Reserve can 
assert more power on land use planning and development projects the experience 
could be adapted by YNNR.  
 
Finally, funding is always a serious problem for nature reserve management. As 
previously mentioned in the context and literature review chapters, although total 
investment for national nature reserves increased to 5.5 US$/ha in 2009, 35% of 
national nature reserves in China still have deficits (Li et al. 2013). To make up this 
shortage, about 80% of the reserves have carried out entrepreneurial activities to 
exploit the resources that the reserve was set up to protect (Yuan et al. 2008). Such 
exploitation has increased the welfare of the nature reserve at a cost to the natural 
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environment. Moreover, while conducting this sort of official resource exploitation, 
nature reserves also enforce state regulations and laws denying local residents access 
to the resources, which has led to local people’s antagonism and intensified people–
park conflicts (Yuan et al. 2008). This is certainly the case in YNNR. An example is 
evident with the aquaculture ponds in the core zone, which is a major cause of dispute 
between locals and the nature reserve, and gives the local community reasons to 
distrust the nature reserve authority in relation to their lack of regulatory enforcement 
and the legitimacy of the conservation regulations as a whole.  
 
Funding is also a problem in other Biosphere Reserves throughout the world. 
Consequently, some Biosphere Reserves have either had low staff numbers (more 
than half of the 214 BRs surveyed by UNESCO have a maximum of 5 staff) 
(UNESCO 2014) or delegated management responsibilities to local communities. By 
contrast, in Changbai Mountain Biosphere Reserve, there are 340 forest guards (which 
contributes to the funding shortage or makes it even worse) who patrol the reserve 
boundary day and night during the harvest season which adds to local farmer’s disdain 
of conservation efforts (Yuan et al. 2008). In YNNR, the nature reserve interviewees 
mentioned there should be at least 150 staff to fulfil the management responsibilities, 
rather than the 62 currently in place. With these staff numbers and operational costs in 
mind, it is no wonder that funding is insufficient. This is similar to a classic Chinese 
story in Mencius (Legge 1960): while King Wen had a park of 70 square li (one li 
equals to half kilometre), people thought it was small, King Xuan had a park of 40 
square li and people thought it was large. The reason was that King Wen shared the 
larger park with all people; grass cutters, fuel gatherers and hunters could all use it, so 
people considered it small; but when King Xuan enclosed the smaller park and 
punished the people for using any resources inside the park, people thought it was too 
large. This story well illustrates the modern dilemma for nature reserve management. 
Should they share the nature reserve with people or keep it free of people? This is the 
reason why co-management was proposed, with the ideal being that if local people get 
involved in managing the nature reserve, conservation can be enlarged to include the 
buffer or experimental zones. If reserve management excludes local participation, it 







6.2.1 Co-management adaptation and conditions 
 
Co-management was introduced into nature reserves in China in the hope of 
improving nature reserve management by involving local communities and enhancing 
participation. Many early co-management project designers throughout the world, as 
well as in China, believed that local changes in social organization and enhanced 
participation would inevitably alleviate poverty and thus take pressure off the 
protected area they targeted to preserve (Robinson and Redford 2004). However, 
many studies have shown that greater participation is neither directly linked to 
poverty alleviation, nor does it necessarily lead to desired conservation outcomes 
(Robinson and Redford 2004).  
 
Co-management developed in western society where participation of the general 
public in both environmental debates and grassroots democracy are well-developed 
(Ruddle and Hickey 2008). In colonized nations this also often involves Indigenous 
communities (Agrawal 1995, Nadasdy 2005, Berkes 2008). However in China neither 
the common populace nor the government is used to participation and democracy. 
China has an over two thousand year history of autocracy and there is a strong 
tradition of central government control where the government is always considered as 
the sole decision maker. The government is used to giving orders and people are 
accustomed to obeying them. Such social and cultural characteristics stall public 
participation and power sharing, and make co-management difficult to implement. In 
chapter III, Armitage et al’s (2009) conditions for successful co-management are 
outlined (Table 4), showing that they are largely not applicable in China. Table 8 
draws from Armitage et al (2009), Plummer and Armitage (2007) and other literature 
reviewed in chapter III, to identify some fundamental requirements for successful co-





Table 8: Conditions for successful co-management compared to YNNR in China (adapted 
from Armitage et al (2009), Plummer and Armitage (2007)) 
Conditions for successful 
co-management 
Conditions of YNNR in China 
Small-scale resource use 
contexts 
Relatively small-scale systems  
Clear and identifiable set of 
social entities with shared 
interests  
Complicated social entities with conflicting interests, 
but some common interests for clean environment 
without heavily polluted industry, common desire to 
share conservation benefits 
Clear property rights  Unclear property rights, especially for collective lands  
Empowering the actors 
involved and equity  
The stakeholders, especially local farmers and 
fishermen are not equally informed, listened to, nor 
respected 
Inclusive and effective 
participation and power 
sharing 
Local government is the sole decision maker, with 
minimal power sharing and participation for local 
communities  
National and regional policy 
support  
No explicit support for collaborative processes and 
multi-stakeholder engagement through state/provincial 
legislation  
Existing local systems or 
autonomous regulations  
Absence of prior self-regulation or tenure systems for 
environmental sustainability 
Training, capacity building  Capacity development focused on scientific research, 
not on social issues 
Leadership or energy centre Few key individuals exist with limited resources 
Share knowledge   Very few knowledge sharing, expert knowledge 
dominated, non-expert knowledge seldom recognized. 
 
From Table 8, it is clear that the YNNR lacks most conditions for successful co-
management so there are great challenges for the success of co-management in 
YNNR. The first challenge is the conflicting interests between the local community 
and the nature reserve. The nature reserve focuses on conservation and the local 
community focuses on subsistence and economic development. Further, there are 
unresolved conflicts, defensiveness and mistrust between the local community and the 
nature reserve. Much of this has to do with insufficient compensation for local 
farmers and fishermen. Since conflicts are inherent in environmental choices, conflict 
resolution may become an important motivation for designing resource institutions 
and may spark learning and change (Dietz et al. 2003). After many years of 
confrontation and distrust, both the local community and the nature reserve are 
starting to find some potential common ground to facilitate co-management, such as 
they both care about the relatively clean environment and are against heavily polluted 
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industrial development. Further, many local interviewees expressed a strong desire to 
share the benefits of conservation and wish the nature reserve can act as the leader for 
united branding which can serve as a driver for co-management. 
 
Another barrier to co-management is power asymmetries. There is a significant power 
imbalance among stakeholders in YNNR. The nature reserve is not used to sharing its 
responsibility with others and it is reluctant to redistribute power and resources, unless 
for the purpose of reducing cost, increasing revenues, or getting rid of burdensome 
responsibilities such as monitoring and patrolling. The local fishermen and farmers 
are the most powerless among the stakeholders, as the nature reserve has more power 
than the community members and the municipal government has more power than the 
nature reserve. The local community in Yancheng was not consulted when the nature 
reserve was established, nor when the mudflats were enclosed. Since the state always 
has the power to give access to common resources when it relates to the public 
interest, the interests of a local community would be considered less than that of the 
nation (Aguilar 2001). As discussed in chapter III concerning power, if co-
management exercises fail to recognise power differentials and structural constraints, 
the outcomes will be skewed in favor of dominant interests (Meadowcroft 1998). In, 
YNNR, the powerless farmers and fishermen miss out on benefit sharing, while the 
powerful political and economic stakeholders, such as the local government, the 
nature reserve and contractors make decisions in favor of their interests. Nevertheless, 
as shown in the interviews, there are examples of passive non-compliance, subtle 
sabotage, evasion and deception (Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2007), and such actions 
enable residents to confront the formal power and survive until now. Because of such 
persistence, the YNNR has started to communicate with local communities (at least to 
the state-run enterprises, such as the salt farm, the Reed Company and the agricultural 
farm) to advise them of their development projects beforehand. Some of the nature 
reserve staff also realized the hardship of the local farmers and fishermen and 
mentioned their responsibility to facilitate local livelihood improvement and mutual 
benefit. Such a shift from confrontation to communication may lead to empowering 
local communities in the long run.  
 
Inequity is also demonstrated in the case of YNNR through inefficient distribution of 
revenue from resource extraction. As a result, it is hard to co-manage as Plummer and 
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Armitage (2007b) have observed. For example, the nature reserve let contracts to 
outside contractors for harvesting of reed and mud flat resources, causing resentment 
and distrust among locals. In China there is no legislation to support individual private 
land ownership and no laws to provide locals with power to sue or plea to the 
government concerning their rights and benefits as in western countries. The locals 
cannot secure their fair share of the resources they used traditionally or customarily, 
and are unable to stop outsiders from reaping the most profits. In YNNR, the case of 
locals reaping all of the Korean mud snail in the core zone as mentioned by some 
interviewees in chapter V is an example of locals abandoning their former sustainable 
resource use for fear that they will lose their access to such resources completely (Xu 
and Melick 2007). Face to face communication between local community and the 
nature reserve can address such issues, if they can find ways through discussion to 
convert the time horizon of harvesters from short term to long term (Ostrom 2007), 
and develop more equal rules and norms for benefit distribution. 
 
Participatory conservation, as a guiding principle of Biosphere Reserves, is not well 
implemented in China and there is almost no community participation in YNNR. 
Although the reserve staff knows the importance of community participation, there is 
insufficient commitment of financial, human, and technical resources for community 
engagement given the scarce staff committed to this in YNNR (only two) and the low 
priority for community affairs management. Further, a lack of social science 
knowledge and capacity of nature reserve staff to work with communities also 
hampers cooperation. The nature reserve staff in YNNR still set strict rules for 
protection of wildlife, since they believe that local people have not protected their 
resources very well in the past and do not value the wildlife there very much. 
However, the nature reserve knows this is a necessity and is of the opinion that it is a 
gradual process. As one nature reserve interviewee said: “just slowly progressing, 
whichever step reached is OK, we have ideas, but it is very difficult to settle a matter 
at one go. So progressing forward slowly (for co-management), when there are 
difficulties, we can try to overcome it, otherwise, just maintain, no action won’t do, 
that’s for sure.”  
 
Another important root cause for no or ineffective co-management in YNNR is that 
there are no specific laws and regulations to encourage or support co-management of 
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nature reserves. Although YNNR was involved in the GEF co-management project 
(1999-2008) which has the requirement to develop and implement plans for co-
management of protected areas and buffer zones by local communities, there are no 
actual plans and no cooperation between the nature reserve and local communities. 
For example, there are no community briefings, no stakeholder committees formed, 
no Community Resource Management Plans or Co-Management Contracts prepared, 
and no grants from GEF to support alternative income generation programs to reduce 
the need for communities to harvest protected flora and fauna. The absence of co-
management practices and mechanisms is not surprising given the absence of any 
legal requirements. This has led to a lack of interest by reserve staff as community 
engagement responsibilities and alternative livelihoods for locals were not their 
primary concern. According to nature reserve interviewees, the major achievement 
relating to co-management in YNNR is improved relationships between the nature 
reserve management and the local community due to GEF and other international aid 
projects. As the development pressure is getting stronger, the nature reserve staff is 
increasingly aware of the importance of community involvement. Although China 
does not have formal legislation to support co-management, representatives of the 
People’s Congress at the local level have the power to make local regulations and 
submit proposals on behalf of people. If this scheme can be effectively implemented, 
people’s concerns can be expressed. With more communication between the nature 
reserve and local communities, the preliminary outcome may lead to more significant 
results such as trust building and mutual respect for co-management in the future.  
 
Last but not least, there are no autonomous regulations or existing local systems that 
could be applied to effectively manage nature resources in Yancheng. Traditionally, 
Han people have been expected to obey top-down government directives, which have 
gone through revolutionary changes over the past century, as noted in the context 
chapter. The current mix of command and control together with a market economy 
seems to have weakened the power of top-down regulation while failing to build or 
support bottom-up environmental management practices. This has led to some serious 
environmental consequences. For example, in the area of fishing, even though there 
are rules such as fishing bans and gear restrictions, they have been largely ignored, as 
market value takes priority over rule-following and certainly over resource 
sustainability. Consequently, maximum resource extraction happened to Yancheng’s 
226 
 
near shore fish stock, the fisheries collapsed and local livelihoods were destroyed. On 
land, the absence of effective legitimization of local interests in relation to land or 
resources, and the inability of residents to exercise local stewardship because of the 
top-down political system, means that there is very little prior experience of self-
regulation or autonomous management systems for environmental sustainability. 
According to the nature reserve interviewees, co-management may be more applicable 
in some places with traditional management rules and tenure, such as minority regions 
in the west and southwest of China, but not in Yancheng. However, the Han 
traditional wisdom of the need for environmental stewardship, still has deep roots in 
people’s mind-set, such as frugality, contentment, hard work and collective action 
which can potentially form the basis for informal institutions for community 
compliance and sustainable resource management in Yancheng.  
 
In summary, although western conceptualized co-management as defined by 
Armitage et al. (2009) does not exist in YNNR, there is the potential to reconstruct the 
concept in a way that has a better fit with the Chinese situation. Open and fair 
distribution of benefits is the key for co-management in China. Based on this principle 
people may cooperate more easily. Other general principles for robust governance 
institutions for localized resources mentioned by Dietz et al. (2003) may also be  
applicable in China. The first of these is analytic deliberation, which involves 
organizing well-structured dialogue involving scientists, resource users, and interested 
publics, together with analysis of key information about environmental and human-
environment systems. Second is nesting where institutional arrangements must be 
complex, redundant, and nested in many layers since simple strategies that eliminate 
redundancies in the name of efficiency often failed. Third is institutional variety 
which states that, “governance should employ mixtures of institutional types (e.g. 
hierarchies, markets, and community self-governance) that employ a variety of 
decision rules to change incentives, increase information, monitor use, and induce 






6.2.2 Conceptual differences and opportunities for co-management 
  
Despite all the barriers mentioned above, the research shows that there are a number 
of factors which could underlie the emergence of a form of co-management more 
suited to the situation in YNNR or China more widely. An indication is that some 
nature reserve interviewees considered that they practiced co-management before the 
concept was introduced into China through foreign aid projects such as the ADB 
project, and that these practices are ongoing. According to the nature reserve staff in 
YNNR, co-management means involving the local community in the development 
and management of the nature reserve. For example, they used to ask local 
community members to help them patrol and monitor the buffer and experimental 
zones. Currently, they try to let the local community participate in the development of 
the nature reserve because they recognize that the reserve impedes the economic 
development of the local communities. This type of participation falls into the 
tokenism end of Arnstein’s (1969) ladder of participation as discussed in Chapter III 
because it involves no more than informing and consultation. That is, it does not 
address power asymmetries or inequities as described in the previous section. The 
nature reserve is willing to co-manage the buffer zone in this way with local 
communities, but they believe that the core zone does not need local participation 
since it is the sole responsibility of the nature reserve. If the core zone was co-
managed it might impact a larger number of staff in the reserve, thus it may be that 
other factors are also at play in decreasing interest in co-management in the reserve. 
 
While western co-management strives for genuine power sharing and full 
participation, the Chinese conception of co-management appears to involve delegation 
of responsibilities without rights or benefits as is evidenced by the interview results. 
Further, because of the fixed government structure and the lack of tradition of public 
participation and grass root organization, there is limited opportunity for western style 
co-management. In contrast, the Chinese way of good governance is the middle way – 
the “Mean”. As Lao Zi said: “the sage avoids excess, extravagance and arrogance” 
(Laozi and Lau 1989:45). Similarly, Confucius said Shun (a great wise king in ancient 
China) studied people’s behaviour in order to find out the two extremes and determine 
the Mean, and employed it in his governance of the people (Legge 1960). The spirit of 
keeping in the middle is aligned with the essence of genuine co-management, which 
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means equal benefit sharing and responsibility between the nature reserve and local 
communities for natural resources management. The current power asymmetry and 
inequity where local fishermen and farmers suffer the most loss is the main barrier for 
co-management. The most feasible way of co-management may depend on finding the 
‘Mean’ between the nature reserve and local communities.  
 
Compensation is a major issue connected to equity in YNNR. Many co-management 
projects provide compensation and grants for alternative livelihoods of local 
communities or for participation in co-management activities (Global Environment 
Facility 1995, Bhouraskar 2008). However, in the case of YNNR, there is very little 
funding from the government or outside donors for such compensation. For example, 
the ADB Jiangsu Yancheng Wetland Protection Project has a total investment of 
48.67 million US dollars (half of it from Chinese counterpart), but only one contractor 
gained compensation for a fish pond involving around 30,000 US dollars for annual 
income and around 20,000 US dollars for employee salaries (Nanjing University 
2011). The bulk of the investment is for construction and equipment purchasing.  
 
In the past it used to be very common for Chinese people to sacrifice their own 
freedom or benefits for the sake of the public interest. For example, the One Child 
Policy where millions of Chinese couples sacrificed their freedom and welfare to have 
just one child with minimal compensation. Only after the economic reform and the 
introduction of western human rights concepts, did Chinese people start asking for 
compensation for all kinds of losses. As western culture is substituting traditional 
Chinese culture and values, self-sacrifice is likely to become less common in China, 
and this may be the driver for local communities to ask for compensation from the 
nature reserve. Since the nature reserve does not have the financial resources for such 
compensation, conflict is inevitable. If the international aid projects can allocate more 
funding for local compensation, and the eco-compensation subsidy from the 
government can go directly to local community members who suffer the loss, people 
will be more willing to cooperate with the nature reserve, as mentioned by local 
interviewees. 
 
Another focal point of co-management is green branding of the nature reserve; 
including organic farming, aquaculture, and ecotourism, which may bring mutual 
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benefits for both the nature reserve and local communities in the future. However, as 
all the local and nature reserve interviewees said, organic production and branding is 
very hard at the beginning, since it needs large investments and more human 
resources and market promotion to ensure the success of the brand. Other nature 
reserves have also tried to use green branding to achieve mutual benefits for both 
sides, such as the Foping Nature Reserve in Qinling. They contracted an outside 
company to promote nature reserve branded honey, and it was hoped that the project 
could solve the problem of sustainable funding (Liang and He 2006). The green rice 
project in Crested Ibis National Nature Reserve (CINNR) in Shaanxi Province also 
used the nature reserve as the brand for their green rice, but sustainable funding is 
crucial for the transition period and long-term involvement (Wang et al. 2012). Other 
cases throughout the world as mentioned in Chapter III have showed green branding 
may increase local income to some extent, but such branding ties the local product to 
the outside market so if the market fails, the locals will suffer income loss as well. 
This reliance on market solutions poses potential threats to local people as well as to 
local resources. If demand exceeds supply, overexploitation will occur and 
biodiversity will be at risk. If demand is insufficient, local people will not earn 
enough money to maintain their sustainable way of production and may return to 
unsustainable harvesting or other environmentally destructive practices. As some 
interviewees mentioned, the development of local markets and enhancing the 
willingness of people to pay for organic products are important factors to promoting 
green branding.  
 
In the case of YNNR, although organic farming is more environmentally friendly than 
conventional farming, they still need fertilizer and pesticides for production, however, 
according to nature reserve interviewees, highly efficient and less poisonous 
pesticides will be used. In addition, the biodiversity on organic farmland is still far 
less than a natural wetland. Even if wetlands become organic farmlands, lots of 
species may have already been lost due to the conversion. Further, farmers may also 
experience loss since the production volume is lower and labor input is higher, 
according to some interviewees. As a result, eco-compensation from outside the 
region (either from government subsidies or private donations) is crucial for the shift 




Ecotourism and community based tourism have similar hopes and problems. When 
the number of tourists is small, the financial benefit is often not large enough to 
positively impact local communities (Fu et al. 2004, Xu and Wall 2007, Yuan et al. 
2008). Even if the branding is quite successful as in the case of Jiuzhaigou Nature 
Reserve, when tourism developed to a certain extent, it negatively impacted the 
environment and degraded the biological diversity it was designed to protect (Li et al. 
2006). In the case of YNNR, as tourism is at an early stage, there are very few tourism 
activities besides bird watching and sightseeing (Xu and Wall 2007). Further, the 
Yancheng wetland lacks scenic diversity and the Red-crowned Cranes are 
concentrated in the core zone of this very large wetland, so it is not easy for tourists to 
see them. Local people also gain few benefits from tourism because their participation 
is limited due to low educational levels, lack of entrepreneurial skills, and lack of 
tourism traditions (Xu and Wall 2007). Additionally, the local government is not 
interested in promoting tourism in the nature reserve since the benefits belong to the 
Jiangsu Provincial Environmental Bureau, not the local government (Xu and Wall 
2007). Consequently, existing facilities are mainly operated by the nature reserve and 
contractors from outside of Yancheng. Although local communities expressed their 
interests in tourism and wanted to get involved in many ways, lack of funding and 
trust of the nature reserve hindered their participation. Furthermore, as the ecotourism 
concept is not well understood in China, and tourism developments put more 
emphasis on economic gains, some nature reserve staff worried that unplanned 
tourism developments will do more harm than good to the environment. 
 
In summary, co-management is not an easy solution for YNNR. Power asymmetries, 
insufficient commitment of resources and lack of common ground hamper 
cooperation. Local communities have not had the historic autonomy or opportunity to 
develop local stewardship practices, unlike many Indigenous communities, so the 
concept of environmental management, let alone co-management, is novel. All of this 
implies that the western concept and practice of co-management does not have a good 
fit with conditions in China at this time. However, as the state government has put 
more emphasis on environmental protection goals than ever before, people are 
increasingly aware of the importance of conservation. Further, there is growing 
awareness of the need for local involvement in reserve management, although lack of 
funding for alternative livelihoods such as organic production and ecotourism make 
231 
 
such initiatives difficult to implement. In the long run, if the following conditions are 
met, co-management of nature reserves in China will be practicable: 
 Find a strong and solid shared interest 
 Clarify property rights to resources and ensure fair and open benefit sharing 
 Strengthen the enforcement of environmental laws 
 Empower local communities for effective participation 
 Commit adequate resources (local and international) for community affairs  
 Create national and regional policies explicitly support collaborative 
management efforts 
 Revive traditional values of environmental sustainability 
 Recognize and respect non-expert knowledge 
 




The literature suggests that the existence and sharing of important LK/IK is often a 
key part of co-management arrangements. However, in YNNR the nature reserve staff 
think the locals have no knowledge or irrelevant knowledge as it pertains to the 
management of the nature reserve and they believe there is nothing for them to learn 
from locals, so the idea of knowledge co-production has no value to them. The 
research results show that although locals have detailed knowledge about their 
livelihoods, living environment and former experiences, most local interviewees have 
very limited knowledge concerning birds and their habitats. Lack of this specific 
knowledge restrains the opportunity for them to contribute to nature reserve 
management. Conventional scientific knowledge is the main source of information 
supporting the management of the reserve. Some nature reserve staff stated that when 
local people do not have sustainable use knowledge of natural resources, it is 
dangerous to give them control over land and resources, since they may exhaust the 
resources very quickly. Consequently, the nature reserve has always insisted that the 
core-zone must be managed by them solely, and cannot be co-managed. Additionally, 
there are nature reserve staff who believed that some local knowledge may be wrong 
or arise out of vested interest, since there are cases where the locals know the limits 
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but still overexploit resources. For example, some locals said harvesting mud flat 
resources would not affect birds, but in fact such activities have impacts. As a result, 
local knowledge has never been consulted nor integrated into nature reserve 
management.  
 
Many of the local people also felt that they do not have relevant knowledge as they 
are not well-educated and some are even illiterate. This is aligned with the Chinese 
traditional stereotype, which prefers intellectual knowledge and puts scholars ahead of 
all other social groups. According to Chinese tradition, only officially held and 
formally educated people’s knowledge is authentic, whereas local knowledge is 
anecdotal and imprecise. As a result, even some very knowledgeable local 
interviewees considered their knowledge insignificant and unaccountable as they 
always thought the nature reserve staff were more knowledgeable and professional, 
and that they know everything the locals know. Such lack of confidence also 
hampered their ability to contribute when they did have relevant and valuable 




The lack of recognition and value of local knowledge from the nature reserve staff 
and local interviewees are erroneous since local knowledge cannot be narrowly 
defined as only related to the rare birds and their habitats. As Ross (2011) stated, such 
lack of recognition and narrow definition are the epistemological barriers to 
Indigenous involvement, and in YNNR, such barriers result in the exclusion of local 
knowledge in YNNR management. Although some of the above perceptions held by 
nature reserve interviewees towards local knowledge are reasonable; any kind of 
knowledge has its own value. In Yancheng, it is evident from the interviews that local 
knowledge mainly concerns traditional use of natural resources, such as fish, reeds 
and salt. Such knowledge may not directly relate to the rare birds and their habitats 
that the nature reserve aims to protect, but it is still valuable for its social and cultural 
context as mentioned by Professor Pei Qin and Dr. Ping Zuo. The traditional 
livelihood knowledge is useful for designing eco-friendly development models and 
alternative livelihoods based on limited natural resources. Further, understanding 
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people’s perceptions towards resources, value judgments towards problems and 
motivations for management actions are very important for nature reserve 
management (Groombridge et al. 2003). In this sense, the nature reserve should 
consult local communities for their opinions and values to facilitate better decision 
making. 
 
Unfortunately, local knowledge and practices in Yancheng are declining as old 
livelihoods are disappearing which are evident through onsite observations and the 
interview results. Because of the near-shore fish stock decline and on-land 
biodiversity loss, there may be a shifting baseline in local memories of species, as 
with the study of local memory of now-extinct species in Yangtze fishing 
communities (Turvey et al. 2010), where lower species diversity becomes the ‘new 
normal’. Many authors reviewed in chapter III considered that the transition to market 
economies, loss of access to traditional resources, and more generally, the forces of 
industrialization and globalization, are the main causes of local knowledge decline 
(Agrawal 1995, Pilgrim et al. 2009, Gomez-Baggethun et al. 2010). In the case of 
Yancheng, as the planned economy changed to a market economy, everyone is now 
seeking to maximize profit and local subsistence knowledge is being lost very fast. 
According to onsite observation and interview results, industrialized large scale 
aquaculture ponds and mechanized farming have replaced subsistence living and are 
now the major forms of local production, and local people are abandoning old 
knowledge and adopting knowledge relevant to this more industrialized approach. The 
focus on development and the associated values of western industrial culture have 
already taken root in Yancheng as the field research results show. For example, many 
interviewees mentioned locals used to be very thrifty, and in the past used willow and 
reed containers and there was no non-biodegradable waste; however, the modern use 
of plastic bags and the culture of one-time usage is creating enormous problems with 
waste and pollution on land and in the sea as well. 
 
Another problem associated with western industrial culture and the market economy 
is that when people harvest for markets, in order to get maximum profit, they are 
incentivized to over-exploit resources (Robinson 1993, Salafsky 2011). As described 
earlier in this chapter, this is a key driver of the fishery collapse in the near-shore 
region, and the development encroachments into the YNNR buffer zone. Before the 
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introduction of the market economy, diverse harvesting strategies (such as LaRochelle 
and Berkes (2003) mentioned in their study about edible wild plant in Mexico), 
prevailed in China, which is completely different from the profit maximization 
approach of the market economy. The development of the aquaculture industry in 
Yancheng is a good example of such a transition according to interview results. 
Originally, local people’s livelihoods involved both near-shore fishing and on-land 
harvesting of reeds and mudflat resources to supplement food sources and bring in 
extra income. Later, in order to increase income, locals changed some of the reed flats 
to fish and reed co-production ponds. At that time, both people and the birds benefited, 
according to local interviewees, as people had income from fish and reed while the 
birds ate small fish and crustaceans in the pond. Following the collapse of near-shore 
fisheries, fishermen now have to work in aquaculture farms converted from mudflats 
or reed flats and depend on farmed creatures for cash income. According to local 
interviewees, in order to maximize profits, fish-reed co-production was altered to 
intensive fish farming in deeper ponds which need high inputs of hormones to achieve 
high levels of output. Such reliance on intensive production of mono species often 
leads to fish diseases and environmental pollution, and the ponds are too deep for 
wading birds. In contrast, the former diverse harvesting strategies depended on wild 
and multiple species with benefits for both people and biodiversity. This resulted in 
less disease, but also less cash income due to reduced productivity (LaRochelle and 
Berkes 2003). Profit maximization may only be temporarily effective, and some local 
interviewees predicted that the aquaculture industry will also collapse in the near 
future.  
 
Compared to the number of local knowledge studies concerning minority nationalities, 
there are few studies of the Han nationality’s local knowledge. There appears to be 
very little recorded evidence of local ecological knowledge in particular. This is a 
serious shortcoming as, from the Yellow Emperor until now, for more than 5000 years, 
the majority of Chinese classical wisdom and traditional knowledge is associated with 
the Han nationality. Nature reserve management could be enhanced if there was a 
systematic focus on recording and archiving traditional and local Han ecological 
knowledge, and this knowledge was utilized and enlivened through co-management. 
However, some studies about minority nationality’s local knowledge are also relevant 
for the case of Yancheng. The study of the Jinuo community forests (Long and Zhou 
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2001), for example, demonstrate the importance of social study and the problems of 
misperception of local knowledge. In Yancheng according to the nature reserve staff, 
the local fishermen were considered poor and their fishing technique as backward, but 
in fact, these may be more sustainable than modern fishing techniques. Although they 
did not realize it, their subsistence living style sustained the near shore resources for 
centuries, and only after the reform and open policy and introduction of market 




The above discussion shows that it is important to preserve local knowledge for its 
contribution to understanding opportunities for sustainable livelihoods as well as its 
value in understanding and conserving local ecologies. The appropriate way to 
preserve the diversity of different knowledge is to facilitate it’s in situ preservation 
(Agrawal 1995), which can be achieved in three ways: by living on the land; by 
continuing to practice traditional livelihoods; and by teaching children the knowledge 
(LaRochelle and Berkes 2003). Since successful transmission of many skills is 
associated with high levels of involvement in subsistence actives, the key to protect 
local knowledge (or IK as Agrawal states) from disappearing is to ensure the survival, 
resilience, and flourishing of local peoples (Agrawal 1995).  
 
Applied to the case of Yancheng, the Tao Yuan Decoration Company has advanced 
local knowledge on reed processing and production, and invented new uses and new 
products according to the field research. If they can succeed in applying for UN’s 
Intangible Cultural Heritage, this local knowledge can be successfully evolved into 
new local knowledge and bring ecological, economic and social benefits to the local 
communities at the same time. Similar opportunities exist in other forms of livelihood. 
As a buffer from the heavily polluted industrial development occurring in most of the 
province, if YNNR can promote an eco-friendly development model and revive some 
of the traditional farming techniques and the production of local specialties (such as 
reed handicrafts and sea food production) it may facilitate local knowledge protection 






Upon reflection, the field research provides the following answers to the previously 
proposed research questions: 
First, the local community in YNNR possess detailed knowledge concerning their 
livelihoods although they have limited local knowledge relating to the reed ecosystem 
and its relationship with bird species. They are unaware that their other local 
knowledge would have any use in the management of the reserve.  
Second, most nature reserve staff considered there is no useful local knowledge held 
by local community members and there is no need to consult about such knowledge in 
the management of the reserve. However, some scientific researchers realize the 
importance of local knowledge and think it is necessary to incorporate such 
knowledge for conservation.   
Third, the current management mechanisms have failed to integrate local knowledge 
despite the Biosphere Reserve guidelines and international aid projects suggesting 
such integration through co-management principles. The main challenges of 
integrating local knowledge stem from epistemological barriers of both nature reserve 
staff and local people, such as lack of recognition and narrow definition of local 
knowledge. Neither group recognizes the value of local knowledge and as a result, 
nature reserve staff are unwilling to consult locals concerning local knowledge and 
residents are not confident in offering their knowledge. However, opportunities still 
exist if the nature reserve staff can change their perceptions and put more emphasis on 
local livelihood improvement through co-management.   
 
More generally, the research found that the current development model in China is 
incompatible with western notions of conservation. Trade-offs and hard choices will 
have to be made if China is to commit to locally informed conservation. Additionally, 
the western concept of co-management does not have an easy fit in Yancheng, and 
possibly across China, because the general lack of democracy and equality tends to 
stall attempts at public participation and power sharing. The collaborative 
conservation approach may be difficult to implement in China with such a different 
context in comparison to western counties, including a long-term tradition of 
autocracy, no real tradition of participation in decision-making, a lack of organization 
at the grassroots level, and an increasing impact of the market economy driving new 
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demands and expectation within its huge population. However, the concept of co-
management with its essence of equity and power sharing is still workable in China if 
open and fair rules of benefit distribution can be effectively enforced. As for the role 
of local knowledge, since I am also confined by the narrow focus on knowledge 
concerning reed and Red-crowned Crane, the limited local ecological knowledge was 
disappointing. Further, this finding seems counter to the view of the literature that rich 
local ecological knowledge exists in culturally and biologically diverse developing 
countries. However, the research found that although the locals have limited 
contemporary knowledge concerning the rare birds and their habitats, they have 
detailed knowledge about fishery, farming, salt production and reed production. This 
local knowledge can potentially contribute to low-impact livelihoods consistent with 
environmental protection. So, active incorporation and preservation of local 
knowledge should be pursued for the sake of its social cultural value as well as its 
potential for an alternative development model.  
 
Theoretically, China offers a very good case for local knowledge studies concerning 
conservation and development, given the fast increasing economic and population 
pressures on conservation. Through discovering the factors affecting co-management 
and local knowledge incorporation in nature reserves in China’s densely populated 
provinces, solutions may be found which are applicable to other developing countries 
as well. This case study made an initial effort to explore the existence and role of local 
knowledge in the management of YNNR. Although the findings are not as expected 
the case study shows the extremes of pressures on biodiversity, and reveals a new area 
worth developing further – the design of co-management systems better suited to the 
Chinese situation. Further comparative studies may contribute more for local 









Figure 34: Da Feng Industrial Development Zone, in Da Feng County, Yancheng, 2014 
 





7 Chapter VII   Conclusion 
 
The aim of the thesis was to examine the existence of local knowledge concerning the 
habitat of the Red-crowned Crane and the incorporation of such knowledge in YNNR 
co-management. The research was guided by three questions:  
 
1. What types of local knowledge does the local community possess in YNNR relating 
to the reed ecosystem which is the habitat of the protected Red-crowned Crane, and 
what are their aspirations for the use of this knowledge in the management of the 
reserve? 
 
2. What are the perceptions and practices of nature reserve management staff and 
scientific researchers towards the use of the local knowledge held by local community 
members in the management of the reserve? 
 
3. To what extent do current management mechanisms integrate local knowledge, and 
what are the challenges of and opportunities for the integration of local knowledge 
into co-management of YNNR? 
 
The research used on-site observation, semi-structured, one-on-one or group 
interviews with local people, nature reserve staff and scientific researchers together 
with document analysis to learn more about the existence and the integration of local 
knowledge in YNNR.  
 
First, it is clear that the local community in YNNR possess detailed knowledge 
concerning their livelihoods, such as fishing and farming, as well as salt, reed and 
aquaculture production. However, they have limited local knowledge relating to the 
reed ecosystem as an important habitat for many rare birds including Red-crowned 
Crane. Since birds and their habitats are irrelevant to local people’s livelihoods, they 
have developed limited knowledge about these species. As knowledge concerning 
birds and their habitats is considered the most relevant information for nature reserve 
management, lack of such knowledge has greatly reduced the opportunities of locals 
to cooperate with the nature reserve staff in conservation. Further, the local 
community members are unaware that their local knowledge relating to their 
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livelihoods could be of any use in the management of the reserve. As a result, even 
some locals who have relevant knowledge such as reed processing and bird habitats in 
the salt farm ponds were not aware of the value of their knowledge for YNNR 
management. This perception from the local community makes local knowledge 
incorporation even harder.  
 
Second, although some scientific researchers appreciate the importance and value of 
local knowledge in reserve management, most nature reserve staff thought local 
community members have no useful knowledge and that there is no need to consult 
them in the management of the reserve. This perception stems from epistemological 
barriers such as a lack of recognition and narrow definition of local knowledge from 
the nature reserve staff. Since YNNR still focuses on rare birds’ protection and uses 
science as the only valid form of knowledge for decision making, local knowledge is 
unrecognized and undervalued by nature reserve staff. Further, as local livelihoods 
and community affairs are not a priority of the nature reserve management, there is no 
obligation for the nature reserve to consult and integrate local knowledge in reserve 
management. Although some local knowledge, as mentioned in Chapter V, is relevant 
and could potentially contribute to the reserve management, with limited financial and 
human resources, the nature reserve staff can hardly engage the community in 
management in any meaningful way. 
 
Third, the current management mechanisms failed to integrate local knowledge 
despite the fact that Biosphere Reserve guidelines and international aid projects 
suggest that such integration should occur in line with co-management principles. The 
current management structure has failed to include local communities in its planning, 
operating and managing decision making processes. There is little trust and respect 
between the local communities and the nature reserve, partly because of insufficient 
compensation and unequal benefit distribution as mentioned in Chapter V. The main 
challenges of integrating local knowledge include perception constraints such as the 
narrow definition of local knowledge and not recognizing its existence and 
importance. There are also structural constraints such as the low priority given to 
incorporating local knowledge and the limited resources to do so. However, there are 
opportunities for knowledge incorporation in YNNR co-management if the nature 
reserve staff can change their perception on local knowledge and put more emphasis 
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on supporting the development of low-impact local livelihoods.   
 
Although it was disappointing to find that there was a lack of local knowledge 
specific to the Red-crowned Crane and its habitat, and that the reserve management 
has little interest in involving local people in co-management, the research showed 
how this situation arises out of the political, economic, social and cultural context of 
YNNR and China. There is little literature that discusses co-management and local 
knowledge under this circumstance, so the research contributes to the literature in the 
following ways: first, it questions the relevance of co-management concept in poorer 
and socialist countries where power is centralised with a background of semi-
feudal/enclave cultural power (such as in southeast and west Asia, Latin America, 
parts of Caribbean, parts of west Africa). Second, it critiques the applicability of 
Biosphere Reserve concept in developing countries with much economic development 
and population pressure. Third, it describes the Chinese context for protected area 
management and discusses the potential of a Chinese style of co-management and 
sustainable development.  
 
The research found that the underlying cause for the lack of cooperation and 
involvement of local communities is the social and political characteristics of China. 
Since China has had long-term autocracy with central government control, there is 
little tradition of grassroots democracy and autonomous regulations. Western concepts, 
such as co-management and participatory conservation, are novel for Chinese culture 
and hard to implement in China due to power imbalances and inequity. This misfit of 
western concept may also be true in other developing countries with similar 
backgrounds to China. It is unadvisable to advocate co-management as a single-policy 
panacea for nature reserve management worldwide. However, the adaptive nature of 
co-management means it can take numerous forms, the institutional arrangement of 
co-operative management can range from highly formalized to loosely defined or 
informal (Mandell 1999, Plummer and FitzGibbon 2004b). We can design evolving 
rules to address the combinations of variables that affect the incentives and actions of 
actors under diverse governance systems (Dietz et al. 2003, Ostrom 2007). The 
general principles mentioned in Chapter VI may guide the reconstruction of co-




First: analytic deliberation. Since many nature reserves have already realized the 
importance of public involvement, it is possible to organize formal or informal 
meetings with all stakeholders to share information and discuss problems. Such 
analytic deliberation can provide improved information and the trust in it which can 
ensure effective use of such information. Further, it can build social capital, and deal 
with conflicts well enough to produce consensus on governance rules (Dietz et al. 
2003).  
 
Second: nesting. As showed in the case study results, neither the centralized command 
and control nor the market strategies governed the nature reserve sustainably. In order 
to avoid catastrophic failures of either market or central governments control over 
resources, redundant and layered institutions must be designed (Dietz et al. 2003). 
 
Third: institutional variety. Because humans devise ways of evading governance rules 
and a set of rules suitable for one set of socioecological conditions can erode as 
developments make significant changes, it is necessary to employ a variety of 
decision rules such as hierarchies, markets and community self-governance (Dietz et 
al. 2003). In China, the sophisticated hierarchies of government structure can offer 
checks and balances for power which may be a potential advantage for developing co-
management institutions. What is lacking are market and community rules to enhance 
power balance and ensure rule compliance. If a multiplicity of rules as mentioned 
above is constructed, it will be more difficult to break than a single type of rule. 
 
The Chinese style co-management will not necessarily be a co-management 
committee with equal representation from all stakeholders, it can take many forms. As 
Chinese classic Chuang Tzu said: there is nothing fixed about either noble behaviour 
or vicious behaviour; everything has different functions, skills and nature (Zhuangzi 
and Palmer 1996). According to Zhuangzi: “the remark of following the right but not 
make wrong shows that you have not been illuminated by Heaven and Earth and by 
the multitudinous differences of all life. This is like being a devout follower of 
Heaven and ignoring Earth, or like being a devout follower of yin and ignoring yang. 
It is quite clear this is not possible” (Zhuangzi and Palmer 1996:141). Some 
interviewees also expressed the above by suggesting that one solution which is good 
for one place may not be suitable for other places; the best way to solve a problem 
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must be based on specific temporal, spatial and human conditions. In this sense, the 
concept of co-management and knowledge integration can be modified to fit in all the 
different cultural and political conditions of China.  
 
Moreover, the YNNR case demonstrated the magnitude of development pressures 
around the reserve as the resulting degradation was beyond my expectation. Although 
YNNR cannot be considered as representative of all nature reserves throughout China, 
it certainly presents problems and challenges that are likely to be impacting many 
nature reserves along China’s east coast and many developing nations in Asia, Africa 
and Latin America where biodiversity and development pressure are co-located. The 
results chapter showed how the impact of the market economy and globalization since 
1980s has exacerbated wealth accumulation and inequity, and consequently traditional 
values and livelihoods are vanishing rapidly. Many traditional values such as thrift 
and moderate consumption, and many old livelihoods which have the potential for 
sustainable use of natural resources, have been abandoned. As Chinese classic 
Confucius said, old knowledge is as valuable as new knowledge, and it must be 
cherished. To preserve such knowledge, China should change the current 
development model to more conservation oriented goals and revive traditional virtues 
which emphasize living in harmony with nature. The traditional Chinese middle way 
of governance has a similar essence with the characteristic of adaptation of co-
management as both emphasis fairness and equity. If YNNR can adhere to the middle 
way between conservation and development, which means no excessive development 
and fair distribution of economic benefits from sustainable natural resources 
extraction, it may become the model of sustainable development in China’s coastal 
area. 
 
In general, this research is the first attempt to provide insights from the angle of local 
knowledge incorporation in co-management of nature reserve in China. This is a 
unique exploration in this area. The research also reviewed a large amount of 
literature written in the Chinese language which is scarcely mentioned in western 
literature. Such literature review complemented the content and expanded the 
viewpoint of international literature in the co-management and local knowledge area. 
The method used for investigating local knowledge of the Han people in densely 
populated coastal provinces in China is also novel as there appears to have been no 
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such studies undertaken previously. The research findings concerning local 
knowledge, nature reserve management structures and conservation vs the 
development dilemma also contributes greatly to the understanding of practices in 
China’s nature reserve management. The case of YNNR is almost like a fable for the 
fate of Chinese coastal nature reserves’ evolution, and will provide lessons for other 
nature reserves in developing countries facing the same condition.   
 
In summary, this study is an initial effort to explore the relationship between 
contemporary local knowledge of Han people and nature reserve management in 
China. The temporal and spatial limitations of the single case as mentioned in Chapter 
IV constrained deeper understanding of how the social and political factors contribute 
to the current situation. Future studies could focus on more comparative studies on 
Han people’s local knowledge in other nature reserves. Not only the relevant 
knowledge, but also its origin, development and transition must be studied. For co-
management, further studies about institutional arrangement in different social 
economic settings should be conducted, especially the failed co-management cases 
and reasons behind them. Research concerning biosphere reserve concept application 
in developing countries should also be carried out to justify the trade-offs between 
solutions. Questions concerning culture and wealth and pro-environmental behaviour 
are also worth investigation, such as the appropriateness of the assumption that more 
money (compensation) will mean greater care of the environment. To conclude, 
although there are many difficulties and challenges in combining conservation and 
development, it is the responsibility of the current generation to solve them. As in the 
following statement from Zhuangzi, courage and fortitude are needed for success in 
dealing with such complex situations in modern times.    
 
 
To know that hardship is part of life, to know that success depends 
upon the times and to confront great disasters with fortitude, this is 
the courage of the sage.  
Chuang Tzu: Season of Autumn Floods 






Figure 36: Red-crowned Crane in the core zone of YNNR, Yancheng, 2014 
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10 APPENDICES  
 
Appendix 1: List of interview questions 
 
I. The main interview questions for local community members: 
1. How long have you been living here, are you locally born? 
2. Do you like the environment here, what do you like the most? Do you want to 
keep it the same way or you want some changes? 
3. What is your occupation? What is your major income source? 
4. Do you go into the reserve to collect any resources? what resources did you 
use in the past, and how did you gather/use them 
5. When and where you harvest them? How?  How do they contribute to your 
daily life (e.g. sell them, eat them, use them)  
6. Have you noticed any changes in the health or abundance of plants/animals?  
Why do you think this is happening?   
7. What has changed since the nature reserve establishment? What do you think 
about the nature reserve? 
8. Do you use the reeds, or did you use them in the past? How do/did you use 
them? Has that changed over time? 
9. What time and where do you harvest reed from?  
10. What other plants or animals live in the reed or are dependent on it? How are 
they affected by the harvesting? 
11. Have you seen red crown cranes in the reserve? How many did you see? 
12. What changes of red crown-crane habitat occurred according to your 
experience?  
13. Are there things that you know about the plants and animals that you think the 
reserve managers don’t know?   
14. Could your knowledge help manage the reserve in a better way? How?    
15. Any policies from the nature reserve management affect your harvesting 
activities? Will you obey the policies? 
16. Does the nature reserve affect your everyday life in any other way? If the 
nature reserve affects your life what kind of compensation you want from the 
nature reserve? 
17. Would you like to be more involved in the management of the nature reserve?  
What do you think you could offer? How do you think it could be different? 
18. Do you know anyone else who uses the resources in the reserve, or would 
know about them? Can you give me the names? 
 
II. The main interview questions for the nature reserve staff: 
1. What are the most important plants and animals for you in the nature reserve?  
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2. Did/do you contact the local community during management? For what 
purposes? 
3. What role does the local community currently play in the management of 
nature reserve? 
4. What more could the local community contribute to the management of nature 
reserve? 
5. According to your opinion what is local knowledge? What knowledge will be 
useful in nature reserve management?  
6. Do you think the local community members possess local knowledge relating 
to reed or red crown crane habitat ecosystems? 
7. Who possess such knowledge? What could be the use of such knowledge in 
the reserve management? 
8. How could you incorporate such knowledge in the reserve management and 
what are the challenges? 
9. Did your conduct any project contain co-management content? 
10. How do you define co-management?  
11. How do you evaluate the co-management project? What are the challenges and 
problems for such projects?  
 
III. The main questions for the scientific researchers:  
1. Lots of local people thought the nature reserve’s ban on them to go to the mud 
flat to collect clams and crabs. They said if they collected clams and crabs in 
summer the wintering migrate bird would not be affected. Do you think their 
opinion is correct?  
2. Currently, the development in the buffer and experimental zone is very intense, 
with lots of mud flat developed into fish ponds and farm land. What do you 
think about such development? Will they affect bird conservation? Some 
experts think such development will finally affect the core zone, and the nature 
reserve can only slow down the trend but cannot reverse it. Environment 
degradation of the nature reserve is getting worse and the reserve will be 
unable to protect the rare bird species in the end. Do you agree with such a 
point of view? 
3. The latest adjustment of the nature reserve moved some coastal areas outside 
the experimental zone which caused fragmentation of the nature reserve. Will 
such adjustment affect bird conservation? What are the criteria for nature 
reserve adjustment? Is the priority for bird conservation or human needs? 
4. Is it possible to enlarge the nature reserve core zone under the increasing 
pressure of development currently? How can the protection of bird species in 
Yancheng National Nature Reserve be maximized?  
5. Many local people we interviewed in communities throughout the reserve 
thought the nature reserve hindered community development. How can a 
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compromise between conservation and development conflict be found? Are 
there any win-win solutions?  
6. According to your experience, do the local communities possess any local 
knowledge that will be helpful for nature reserve management? 
7. What is the real value of the reed ecosystem in the nature reserve? Does it 
provide important ecosystem services and vital habitat to bird species? 
8. Currently reed has a low economic value for the local community, but we 
found a reed factory which manufactures all kinds of reed handicrafts and 
decoration materials and such production significantly increased the value of 
reed. Is it possible to increase reed and fish co-production to enhance both the 





Appendix 2: Information sheet for participants 
 
 
The role of local knowledge in nature reserve management in 
Yancheng National Nature Reserve, China 
 
INFORMATION  SHEET  FOR  PARTICIPANTS 
 
 
Thank you for showing an interest in this project.  Please read this information sheet 
carefully before deciding whether or not to participate.  If you decide to participate 
we thank you.  If you decide not to take part there will be no disadvantage to you and 
we thank you for considering our request.   
 
What is the Aim of the Project? 
 
The aim of this research is to explore community knowledge relating to reed 
ecosystems in Yancheng National Nature Reserve (YNNR) and the use of this 
knowledge in the management of the reserve. We hope to discover the challenges 
and opportunities for the integration of community knowledge into the 
management of YNNR. 
 
What Type of Participants are being sought? 
 
The research seeks to work with two groups of people: (1) knowledgeable local 
community members (15-30) to find out about their interactions with reed 
ecosystems, and (2) nature reserve staff (who manage community affairs) and NGO 
staff and scientists (5-10) who are involved in YNNR or research projects.   
 
What will Participants be Asked to Do? 
 
Local community members are being asked to participate in an interview exploring 
their interactions with reed ecosystems. The interviews will take between 1 to 2 
hours. Interviewees will be compensated for their time with a small gift. Participants 
may also be asked to show the site for reed harvesting, how to harvest the plant and 
any changes that has occurred according to his/her experience.  
 
Nature reserve staff, scientists and NGOs are being asked to participate in an 
interview exploring their perspectives on community interaction with YNNR, and the 
knowledge communities hold that might be useful in reserve management. The 
interviews will take between 1 to 2 hours. Participants may also be asked to attend 
focus group discussion (1-2 hours) exploring the themes identified from the 
interviews with all participants. 
 
If there are co-management meeting scheduled during the field research period, the 
researcher will seek approval to attend such meeting as an observer, and, with 
permission, to record the discussion and take photos. If organisers prefer the 
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meeting not to be recorded, the researcher will take detailed notes and the notes 
will be part of the research data.  
 
The interviews conducted will follow an open question approach where the exact 
nature of the questions which will be asked have not been pre-determined but will 
depend on the way the interview develops and on the particular expertise, 
experience and wishes of the participant. Consequently, although the University of 
Otago Human Ethics Committee is aware of the general areas to be explored in the 
interview, the Committee has not been able to review the precise questions to be 
used. There will be no risk or discomfort involved. In the event that the line of 
questioning in either interviews or focus groups develops in such a way that you feel 
hesitant or uncomfortable, you are reminded of your right to decline to answer any 
particular question(s) and that you may also withdraw from the project at any stage 
without any disadvantage to yourself of any kind. 
 
What Data or Information will be collected and What Use will be Made of it? 
The interview and focus group will be recorded, unless you indicate that you do not 
wish to be recorded on the consent form. During the interview the interviewer will 
also take notes. At this time you’ll also be asked if you want to have your personal 
details (name, village affiliation, length of residence, occupation and age) revealed in 
publications. Please be aware that we will make every attempt to preserve your 
anonymity unless you specify otherwise. However, with your consent, there are 
some cases where it would be preferable to attribute contributions made to 
individual participants. It is absolutely up to you which of these options you prefer. 
Key findings from community interviews and field observations will be discussed 
with people directly involved in the management of YNNR. Individuals’ comments 
will not be identifiable during this discussion.  
 
This research is being conducted as part of a PhD study. The data collected will be 
securely stored at the host University research centre and only the supervisors and 
the PhD student will be able to gain access to it. Data obtained as a result of the 
research will be retained for at least 5 years in secure storage. Any personal 
information held may be destroyed at the completion of the research.  
 
You are most welcome to request a copy of the results of the project should you 
wish.  
 
Can Participants Change their Mind and Withdraw from the Project? 
 
You may withdraw from participation in the project at any time and without any 
disadvantage to yourself of any kind. 
 
What if Participants have any Questions? 
If you have any questions about our project, either now or in the future, please feel 
free to contact either: 
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Yuan Lu (PhD student) 
CSAFE (Centre for Sustainability)  
University of Otago 
Luyu6923@student.otago.ac.nz 
03 479 9243 
 
Janet Stephenson (Supervisor) 
CSAFE (Centre for Sustainability) 
University of Otago 
janet.stephenson@otago.ac.nz 
03 479 8779 
 
Jacinta Ruru (Supervisor)  
Faculty of Law  
University of Otago  
Jacinta.ruru@otago.ac.nz 
Telephone number: +64 3479 8833;  
 
Chris Jacobson (Supervisor) 
CRN Research Fellow of the Sustainability Research Centre  




This study has been approved by the University of Otago Human Ethics Committee. 
If you have any concerns about the ethical conduct of the research you may contact 
the Committee through the Human Ethics Committee Administrator (ph 03 479 
8256). Any issues you raise will be treated in confidence and investigated and you 
will be informed of the outcome. 





Appendix 3: Consent Form for Participants 
 
The role of local knowledge in nature reserve management in 
Yancheng National Nature Reserve, China 
 
CONSENT  FORM  FOR  PARTICIPANTS (Local community members) 
 
I have read the Information Sheet concerning this project and understand what it is 
about.  All my questions have been answered to my satisfaction.  I understand that I 
am free to request further information at any stage. 
I know that: 
1. My participation in the project is entirely voluntary; 
 
2. I am free to withdraw from the project at any time without any disadvantage; 
 
3. Personal identifying information held on audio recordings will be destroyed at the 
conclusion of the project but any raw data on which the results of the project 
depend (for example transcripts of interviews, photos and field notes) will be 
retained in secure storage for at least five years; 
 
4.  This project involves an open-questioning technique. The general line of 
questioning includes types of local knowledge and perception towards it.  The 
precise nature of the questions which will be asked have not been determined in 
advance, but will depend on the way in which the interview develops and that in 
the event that the line of questioning develops in such a way that I feel hesitant or 
uncomfortable I may decline to answer any particular question(s) and/or may 
withdraw from the project without any disadvantage of any kind; 
 
5. The researcher does not foresee any discomfort or risks to me in participating in 
this research; 
 
6. There will be no commercial use of this data. I will be compensated for my time 
by receiving a small gift; 
 
7. The results of the project may be published and will be available in the University 
of Otago Library (Dunedin, New Zealand) but every attempt will be made to 
preserve my anonymity should I choose to remain anonymous.   
 
(signature & date) 
I agree to be interviewed   
 
 
I agree to the interview being recorded 
 
 











8. I, as the participant: EITHER  a) agree to being named in the research, 
 
 
      OR  b) would rather remain anonymous 
 
This study has been approved by the University of Otago Human Ethics Committee. 
If you have any concerns about the ethical conduct of the research you may contact 
the Committee through the Human Ethics Committee Administrator (ph 03 479 
8256). Any issues you raise will be treated in confidence and investigated and you 
will be informed of the outcome. 
[Note: The above statement should not be included if the project has been considered and approved 










The role of local knowledge in nature reserve management in 
Yancheng National Nature Reserve, China 
 
CONSENT  FORM  FOR  PARTICIPANTS (Nature reserve staff, and scientists) 
 
I have read the Information Sheet concerning this project and understand what it is 
about.  All my questions have been answered to my satisfaction.  I understand that I 
am free to request further information at any stage. 
I know that: 
1. My participation in the project is entirely voluntary; 
 
2. I am free to withdraw from the project at any time without any disadvantage; 
 
3. Personal identifying information held on audio recordings will be destroyed at the 
conclusion of the project but any raw data on which the results of the project 
depend (for example transcripts of interviews, photos and field notes) will be 
retained in secure storage for at least five years; 
 
4.  This project involves an open-questioning technique. The general line of 
questioning includes types of local knowledge and perception towards it.  The 
precise nature of the questions which will be asked have not been determined in 
advance, but will depend on the way in which the interview develops and that in 
the event that the line of questioning develops in such a way that I feel hesitant or 
uncomfortable I may decline to answer any particular question(s) and/or may 
withdraw from the project without any disadvantage of any kind; 
 
5. The researcher does not foresee any discomfort or risks to me in participating in 
this research; 
 
6. There will be no commercial use of this data.  
 
7. The results of the project may be published and will be available in the University 
of Otago Library (Dunedin, New Zealand) but every attempt will be made to 
preserve my anonymity should I choose to remain anonymous.   
 
(signature & date) 
I agree to be interviewed   
 
 
I agree to the interview being recorded 
 
 
I agree to attend a focus group 
 
 







8. I, as the participant: a) agree to being named in the research,   OR;
  
           
     b) would rather remain anonymous 
  
   
     
 
 
I agree to take part in this project. 
 
 
...................................................................................(Signature of participant) 
       (Date) 
 
This study has been approved by the University of Otago Human Ethics Committee. 
If you have any concerns about the ethical conduct of the research you may contact 
the Committee through the Human Ethics Committee Administrator (ph 03 479 
8256). Any issues you raise will be treated in confidence and investigated and you 
will be informed of the outcome. 
[Note: The above statement should not be included if the project has been considered and approved 









Appendix 4: Interview Summery 
 
 








1.  Participant 1  aquaculture 22/12/13 50  05/01/14 68   
2.  Participant 2  aquaculture 22/12/13 28     
3.  Participant 3  farmer 23/12/13 32    Group interviewed 
with 3 other locals  
4.  N1 Nature reserve staff 23/12/13 80 21/01/14 40  
5.  Participant 4 fisherman 24/12/13 65 09/01/14 73 Second interview 
together with 
Participant 24 
6.  N2 Nature reserve staff 24/12/13 45   Talking informally 
several times later 
7.  Participant 5 manager 25/12/13 38    
8.  Participant 6  worker 25/12/13 48   Group interviewed 
with Participant 7, 8, 
9 
9.  Participant 7 worker 25/12/13 48 25/12/13 23 First Group 
interviewed with 
Participant 6, 8,9 
10.  Participant 8  worker 25/12/13 48   Group interviewed 
with Participant 6,7,9 
11.  Participant 9 worker 25/12/13 48   Group interviewed 
with Participant 6,7,8 
12.  Participant 10 manager 26/12/13 101    
13.  Participant 11  worker 26/12/13 28 07/01/14 39 First group 
interviewed with 
other three workers 
then individually 
14.  Participant12 manager 26/12/13 75    
15.  Participant13  worker 26/12/13 19    
16.  Participant 14 manager 27/12/13 74    
17.  Participant 15 worker 28/12/13 73   Group interviewed 
with other workers  
18.  Participant 16 farmer 30/12/13 43    
19.  Participant 17 farmer 30/12/13 39    
20.  N3 Nature reserve staff 30/12/13 10 13/01/14 55  
21.  Participant 18 Fisherman 04/01/14 76    
22.  Participant 19 manager 05/01/14 76   Group interviewed 
with Participant 20 
23.  Participant 20 manager 05/01/14 76   Group interviewed 
with Participant 19 
24.  Participant 21 Fisherman 06/01/14 49    
25.  Participant 22 business man 07/01/14 20    
26.  Participant 23 worker 07/01/14 44    
27.  Participant 24 fisherman 09/01/14 73   Group interviewed 
with Participant 4 
28.  N4 Nature reserve staff 09/01/14 50    
29.  Participant 25 manager 10/01/14 60    
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30.  N5  Nature reserve staff 11/01/14 27    
31.  Zuo Pin Nan Jing University 
researcher 
11/01/14 60    
32.  Participant 26 Fisherman 16/01/14 62   Group interviewed 
with Participant 27 
33.  Participant 27 Fisherman 16/01/14 62   Group interviewed 
with Participant 26 
34.  N6 Nature reserve staff 17/01/14 41    
35.  Participant 28 manager 19/01/14 44    
36.  Participant 29 manager 19/01/14 48    
37.  Participant 30 manager 20/01/14 29    
38.  N7 Nature reserve staff 21/01/14 67    
39.  N8  Nature reserve staff 21/01/14 36    
40.  Ma Zhi Jun Fudan University 27/01/14    Email response of 
research questions 
41.  Li Yang Fan Xia Men University  
researcher 
10/02/14 39   Through internet 
audio conversation 
42.  Ou Wei Xin Nanjing Agricultural 
University, researcher 
17/02/14    Email response of 
research questions 
43.  Qin Pei Nanjing University 
researcher 
18/02/14    Email response of 
research questions 
Notes: the numbers are the pseudonyms for interviewees to remain anonymous. 
 
 
